
Criminalized Legacies of War

The Clandestine Political Economy of the Western Balkans

Peter Andreas, Guest Editor

THIS ISSUE of *Problems of Post-Communism* focuses on the understudied intersection of political economy, conflict, and crime. From a range of scholarly and practitioner perspectives, the contributors examine the clandestine political economy of the western Balkans.¹ Its significance is underscored by troubling recent trends and events. These include the emergence of the region as a smuggling hub for the movement of illegal drugs, untaxed consumer goods, unauthorized migrants,² and arms; direct links between organized crime and the assassination of Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjić in March 2003; and widespread allegations of a close business relationship between the Montenegrin government and Italian organized crime groups that has helped make cigarette smuggling Montenegro's leading economic activity.³

To varying degrees, smuggling, political corruption, and organized crime have been part of the turbulent transition experience of many post-communist states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. But few cases rival the western Balkans in terms of the intensity and expansiveness of these problems. Part of this situation is explained by the fact that much of the region has been devastated by the violent conflicts associated with the breakup of Yugoslavia. But the problem is deeper and more complex than simply recovering from the physical damage of war. Smuggling networks and crimi-

nal actors played a critical role in sustaining the material basis for the military conflicts in the region.⁴ They diverted international humanitarian aid to the black market, engaged in clandestine trading across the front lines, and smuggled and sold looted goods. The international economic sanctions and arms embargo contributed to the criminalization of the conflict by creating an economic opportunity structure for clandestine trade and making the competing sides more dependent on cross-border smuggling channels. Under these conditions, military success often depended on entrepreneurial success in the underworld of clandestine commerce. Of course, as Aida Hozić notes, the clandestine trade routes across the Balkan peninsula have deep historical roots. They have been developing side by side with the legitimate trade routes since the Ottoman Empire. Existing clandestine trade routes provided the initial infrastructure for the smuggling networks that mushroomed during and after the armed conflicts of the 1990s.

The region's clandestine war economies left criminalized legacies for the post-war reconstruction period. This introductory overview emphasizes the importance of these legacies and highlights some of their core elements. How the region copes with these legacies will significantly determine the prospects for durable peace and stability. Criminalized war problems have turned into politicized crime problems, with crime-fighting concerns now overshadowing war-fighting concerns.

PETER ANDREAS is an assistant professor of political science and international studies at Brown University.

The Emergence of a Nouveau Riche Criminalized Elite

As Michael Pugh emphasizes, most of the participants in the shadow economy do so as part of an everyday-survival strategy.⁵ Clandestine economic activity has become a critical source of revenue and employment in the region, providing an economic cushion for many in the face of bleak employment prospects in the formal economy. But for the privileged few with the necessary political connections, the clandestine economy has been the basis of initial wealth accumulation and provided an alternative ladder for upward social mobility. Indeed, black market entrepreneurs are among the chief beneficiaries of the region's recent conflicts, having emerged from them as a nouveau riche criminalized elite, and continuing to utilize political

The economic sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro and the arms embargo imposed on the entire region in the early 1990s unintentionally (but predictably) fueled the emergence of a sanctions-busting infrastructure that has outlasted the war and the sanctions, and has been adapted for other smuggling activities, ranging from sex trafficking to cigarette smuggling.

connections and smuggling channels built up during wartime. Thus, the wars not only involved military confrontation but also a radical social transformation. As part of this transformation, many who lived on the margins of society experienced a rapid rise in status that would have been inconceivable in peacetime. War, in short, has been a highly effective mechanism for criminalized social advancement.⁶

Of course, corruption and crime have been part of the formation of new elites in the post-communist transition process throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but in the western Balkans the criminalization of the transition was significantly reinforced and accelerated under conditions of sanctions-busting and war profiteering. This is usefully illustrated by a brief look at the career of Momčilo Mandić (profiled by Christopher Corpora). Mandić, a Bosnian Serb, was reportedly a sanctions-busting war profiteer who emerged from the war as one of the wealthiest individuals in the region. His

black-market business skills were most apparent in supplying arms, oil, and other goods during the Bosnia conflict.⁷ Mandić's initial wealth was allegedly created by stealing 150,000 deutsche marks from the treasury of the Ministry of the Interior in Sarajevo shortly before the war started. His holdings were evidently expanded by the wartime robbery of warehouses and manipulation of humanitarian aid, and his enrichment culminated with his dominant role in oil smuggling, banking, and fraudulent loan schemes in Republika Srpska.⁸ Mandić reportedly also stole and sold thousands of blank Bosnian identity papers, such as driver licenses and passports. (Bosnian identity papers were valuable commodities during the war because they provided refugee benefits to their holders and often led to a refugee or immigration visa.) Mandić's political posts, as a deputy minister of the interior and then as justice minister in the wartime Bosnian Serb leadership, facilitated his accumulation of wealth. He has allegedly been an important funding source for the Bosnian Serb war criminal Radovan Karadžić.⁹

In Serbia, the most successful entrepreneurs to emerge from the 1990s were those with close ties to the regime who were given informal monopolies, including in the black market business of sanctions evasion during the war years. Individuals who made fortunes in the shadow economy during the Milošević era have successfully used their financial position to shield their ill-gotten gains. This has been aided by the fact that the competitiveness of the new political parties depends on securing financing and there are few alternatives to turn to for funding. "I think it is more expensive to deal with opposition politicians than with the Socialists," complained a gangster turned businessman in August 1999. "The new parties are very hungry for bribes."¹⁰ The businessman, who was well connected to the Milošević government, owned an auto dealership and also imported jeans, sportswear, and gasoline. He reportedly got his start-up capital working in Belgrade's criminal underworld in the early 1990s and is now part of the city's new elite. Serbian public opinion surveys suggest that there is broad societal tolerance and acceptance of illegal practices such as bribery and smuggling. In one survey, more than 50 percent of the respondents indicated that smuggling was (always or under certain conditions) a morally acceptable activity. Seventy-four percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, "Only criminals and thieves are getting on well in this society," and some 70 percent agreed that "People in Serbia respect the law only when it suits them."¹¹

The emergence of a new criminalized elite is also evident in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Leading actors in the covert acquisition and distribution of supplies during the war have emerged as a new elite with close ties to the government and nationalist political parties. In January 2000, the U.S. special representative to Bosnia told the Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee of the Council of Europe, “War-time underground networks have turned into [political] criminal networks involved in massive smuggling, tax evasion, and trafficking in women and stolen cars.”¹² In the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, for example, the city’s social structure has undergone a metamorphosis as a consequence of the military siege and its aftermath. While many of the best-educated professionals fled abroad, many residents who were previously on the margins of society have experienced rapid upward mobility through their wartime roles and political connections. The daily Sarajevo newspaper *Oslobodjenje* lamented during the siege, “Before our eyes, the new class is being born in this war, the class of those who got rich overnight, all former ‘marginals’.”¹³ Zdravko Grebo, a law professor at the University of Sarajevo, points out that while new elite formation during transitions elsewhere has taken years and even decades, in Bosnia it has happened overnight, with small fortunes made during the war by simply smuggling in a shipment of cigarettes or oil.¹⁴ Another legacy of the war is the criminalization of the city itself, as power shifted during wartime to those most connected in the world of clandestine transactions.¹⁵ Political corruption—based on relationships of loyalty and trust among nationalist politicians, the security establishment, and criminals that were cemented during the war—has eroded public trust in governmental institutions and undermined efforts at political reform.¹⁶

Moreover, local war profiteers on all sides of the Bosnian conflict, including many politicians and military commanders, are now conveniently protected from prosecution by an amnesty law that has essentially legalized their questionable sources of wealth. When the international community pushed for an amnesty for draft dodgers and deserters, local politicians expanded it to include such crimes as illegal commerce, tax evasion, and illegal use of humanitarian aid. The amnesty covers January 1991–December 22, 1995, a time period that closely corresponds to the rise of nationalist political parties. Some of the politicians who pushed the amnesty had investigations and indictments pending against them.¹⁷ War entrepreneurs have also been well positioned to take advantage of the privatization

process promoted by international financial institutions as a condition for continued foreign aid. Some people who profited the most from the wars have successfully “cleaned” their wealth, presenting themselves as legitimate new elites. For example, the Bosnian wartime deputy minister of defense, Hasan Čengić, lived a modest pre-war life as an Islamic clergyman, but he is now part of a family-run regional economic empire. For high-level logisticians such as Čengić, the covert nature of importing arms and soliciting clandestine external financial support from Islamic countries (with no accountability or record keeping) apparently provided a convenient cover for corruption and personal enrichment.¹⁸

The Clandestine Economy as an Arena of Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation

As Amra Festić and Adrian Rausche argue, the region’s clandestine economies in some respects facilitate a continuation of conflict by other (i.e., criminal) means. In this view, organized criminal enterprises can be harnessed to fund ethnic-nationalist political ends. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the clandestine economy has involved (indeed depends on) substantial cross-ethnic collusion. The popular tendency to analyze the former Yugoslav republics through the lens of ethnic animosity obscures and cannot account for such high levels of interethnic economic cooperation in the form of clandestine trading. Indeed, dense interethnic social ties in pre-war Yugoslavia facilitated black marketeering across ethnically divided front lines in wartime, and in the post-war era the ability to transcend ethnic divides is arguably most advanced in the underground economy.

Perhaps the most visible evidence that economic crime crosses ethnic boundaries is Bosnia’s Arizona Market, probably the largest open-air black-market bazaar in Europe. Located in an area that once was a NATO-enforced “zone of separation” and checkpoint between Serb, Muslim, and Croat forces, the market has mushroomed into a complex of about 2,000 plywood and steel shacks spread out over some 35 acres, with about 20,000 people reportedly owing their livelihoods to the Arizona Market (named for NATO’s designation of an adjacent highway).¹⁹ A sign at the entry reads “Our thanks to the U.S. Army for supporting the development of this market.”²⁰ The Pentagon provided \$40,000 of the start-up costs. International officials initially encouraged the market as a way to generate local entrepreneurship and cross-

ethnic interaction. It worked stunningly well, but not quite as they had envisioned.

The bustling market soon turned into a smuggling center, with untaxed cigarettes and alcohol, illegal drugs, stolen cars, and guns readily available. It became an embarrassing symbol of the government's failure to control the hundreds of border crossings into Bosnia. By 1999, as many as 25,000 shoppers were visiting the market every weekend, and the state was losing an estimated \$30 million in tax revenue every year.²¹ The market also became a major destination for illegal migrants, prostitutes, and drugs brought from Asia and the former Soviet bloc en route to Western Europe.²² In 1999, Jacques Klein, then the head of the UN mission to Bosnia, charged that the market was run by hard-liners promoting ethnic division, and he pushed (unsuccessfully) to have the site closed down.²³ In 2000, in an effort to make the best of a bad situation, the Office of the High Representative launched an initiative to better regulate the market. The effort has, at best, been only partly effective, and a number of other, less expansive contraband markets have sprung up across the region.

Trying to put a positive spin on the situation, some observers depict the Arizona Market as a successful example of interethnic cooperation, pointing to the fact that Serbs, Croats, and Muslims now mingle peacefully through commercial exchange on what once was violently contested terrain. The market spans both entities that comprise the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina—one area of the market is in the Muslim-Croat Federation, and the other is in the Republika Srpska. Individual fortunes have been made through cross-ethnic collaboration in keeping the Arizona Market supplied. For example, Bosnian Muslim Sadinet ("Sido") Karić, known as the Arizona Market's "smuggling king," allegedly specializes in the illegal importation of textiles from Turkey and Hungary. Transcending ethnic divisions, his business dealings have reportedly been made possible by political connections in Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. In late 2003, Karić and some of his associates were arrested on smuggling and money-laundering charges as part of a broader law enforcement operation in Bosnia.²⁴ But even as the contraband trade at the Arizona Market is based on cross-ethnic cooperation, revenue generated by the market is also used to fund ethnic nationalist causes (see Festić and Rausche). Thus, while international officials optimistically cling to the liberal economic argument that peace can be promoted through trade, the jury is still out on whether peace can also be sustained through illegal trade.

Politicized Crime and Criminalized Politics

A common thread weaving through many of the articles in this issue is that the clandestine political economy of the western Balkans makes nonsense of sharp distinctions between political and economic motivations. Focusing on crime and clandestine economies should not mean taking politics out and simply reducing all motives to personal material gain. Attempting to determine whether "greed" or "grievance" explains behavior, as evident in some recent economic approaches to conflict, represents a false, misleading, and overstated dichotomy. Political and economic motives often blur in practice, making it difficult to distinguish between patriots and profiteers. And when profiteers are treated like war heroes, as has been the case in some places in the former Yugoslavia, it makes it all the more difficult to crack down on the accumulation of illicit wealth.

Moreover, as Robert Hislope's analysis of Macedonian paramilitary formation notes, the fusion between criminal and political behavior, far from being a novel characteristic of what Mary Kaldor calls "new wars," is an old and familiar story in the Balkans. Today's criminalized paramilitary groups, Hislope writes, are in some respects simply the latest versions of Eric Hobsbawm's "social bandits."²⁵ While they may be more trans-nationally connected through cross-border crime networks and diaspora communities, it is important to remember that external sponsorship and support, including from Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, was also crucial for nationalist-criminal bands in Macedonia in the early twentieth century.

Political and criminal agendas can also merge in the shadow economy as part of competing state-making projects, as is evident in post-Dayton Bosnia. Amra Festić and Adrian Rausche provide a practitioner's view of how the shadow economy of Bosnia has been strategically used to obstruct the creation of a viable multi-ethnic state (as outlined by the Dayton Peace Agreement constitutional framework) and at the same time to empower nationalist Serb and Croat clandestine state-building projects. In these cases, criminal and political activities and agendas overlap, provoking more aggressive international investigations and crackdowns that may prove increasingly difficult to carry out. It seems that highly criminalized politics and economics in post-Dayton Bosnia have, at least so far, produced state deformation rather than state destruction or state formation. Part of the challenge is the problematic char-

acter of the Dayton Agreement itself. The highly fractured and fragmented nature of the Bosnian state that emerged from the Dayton Agreement (based on two formal entities, the Federation and the Republika Srpska, and many local cantons) has invited rent-seeking and made border controls and collection of customs duties extremely cumbersome and difficult.

The criminalization of politics and politicization of crime is perhaps nowhere more advanced than in Serbia and Montenegro, where the wartime symbiosis between organized crime and the state persists in the post-war period. As analyzed by Christopher Corpora and Eric Gordy, the challenge of coping with the after-effects of the criminalized dimensions of the armed conflicts of the 1990s was most dramatically illustrated by the assassination of Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjić on March 12, 2003. The main suspects are Milorad Luković (“Legija”) and his so-called Zemun clan, a well-known Belgrade criminal group engaged in smuggling drugs, cigarettes, and oil. Western authorities had been urging Djindjić to crack down on them. Shortly before the assassination, Luković had denounced Djindjić as unpatriotic for cooperating with the Hague War Crimes Tribunal.²⁶ The power of Luković and his associates can be traced to the Milošević era, when organized crime, business, and the state security apparatus became closely integrated to evade international sanctions, generate war profits, and carry out ethnic cleansing. The symbiosis between the state and organized crime nurtured by Milošević has outlasted the wars and the regime.

Luković, a veteran of the French Foreign Legion and former commander of the Red Berets special unit in the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, had retired from state service into the criminal private sector full-time, but kept informal ties to the security establishment. Djindjić’s rise to power was aided by Luković and Belgrade’s criminal underworld. In June 2001, Luković’s troops even assisted in the deportation of Milošević.²⁷ Some of the country’s top crime groups, having turned their backs on their former sponsor and allied themselves with Djindjić, were essentially given an informal amnesty after Milošević was extradited. However, facing mounting pressure from the West and in urgent need of foreign aid, Djindjić had launched an anti-organized crime campaign that targeted some of the actors who had helped his rise to power. This dangerous move, it would seem, had fatal consequences, sparking yet another political crisis in Serbia.²⁸ Delinking the state security apparatus from criminal enterprises remains one of the country’s most

challenging tasks. As Corpora concludes, it remains to be seen whether there is the political will necessary to take the appropriate steps forward without also taking steps backward (and the recent elections in Serbia are certainly not promising in this regard).

Part of the reason for the stubborn endurance of the symbiosis between the state and organized crime is that

Once a state goes into the business of crime, it can be difficult to get out of the business.

once a state goes into the business of crime, it can be difficult to get out of the business. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Montenegro, which, after specializing in large-scale sanctions busting during the war years, had to choose between the painful path of fully restructuring its economy and the easier path of further nurturing its market niche in smuggling. Gunther Herrmann, a German customs investigator, claims that “since 1992, Montenegro has become one gigantic marketplace for smuggled cigarettes.”²⁹ (See Hozić for a more detailed analysis of the Balkan cigarette-smuggling trade.) Italian investigators claim that cigarette smuggling accounts for nearly 50 percent of the Montenegrin GDP—making it the country’s most important economic activity. Some estimates indicate that by the end of the 1990s the Montenegrin government was earning as much as \$700 million a year from the cigarette trade—leading the tiny republic to be labeled “The Cigarette Empire” in the international press.³⁰ In 1999, revenue from smuggling cigarettes and other goods was reportedly flowing into a parallel government budget that was then used to support the official budget and finance other activities.³¹ Montenegro’s links to the Italian mafia were nurtured during the war years, with some mafia leaders even relocating to the Montenegrin port of Bar.³² By the end of the 1990s, there was a colony of Italian smugglers in Bar. In March 1998, the chief of police in Bar was arrested in Italy and found guilty of protecting Italian criminal activities in Montenegro in return for cash, luxury boats, and automobiles.³³ More recently, in a 365-page July 2003 indictment, Prime Minister Milo Djukanović of Montenegro was accused by Italian prosecutors of collaborating with Italian crime organizations in smuggling mass quantities of untaxed cigarettes into the European Union.³⁴ In this case, it seems, the distinction between the state and organized crime has evaporated.

Final Thoughts

The focus on the clandestine political economy of the western Balkans in this issue of *Problems of Post-Communism* illustrates the need to take topics traditionally viewed as belonging to the realm of criminological analysis and making them of more central importance to the political analysis of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. At the same time, such a focus does not mean simply reducing all motives and behavior to crime and criminality. International officials increasingly blame organized crime for blocking reforms and obstructing the reconstruction process in the western Balkans and have pushed new initiatives to curb it. Greater policy attention to these problems is certainly long overdue, but it would be an error to simplistically label the region as an organized crime problem that can be handled narrowly and one-dimensionally through more aggressive crime-fighting measures. Because of its sheer size and diversity, and its highly politicized nature, the region's clandestine economy defies simple definitions and prescriptions.

Even while viewing the western Balkans as an organized crime gateway to Europe, the international community must also take some responsibility for helping to create such a formidable criminal enterprise problem in the first place. The economic sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro and the arms embargo imposed on the entire region in the early 1990s unintentionally (but predictably) fueled the emergence of a sanctions-busting infrastructure that has outlasted the war and the sanctions, and has been adapted for other smuggling activities, ranging from sex trafficking to cigarette smuggling (see Nicole Lindstrom and Aida Hozčić). Moreover, it should be acknowledged that the enormous international presence in the region has helped to sustain the shadow economy by becoming a part of the consumer base, ranging from the purchase of pirated music to frequenting the brothels that have proliferated in the post-war period (in Bosnia, for example, foreigners make up an estimated 30 percent of the brothel customers, but are the source of approximately 70 percent of brothel revenues, since they spend more than locals).³⁵ In addition, some of the market-based economic reforms promoted by international advisers and financial institutions as a condition for aid have also, at least in the short term, contributed to economic dislocations, with some sectors of the population turning to the clandestine economy as an immediate coping mechanism in the absence of an adequate social safety net (see Michael Pugh).

Rather than merely reinforcing the common tendency to either condemn or ignore the clandestine economy and its relationship to conflict and post-war reconstruction in the western Balkans, we need more nuanced approaches that recognize its considerable complexity, ambiguity, and embeddedness within the region's deeper political and economic problems. More effective, targeted, and sustained law enforcement efforts are certainly needed, but ultimately they will accomplish little unless genuine political reforms and sustainable economic development are also promoted. The diverse range of scholarly and practitioner perspectives offered in this issue contribute to the effort to bring analysis of the clandestine political economy of the western Balkans more centrally into the debate over conflict and post-conflict reconstruction without reducing it to a narrow and simplified conception of crime and criminality.

Notes

1. Most of the articles in this issue emerged from a workshop held at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University in May 2003. In addition to the article contributors, I thank the other presenters and discussants at the workshop: John Fawcett, Terry Hopmann, John Mueller, Peter Romaniuk, and Clemson Turregano.

2. This includes both sex trafficking to and through the region (see Lindstrom, this issue) and use of the region as a major transit point for migrant smuggling to the European Union. For example, in 2001 the UN Mission in Bosnia reported that the Bosnia route is taken by about 10 percent of the smuggled illegal migrants entering Western Europe. See *Borderline: UNMIBH Bulletin on State Border Service Activities* 2, no. 2 (March/April 2001): 1.

3. Ian Traynor, "Montenegrin PM Accused of Link with Tobacco Racket," *Guardian* (July 10, 2003).

4. For example, see Peter Andreas, "The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (March 2004): 29–51. For a regionwide overview, see Marko Hajdinjak, "Smuggling in Southeast Europe: The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of Regional Criminal Networks in the Balkans" (Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002), available at unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan009979.pdf.

5. In Bosnia, for example, many people survive thanks to gifts from relatives abroad and the gray economy. See "Narod živi od darova i sive ekonomije" (Public Lives from Gifts and Gray Economy), *Oslobodjenje* (Sarajevo) (December 16, 2003), available at www.oslobodjenje.com.ba.

6. As the war-time commander of Bosnia's Green Berets unit has bitterly lamented, "We know that there are people, because we know them personally, who didn't have a pair of decent shoes before the war, and today they have 4–5 million marks and entire buildings in their property. On the other hand, there are people who had a lot before the war, and have nothing today." Interview with Emin Švrakić, *Start* (Sarajevo) (November 18, 2003), available at www.startbih.info.

7. Mandić was considered untouchable until April 2003, when he was arrested in Belgrade as part of a larger crackdown on organized crime following the assassination of Djindjić. He was released in September 2003.

8. Tamara Skrozza, "Ko je Ko?" (Who Is Who?), *Vreme* (Belgrade) (February 7, 2002): 26–27; Vildana Selimbegović, "Žetva Posijanog Straha" (Reaping the Sown Fears), *DANI* (Sarajevo) (May 26, 2000).

9. See "U.S. Moves against Balkan War Criminal Karadzic's Support Network," *U.S. Mission Daily Bulletin* (March 10, 2003): 2–3.

10. Blaine Harden, "The Milošević Generation," *New York Times Magazine* (August 29, 1999).

11. Korupcija i Podmićivanje: Pogled iz Uгла Javnog Mnenja Srbije (Corruption and Bribery: A View from Serbian Public Opinion), Survey report, pt. IV (Mirjana Vasović, "Citizens Moral Position and Accounts of the Social Anomie Condition") (Belgrade: Center for Policy Studies, April 2000), available at www.cpa-cps.org.yu/cpa-cps/cps.
12. *Bosnia Peace Operation: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 2000), p. 13.
13. Quoted in Munir Alibabić, *Bosna u Kandžma KOS-a* (Bosnia in the Claws of KOS) (Sarajevo: NIP Behar, 1996), p. 73.
14. Author interview, Sarajevo (July 15, 2002).
15. Senad Pećanin and Vildana Selimbegović, "Abecada Korupcije" (The Corruption Alphabet), *DANI* (Sarajevo) (August 27, 1999): 16–21.
16. Author interview, Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo (June 12, 2001).
17. Author interview with a senior official in the Bosnian Intelligence Agency, July 15, 2002. See also Emir Hodžić and Adnan Buturović, "Kako su SDA i HDZ Zaštitili (prije) Ratni Kriminal" (How SDA and HDZ Protected (Pre)-War Crimes), *Slobodna Bosna* (Sarajevo) (June 20, 2002): 5–8.
18. Author interviews, International Crisis Group, Sarajevo, July 5, 2002, and Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo, July 19, 2002.
19. Philip Sherwell, "Guns, Girls, Drugs, Fake Track Suits: It's All Here in the Wildest Market in the World," *Sunday Telegraph* (London) (November 19, 2000): 35.
20. Jeffrey Smith, "Bosnian Mart Becomes Den of Criminal Enterprise," *Washington Post* (December 26, 1999): A33.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Sherwell, "Guns, Girls, Drugs, Fake Track Suits."
23. Smith, "Bosnian Mart Becomes Den of Criminal Enterprise."
24. "Organizovani Kriminal—Država uzvraća udarac" (Organized Crime: The State Strikes Back), *Slobodna Bosna* (December 12, 2003).
25. Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (New York: New Press, 2000).
26. Boris Drenca and Daniel Sunter, "Serbia: Further Action Against Mafia Demanded," *Balkan Crisis Report*, no. 432 (May 23, 2003).
27. Eric Jansson and Stefan Wagstyle, "The Cancer of Organized Crime That Riddles Serbia," *Financial Times* (March 14, 2003).
28. Adam LeBor, "Brussels Fears Serbian Gangsters," *Balkan Crisis Report*, no. 414 (March 13, 2003).
29. Nicholas Forster and Sead Husić, "Probe into Montenegro's Role in Illegal Cigarette Trade," *Financial Times* (August 9, 2001).
30. Hajdinjak, "Smuggling in Southeast Europe," pp. 26–27, 41.
31. Dragoljub Vuković, "Montenegrin Parallel Budget," *AIM* (November 13, 1999).
32. Marko Vuković, "Bar Chief of Police Arrested by Italian Police," *AIM* (April 10, 1998).
33. Forster and Husić, "Probe into Montenegro's Role."
34. Ian Traynor, "Montenegrin PM Accused of Link with Tobacco Racket," *Guardian* (July 10, 2003).
35. Author interview, United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (Sarajevo office), July 12, 2002.

To order reprints, call 1-800-352-2210;
outside the United States, call 717-632-3535.