

Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? A Comparison of Conflict-Regulation Strategies in Postwar Bosnia*

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This article compares the effectiveness of the consociational and the integrative approach in fostering stability in postwar Bosnia. Whereas the ethnic groups in Lijphart's consociational model constitute the basic units on which the political structure is built, the political structure in Horowitz's integrative model transcends ethnic divisions. The Dayton Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia contains elements of both approaches, and the balance between them has been changing in the course of its implementation. Bosnia constitutes a very suitable case for a comparison of the effect on stability of the two approaches: elements of each approach can be isolated and their effects compared, and the interplay between the approaches and the effect of international involvement can also be analysed. An international dimension and the phase of (de)escalation of the conflict are variables missing from both approaches, but it is important to include them when analysing a postwar situation. Owing to the deep divisions in the population, the numerical balance between the groups and the maximalist objectives of the dominant parties, the consociational model has been more effective in fostering stability in Bosnia. Currently, a change to an integrative structure seems premature, but a mix of the approaches has been demonstrated to be able to foster moderation.

Introduction

Which institutions are most effective in fostering stability following an ethnic war? This question increasingly has to be answered by international policymakers, since international interventions in ethnic wars have

become more commonplace.¹ International presence will often limit the options on the agenda to inclusive solutions, that is, democratic rule within the existing state that does not serve one group at the expense of another (Sisk, 2001: 26). However, within this category the options differ significantly, and the right choice of approach can make the difference between continued warfare and gradual development of peace and stability.

In the literature on democratic regulation of ethnic conflicts, Arend Lijphart's consociational model, as presented in, for

* An earlier version of this article was presented at a European Peace Research Association (EuPRA) Conference, Schläining, Austria, 13–17 July 2002, and published as a Working Paper by the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and by Columbia International Affairs Online. Thanks to Håkan Wiberg, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Nils Petter Gleditsch and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The data used in this article can be found at <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/caspersen>. E-mail: n.f.caspersen@lse.ac.uk.

¹ 'Ethnic' does not in my usage signify anything inherent or permanent. What is decisive are the labels used and the way in which the conflict is legitimized. In the Bosnian context, religion is regarded as an ethnic marker.

example, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (1977), and Donald Horowitz's integrative model, as presented in, for example, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985), have become the focal point of both empirical and theoretical debate. The models are both based on the assumption that a lasting settlement must be built on inclusive rule. But, whereas the ethnic groups in Lijphart's approach constitute the basic units on which the political structure is built, the political structure in Horowitz's approach transcends ethnic divisions. The approaches thus differ significantly, and the choice between them will have consequences for the ability to foster stability.

The debate is highly relevant in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth referred to as BiH or Bosnia), where it is debated whether to change the political structure in a more integrative direction. The Dayton Agreement that ended the war contains elements of both Lijphart's and Horowitz's approaches, and the balance between them has changed in the course of implementation. Therefore, the case is suitable for a comparison of the effectiveness of the approaches in promoting stability. With only one case, the analysis is of course limited. However, by isolating elements from each approach, the case makes possible a direct comparison of the effect of the approaches on stability. Both the consociational and the integrative approach have been criticized for failing to specify the empirical conditions under which they are effective in promoting stability, and it is the aim of this article to throw some light on this by comparing the effect of the approaches in postwar Bosnia.

Stability in the consociational and integrative approaches hinges on inter-ethnic elite cooperation and moderation, that is, willingness on the part of the political leaders to compromise and to rule inclusively rather than exclusively. The comparison of the two

approaches in the Bosnian case shows that the consociational model has been more effective in fostering stability. This has been due to the still deep divisions in the population, the maximalist objectives of the dominant parties and the numerical balance between the groups. Currently, the integrative model will not be effective in promoting stability, but a mix of the approaches has been demonstrated to be able to foster moderation. Given time and the international presence, it is possible to gradually change the balance of the mix, and the two approaches, while they are conceptual poles, are therefore not incompatible in the Bosnian case.

Lijphart's and Horowitz's Approaches

Lijphart's consociational approach and Horowitz's integrative approach have become the two most advocated models of conflict regulation (Kettley, Sullivan & Fyfe, 2001: 8). Both approaches advocate inclusive solutions to ethnic conflict, that is, solutions based on inter-ethnic accommodation, bargaining and reciprocity. They are, however, conceptual *poles*, since they deeply disagree on whether the institutional structure should be built on the ethnic groups or transcend them (Sisk, 1996: x; Harris & Reilly, 1998: 141). This is based on differing underlying assumptions on the importance of identity and its fluidity and on the motivation of elites in ethnic conflicts.

Lijphart's Theory of Consociational Democracy

The theory of consociational democracy is based on the assumption that successful accommodation of ethnic differences is possible only through inter-ethnic elite cooperation in institutions that explicitly recognize the ethnic divisions and make them the basis of the rules for decisionmaking,

territorial division of power and public policies. It guarantees the protection of group rights and recognizes the legitimacy of claims to national self-determination within the existing state. Consociational democracy is characterized by four institutional devices: (1) a power-sharing government, a so-called grand coalition with representatives from all primary groups; (2) minority veto on issues that can infringe on national interests; (3) proportionality in the electoral system and in the civil service; and (4) ethnic autonomy (Lijphart, 1977: 25–44).

Elite cooperation is argued most often to be based on a 'self-negating prophecy', the idea that the ethnic leaders can realize the grave dangers posed by ethnic differences and therefore choose to cooperate (Lijphart, 1994: 228).

Horowitz: Cooperation Between Electorally Motivated Politicians

Horowitz strongly criticizes the consociational model for failing to specify how the institutional arrangements affect the incentives for cooperation faced by the elites. Elites, Horowitz asserts, cannot be presumed to always want accommodation, and owing to intra-ethnic competition, the elites will furthermore face outbidding and lack the freedom of action to compromise (Horowitz, 1985: 574–579). Moreover, Horowitz argues that consociational democracy underestimates the fluidity of identity: identities are not rigid, and non-ethnic cleavages can be made salient (Horowitz, 2002: 24–25).

The institutional mechanisms are designed to create incentives for moderation and multi-ethnicity. Horowitz, therefore, prescribes a preferential electoral system in which a candidate's election depends on attracting votes from outside his/her ethnic group. This will give the ethnic parties incentives to moderate their position and engage in cross-ethnic appeal (Horowitz, 1991:

141).² Similarly, federalism should preferably be based on ethnically heterogeneous political units, which is argued to foster integrative dynamics, more moderate attitudes and fluid identities (Horowitz, 1985: 617–621). Finally, Horowitz favours 'ethnically blind' public policies that can help reduce the divide rather than augmenting it (Harris & Reilly, 1998: 141).

Horowitz's approach is a minimalist approach that is focused on the dynamics of interaction that can foster accommodative attitudes, but the specific content of this accommodation is not crucial (Horowitz, 2000: 8–9). Group protection is therefore not *a priori* guaranteed in the approach. The aim of the mechanisms prescribed is to abate the ethnic divide, to foster inter-ethnic cooperation and thereby integrate the groups.³

Brief Analysis of the Approaches

While the approaches share some fundamental assumptions, they differ significantly on others. Lijphart stresses the importance of identity and its relative permanence, while Horowitz emphasizes its potential for fluidity. Lijphart relies on the goodwill of elites and on their dominance vis-à-vis the electorate. Horowitz, on the other hand, notes the self-interested nature of elites and the constraints posed by followers.

Both approaches can be criticized for an under-specification of the necessary conditions on which they are built. In addition, each approach has been criticized for specific shortcomings. The consociational structure addresses many of the demands of the parties to an ethnic war: it guarantees them a share in power, it recognizes the legitimacy of ethnic demands, and it accommodates claims

² The basic idea is that voters may be swayed to cast lower preferences across the ethnic divide.

³ The use of the term 'integrative model', which may have positive connotations, does not imply that it is regarded as normatively superior to the consociational model.

to self-determination. However, this means that the political structure becomes squarely based on ethnicity, and Lijphart's approach has been criticized for freezing and entrenching the ethnic divisions and for being an ineffective system of governance (Brass, 1991: 10; Reynolds, 2000: 168–169). Horowitz's approach has been criticized mainly for being an essentially majoritarian system that has inadequate protection of minority rights, and this is argued to make it inappropriate in cases of deeply divided societies (Reynolds, 2000: 159–160; Lijphart, 2002: 47; Sisk, 2001: 30). In my view, the theory lacks an explanation of local acceptance: Why would leaders of a minority group accept a system which gives them no assurances?⁴ Why would nationalist parties accept a system designed to undermine their bases of power?

Different expectations follow from the approaches. A consociational structure is likely to be more acceptable to the local leaders, especially if no group constitutes a majority and if the conflict has been dominated by self-determination claims. Consociational institutions will, however, have a propensity for deadlock and immobility, while integrative institutions are expected to be more effective once established. In the consociational approach, homogeneous units are expected to lead to more moderate attitudes and the election of political leaders more willing to agree to inter-ethnic cooperation. In the integrative model, heterogeneous units are ascribed with this quality.

One important variable is absent from both approaches: the international dimension. In case a settlement is guaranteed by an external power, this will affect the incentives of the parties involved and affect both the

likelihood of acceptance of the integrative model and the risk of breakdown of the consociational structure. A coercive strategy may backfire, however, and an imposed structure is accompanied by the question of what will happen once the international guarantors leave? Time may also be of essence: it can generally be assumed that identities are more fluid over a longer period of time, and even Lijphart does not insist on the permanency of identities. Both the international dimension and the phase of the conflict should therefore be included in the comparison. The variables hypothesized to affect the effectiveness of the approaches are the demographic balance between the groups, maximalist goals of the leaders, attitudes in the population and international presence.

Comparison of the Two Approaches in Bosnia

The aim of this article is to compare the effectiveness of the consociational and integrative model in fostering stability in postwar Bosnia. The Dayton Agreement that ended the war contains elements of both approaches, and during the course of implementation, the balance between consociational and integrative elements has changed. The Bosnian case provides the possibility for a direct, albeit limited, comparison of the consociational and the integrative approaches. International organizations play an important role in the implementation of the agreement and affect the workings of the consociational and integrative elements. The effect of an international dimension, which is absent from both approaches as presented by their authors, can therefore be included in the analysis. Civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement is the responsibility of the international High Representative (henceforth referred to as HR, and the

⁴ Horowitz (2002: 20) argues that his approach will be more readily accepted since it favours majority groups. However, following an ethnic war, the sentiments of not only the largest group need to be considered, especially if the settlement is based on the existence of a 'mutually hurting stalemate'.

institution as OHR), while elections were conducted under the authority of the OSCE until 2002, when election administration was transferred to local authorities.

Consociational Elements

The most visible elements of the Dayton Agreement are consociational, and initially the consociational elements were clearly the strongest. First and foremost are the joint institutions, which are composed of the three-person Presidency, the Council of Ministers and the two-chamber Parliament with its House of Representatives and House of Peoples. One finds in these institutions a grand coalition, minority veto provisions and parity of representation.

Ethnic autonomy is another important consociational feature. Bosnia is composed of two entities with considerable autonomous powers. Republika Srpska (RS) is predominantly Serb, while the Federation (FBiH) is bi-national with both Bosniacs and Croats.⁵ Within the Federation, a complex system of power-sharing exists with minority veto, parity of representation and considerable autonomy for homogeneous cantons and municipalities. Owing to the veto provisions at the central level and the great degree of decentralization, power tends to gravitate to more majoritarian, homogeneous institutions in the two entities, and ethnic autonomy is, to a large extent, the defining feature of the structure.⁶

Integrative Elements

Even though the consociational elements are most visible, one should not overlook the integrative elements in the Dayton Agreement. The ethnic autonomy is based on the congruence of ethnicity and territory and *not* on ethnicity itself. This is important since

returns and people's right to vote in their 1991 residence have the potential for creating greater residential and electoral heterogeneity and thus undermine the ethnic autonomy of the consociational structure.

The second integrative element in the agreement is found in the existence of some more *integrative institutions* – that is, institutions that, while they are based on ethnic parity, have no veto provisions and decide by simple majority. These institutions are the Constitutional Court, the Central Bank, the Joint Interim Commission, the Human Rights Chamber and Commission, the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees, the Commission to Preserve National Monuments and the Commission on Public Cooperations. Although they are not legislative institutions, they are institutions of considerable power and they make decisions that are important from a national point of view.

Despite these integrative elements, the political structure in Bosnia was initially predominantly consociational, but during the course of its implementation this has begun to change (Sharp, 1997/98: 15). Especially since the expansion of the HR's powers in December 1997, the integrative elements within the Dayton Agreement are increasingly emphasized, and new measures have been introduced. In addition, a more coercive strategy has been used to undermine the support of the nationalist parties. One of the most important examples of a new integrative measure was a draft election law to create incentives for cross-ethnic appeals and voting. The draft laws proposed the introduction of a preferential system for the election of the Presidency and would allow all representatives to vote for the delegates of the House of Peoples, which had until then been elected by 'their own' ethnic representatives. However, these measures and three different draft laws were rejected before an election law was finally passed in 2001.

⁵ I use the term 'Bosniacs' as synonymous with the group that before 1993 referred to itself as Bosnian Muslims.

⁶ This has become less pronounced with the recent changes to the entity constitutions (see below).

Another possibility for a more integrative structure was the 2000 ruling by the BiH Constitutional Court that Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs should have equal status in both entities. This decision provided the opportunity for a revision of ethnic autonomy, and the implementation was strongly pushed by the HR.

Owing to the mix of the two approaches and the changed balance between the elements, it is possible to analyse both the responses to a more integrative turn and the effect of the already existing integrative and consociational elements. The elements form part of a complex political system, and even though it is possible to separate consociational and integrative elements, as outlined above, the functioning of these elements will be affected by incentives produced by the rest of the complex system. This will diminish the extreme effects of each of the approaches: the consociational elements will be affected by the greater fluidity emanating from the integrative approach, while the integrative elements are embedded in a system of consociational and international guarantees that makes acceptance by minorities more likely.

Analysis

In the two approaches, stability is defined by the existence of political leaders who are willing and able to engage in inter-ethnic cooperation. This will, therefore, be the measure used in the analysis when comparing the effect of consociational and integrative elements. In addition, responses by local leaders to the above-mentioned integrative turn will be analysed.

The first of the elements that can be compared directly are heterogeneous and homogeneous municipalities. According to the integrative model, heterogeneous units will foster moderation and inter-ethnic cooperation. On the other hand, the consociational model argues that they will foster

greater extremism. The municipalities will be compared in terms of voting patterns: do the extreme nationalist parties have more support in ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous municipalities? Stability in the two models is based on the behaviour of political elites, and voting patterns will not be a direct measure of stability. However, in Bosnia the wartime nationalist parties have been the least willing to accept inter-ethnic accommodation and cooperation, and support for these parties will make stability less likely. In heterogeneous municipalities, inter-ethnic cooperation is an important indicator of stability; are the elected politicians willing and able to cooperate as foreseen in the integrative model? In these municipalities, mayor and speaker positions must be allocated to individuals from different ethnic groups, and this required minority representation gives incentives for the parties to become multi-ethnic. Consociational and integrative elements are thereby combined in heterogeneous municipalities.

Second, the workings of consociational and more integrative institutions will be compared. According to the consociational model, integrative institutions will not be accepted and their establishment will therefore be fraught with difficulty. On the basis of the integrative model, on the other hand, one can argue that the consociational institutions will be marred by deadlock and ineffectiveness. The analysis will compare the establishment and functioning of the joint, consociational institutions and the integrative institutions. It is important to note that the integrative institutions also consist of internationally appointed representatives who hold the chairmanship and often the deciding vote. This international presence provides a guarantee that is usually lacking from integrative institutions, but the representatives of the three constituent peoples still run the risk of being outvoted, and such a risk is not present in the consociational institutions.

In addition to these integrative institutions, responses to refugee returns will be analysed, as will responses to the introduction of new integrative measures. This will enable a further analysis of the variables affecting acceptance or rejection of integrative elements and thereby the possibility for turning the Bosnian structure in a more integrative direction. Such a change would address the problems of immobility and freezing of identities associated with the consociational structure, but the risk is that such a change may foster negative reactions and hence promote *instability*.

The analysis will be divided into two phases, which will enable an analysis of the effect of phases of the conflict and of the international dimension: (1) 1996–97, the first two years after Dayton, when the HR performed the role of assistant to the local implementation of the agreement; and (2) 1998–2002. In December 1997, the HR's powers were strengthened with the so-called Bonn Powers, and the strategy for

implementation changed markedly. This has been described by some observers as a creeping protectorate or a trusteeship (e.g. Cox, 2001: 12; Cousens & Cater, 2001: 129).


Developments in Postwar Bosnia

The political scene in postwar Bosnia has been dominated by the wartime nationalist parties: the Serb SDS, the Croat HDZ and the Bosniac SDA. The only significant party with cross-ethnic appeal is the reformed Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), but even this party predominantly attracts Bosniac voters (UNDP, 2000: 38).

If we look at election results from 1996 to 2002 in Figures 1 and 2, the support for nationalist parties has declined, which indicates a moderation in public attitudes.⁷ The


⁷ The drop in nationalist support in RS in 2000 may be due partly to the banning of the SRS. However, in 2002, the party again ran in elections without this resulting in a reversal of the trend.

Figure 1. Nationalist Party Support in RS



Source: Official election results from <http://www.oscebih.org> and from <http://www.izbori.ba>.

Figure 2. Nationalist Party Support in the Federation



Source: Official election results from <http://www.oscebih.org> and from <http://www.izbori.ba>.

nationalist parties made some comeback at the latest elections in 2002, but this need not be based on a reversal of moderation, since it can be explained, at least in part, by a very low turnout and widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the unstable SDP-led alliance government.

Party pluralism is still almost entirely absent in the Croat community, where the HDZ continues to enjoy overwhelming support (Bose, 2002: 8; Manning, 2001: 35). The Croats are clearly the smallest group, and they do not have the institutional protection offered by their own entity. This, combined with actions by the OSCE and OHR perceived to undercut the position of Croats, has led to a perception of their status being under threat (e.g. Bose, 2002: 28, 258; Manning, 2001: 35–36; HDZ, 2000). Changes in the position of the political parties are discernible in all groups, at least on the rhetorical level. As Bose argues (2002: 11): 'Along with the growth of party pluralism . . . some major

parties have modified their strategies and rhetoric in a "moderate" direction . . . the prime example being the SDS. There are reasons to believe that a latent reformist tendency exists within even the HDZ-BiH.'⁸ The more coercive strategy by the international implementers has not led to more extreme positions, and there has actually been remarkably little opposition to imposition of legislation, removal of obstructionist officials, dismantling of parallel power structures and arrest of indicted war criminals (Cox, 2001: 13; ESI, 2000: 33).

An overall change in attitudes is indicated, both among the electorate and among the political elites, even though the change is not uniform among the three groups. But

⁸ At its most recent conference, the SDS described itself as a 'national/people's party of the democratic centre', ready to cooperate with all democratic parties in Bosnia and open to all citizens (SDS, 2001). The SDA has likewise proclaimed itself to be 'a national/people's party of the political centre open for all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina' (SDA, 2001).

what effect have the consociational and integrative elements had on stability in post-Dayton Bosnia? Have they fared equally well (or badly) in fostering stability?

Comparison of Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Municipalities

The municipalities were categorized by taking advantage of the fact that voting in Bosnia is almost exclusively along ethnic lines.⁹ Almost all parties are national parties, and by calculating the vote shares, the ethnic composition of the municipality can be estimated. A heterogeneous municipality was defined as a municipality in which the largest group constitutes less than 66%.¹⁰

Support for Nationalist Parties

1997 Elections In the 1997 municipal elections, the homogeneous and heterogeneous municipalities differ significantly in terms of nationalist support coded as support for SDA, the HDZ and the SDS, as well as the extreme nationalist Serb Radical Party (SRS). Almost all parties are national if not nationalist parties, but these four parties are

the wartime nationalist parties that, while they have reformed, remain the least willing to compromise on inter-ethnic issues.¹¹ As shown in Table I, for the electorally heterogeneous municipalities, the average nationalist vote share was 85%, while it was 73% for the homogeneous municipalities. For the six residentially heterogeneous municipalities, the difference is even more marked, with an average of 92% compared to a 75% average in the residentially homogeneous municipalities.

2000 Elections The results of the 2000 elections illustrate the overall development as the average nationalist vote share fell to 52%. Despite these changes, the same general pattern as in the first elections can be identified. In the electorally heterogeneous municipalities, the average nationalist vote share is 62% compared with 51% for the homogeneous ones. For the residentially heterogeneous municipalities, the average is 60% compared with 51%. This is a significant decrease since 1997, and it indicates that while residential heterogeneity still causes greater extremism, moderation may develop faster.

A possible explanation for the greater extremism in heterogeneous municipalities can be found in the defence of group status: in case of heterogeneity, the voters do not feel that pluralism can be afforded and therefore

⁹ Elections in deeply divided societies often amount to a census (Horowitz, 1985: 326).

¹⁰ For the 1997 elections, I identified 31 municipalities out of 135 as being *electorally* heterogeneous based on 'in municipality' and 'out of municipality' votes. *Residential* heterogeneity was found in 6 municipalities. In the 2000 elections, 12 of 146 municipalities were electorally heterogeneous, and of these 5 were heterogeneous. See Appendix 2 for further details.

¹¹ Unlike the three other parties, the SRS was not in power during the war, but in the Serb-controlled areas it functioned as a more extreme opposition to the SDS.

Table I. Nationalist Party Support as a Function of Heterogeneity (%)

	<i>Heterogeneous municipalities</i>	<i>Homogenous municipalities</i>	<i>Difference</i>	<i>Violent</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Difference</i>
1997	85 (31)	73 (104)	12*	79 (23)	75 (112)	4
2000	62 (12)	51 (134)	11**	52 (26)	51 (120)	1

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

Number of municipalities in parentheses.

close ranks behind the nationalist forces. The analysis gives some support for this explanation. The biggest difference in nationalist support is found with the Bosniac voters: in 1997, the SDA's average share of the Bosniac vote was 93% in heterogeneous municipalities and 72% in homogeneous Bosniac-majority municipalities. This could indicate that pluralism can best be afforded when the power-base is secure. For the Croats, the perception that their status is under threat may lead to an attitude that pluralism is generally too costly, in homogeneous as well as heterogeneous municipalities, and therefore the vote share of the HDZ does not differ as markedly. In 1997, the HDZ's average share of the Croat votes was 89% in homogeneous municipalities and 93% in heterogeneous municipalities. In 2000, the numbers were 71% and 81%.

The even greater extremism associated with residential heterogeneity does not necessarily mean that contact breeds intolerance, since people may in fact be living in enclaves rather than inter-mixed.¹² This often seems to be the case in postwar Bosnia (Bose, 2002: 36). Actual interaction will therefore be lacking and, shortly after cessation of hostilities, the spatial proximity between the groups can provoke greater fear of domination by the other group than would purely electoral heterogeneity.

Fear of domination may be less pronounced in larger municipalities, which will tend to be more urbanized and in which the size of the local government makes for greater proportionality. Therefore, it is not surprising that nationalist support is negatively correlated with the size of the municipality: in 1997, the average support for nationalist parties was 78% in municipalities with fewer than 8,000 voters and 71% in municipalities with more than 18,000 voters. In 2000, the numbers were 54% and

38%. The relationship between heterogeneity and nationalist support does not disappear when this additional variable is included, and the two variables 'relative size of largest group' and 'number of votes in the municipality' together explain 14% of the variance in 1997 and 15% in 2000.

Ethnic Violence as Hidden Variable?

Could the correlation between heterogeneous municipalities and support for nationalist parties be spurious? Is the difference explained by varying levels of violence? Based on reports from the US State Department (1993), the UN Commission for Human Rights (Masowiecki, 1993–95) and Helsinki Watch (1992, 1993), the municipalities have been coded in terms of the intensity of the war.¹³ As shown in Table I, in 1997 the average nationalist vote share in the municipalities that had experienced a very high level of violence was 79%, compared with 75% for the remaining municipalities. In 2000, the numbers were 52% and 51% respectively.

However, the variable of ethnic violence is significantly correlated with the two other variables, and if the data are split in two, an interesting difference emerges between municipalities with a very high level of violence and the remaining municipalities. As shown in Table II, in municipalities that experienced a very high level of violence during the war, heterogeneity and the size of the municipality together explain 60% of the variance in nationalist support in 1997 and 46% in 2000. In the remaining municipalities, the corresponding percentages are only 9% and 15%.¹⁴

¹³ The coding was based on several reports of 'wilful killings' or 'summary executions' or reports of 'massacres'. The Geneva Convention art. 147 defines 'wilful killings, torture and inhuman treatment' as 'grave breaches' of the Convention.

¹⁴ Because of multicollinearity, the interaction effect is not statistically significant, and the file has, therefore, been split instead of including an interaction effect in the regression.

¹² Allport (1954: 263, 272) argues that if segregation limits contacts to 'casual contacts', then it tends to cause conflict rather than tolerance.

Table II. Nationalist Party Support as a Function of Heterogeneity and Size of the Municipality

	<i>Municipalities with high level of violence</i>		<i>Remaining municipalities</i>	
	1997	2000	1997	2000
Heterogeneity	-0.55 (0.15)**	-0.68 (0.16)**	-0.30 (0.12)*	-0.31 (0.13)*
Size	-0.05 (0.01)**	-0.03 (0.01)**	-0.04 (0.02)*	-0.08 (0.02)**
R ²	0.60	0.46	0.09	0.15
N	23	26	112	120

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

Coefficients (standard deviations) in parentheses.

In municipalities that have experienced a high degree of ethnic violence, the fear of domination is greater, especially in smaller communities. Therefore, in situations of deep divisions following a very intense ethnic war, heterogeneous municipalities seem to foster extremism rather than moderation.

Inter-Ethnic Cooperation in Heterogeneous Municipalities

If heterogeneity results in the election of more extreme political parties, how does this affect inter-ethnic cooperation between the local representatives? Minority representation is required in municipalities in which a minority group won more than 20% of the seats, and inter-ethnic cooperation has therefore been imposed in all heterogeneous municipalities. This has, however, not been without tension.

In 1997, the power-sharing requirements were rejected or ignored in many municipalities, and the OSCE imposed awards of multi-ethnic representation and appointed mayors (Manning, 2001: 27). In some cases, this led to tensions and in others the requirements were still rejected. The implementation process went much more smoothly in 2000, and no municipalities were denied certification based on failure to comply with the power-sharing requirements (internal OSCE BiH report; Manning, 2001: 27). The implementation fostered inter-ethnic alliances as well as intra-ethnic ones, and

even the SDA, the HDZ and the SDS on several occasions offered coalition agreements to parties from other ethnic groups. Still, no inter-ethnic alliances between significant parties were created before the elections, and the SDP was the only significant party that made cross-ethnic appeals. The minority representation provisions require representation of *candidates*, not parties, and the parties could therefore benefit from being multi-ethnic, since they then would not have to share power, but the incentives for multi-ethnic appeals are still too weak compared with the incentives for mono-ethnic nationalist appeals. However, pragmatic power considerations force the parties to make alliances, and the minority representation provisions make it necessary for these alliances to cross the ethnic divide. The development can therefore be seen as a mix of development of greater trust and electoral ambitions. On this basis, however, actual inter-ethnic cooperation may still prove very difficult.

Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Municipalities

The comparison showed that heterogeneous municipalities fostered support for nationalist parties rather than moderation. This seemed to be explained by the defence of group status and fear of domination. In case of heterogeneity, party pluralism can be regarded as being too costly, since it could

reduce the political power of the group's representatives. Extremism was greatest when the groups were residentially inter-mixed. However, the analysis did indicate that residential heterogeneity may in the longer term lead to moderation. The variance explained by the ethnic composition of the municipality was especially great in municipalities that had experienced a very high level of violence during the war. This supports the assertion that integrative structures especially foster instability following an intense war.

Inter-ethnic cooperation was more problem-free and widespread in the second phase, even though incentives for mono-ethnic appeals were still stronger than incentives for multi-ethnicity. The mix of consociational and integrative elements combined with the greater degree of party pluralism thus fostered a greater degree of stability in the second phase.

Comparison of Consociational and Integrative Institutions

The joint institutions were created after the first elections in 1996 and came into function in the beginning of 1997. Initially, they were boycotted by the Serb representatives (HR, 1996c), but a short-lived boycott of the state's main institutions is not surprising considering that the Dayton Agreement was partly imposed.¹⁵ What may be surprising is the fact that the establishment of the more integrative institutions was relatively easy. The Joint Interim Commission, the Human Rights Chamber and Commission, the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees, the Commission to Preserve National Monuments and the Commission on Public Cooperations were all established within the first year after Dayton. The national members were appointed by the

¹⁵ A discussion of the extent to which the Dayton Agreement is an imposed settlement is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this article.

parties, and the establishment seems to have been problem-free (HR, 1996a,b). The establishment of the Constitutional Court and the Central Bank awaited the September 1996 elections. The Constitutional Court was established without significant problems, while the Central Bank was somewhat more contentious, and the HDZ and the SDS delayed the passing of the necessary law (ESI, 2000: 51). Apart from the Central Bank, the establishment was then remarkably easy, and even the Central Bank was established without boycotts. But, once established, how did the consociational and integrative institutions function?

Consociational Institutions

Agreeing on legislation in Parliament turned out to be very difficult, owing to the concurrent majority and veto provisions in the constitution.¹⁶ In the first year of the State Parliament's existence, only ten laws were passed, and the problem continued in the second phase: in 1998–2000, an average of five laws a year were passed by Parliament. After the alliance government came to power in February 2001, however, things began to change. Despite continued obstruction by the Serb caucus in Parliament, close to 40 laws were passed between February 2001 and August 2002.¹⁷ At least 11 of these were laws that had previously been imposed by the HR, and the increasing number could seem to reflect greater pragmatism as regards the international authority. In addition, however, some important 'new' laws were

¹⁶ According to the Constitution, legislation can be blocked by two-thirds of the representatives of one ethnic group in the House of Representatives or by a majority of the representatives of one ethnic group in the House of Peoples.

¹⁷ The counting of the number of laws passed is for 1997–2000, based on the Reports of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the UN. After 2000, such information is no longer included in the reports and the sources used instead are ICG (2002: 19) and BiH Media Round-up, 24 May 2001.

passed. In particular, the passing of the Election Law in August 2001 was seen as a breakthrough: not only the moderate parties but also the HDZ, the SDA and the SDS had been willing to compromise.

Integrative Institutions

Almost from the very beginning, the HR notes how effectively the institutions function (HR, 1996c), but despite this optimism, problems with insufficient cooperation from the political authorities are acknowledged. The human rights institutions, in particular, continually faced problems with local authorities refusing to implement their decisions and recommendations (HR, 1996c, 1997a), and funding for those institutions as well as for the Constitutional Court was lacking.

Cooperation with local authorities improved in the second phase. Funding was forthcoming, and implementation was no longer the exception; for example, the implementation of decisions from the Human Rights Chamber increased from 33% in 1999 to 73% in 2001 (HR, 2001). The Central Bank has also succeeded in implementing a common currency, which is now used in both entities (Bose, 2002: 112). When the Constitutional Court made its decision, in July 2000, on the constituent peoples, there was severe criticism from Croat and Serb parties, since the Serb and Croat judges had voted against the decision. However, the decision was accepted, and the parties took part in its implementation.

Consociational and Integrative Institutions

The effectiveness of both consociational and integrative institutions has increased in the second phase. This is no coincidence, since the effectiveness of most of the integrative institutions depended on the cooperation of consociational structures. What does this,

along with the relatively unproblematic establishment of the integrative institutions, tell us? First, it must be remembered that all the integrative institutions are run under international supervision and their effectiveness may have been dependent on the ultimate international control. Second, while dealing with important issues, the integrative institutions lack the legislative power and the symbolic importance of the consociational institutions, which may have made their establishment easier. However, even when these two points are considered, the comparison of integrative and consociational institutions suggests that integrative institutions may, under some circumstances, be acceptable to the local parties and function effectively.

Turning Implementation in a More Integrative Direction

Over the years, the implementation strategy has changed, and more emphasis is now put on integrative elements. But one of the main problems for the integrative approach is the problem of local acceptance, and by focusing on responses to integrative measures, variables affecting rejection or acceptance can be analysed.

Minority Returns

Minority returns are returns to areas where a different ethnic group retains military control and population majority. This is one of the most important elements if the Dayton structure is to be turned in a more integrative direction, since it will help create the necessary heterogeneity. Such returns are heavily dependent on both the willingness of political leaders to accept increased heterogeneity and the forcefulness of the international strategy. Significant developments have occurred in this field.

In the first year after Dayton, it was decided by the Peace Implementation

Council¹⁸ to prioritize majority returns, since it was argued to be too early for minority returns, owing to the still volatile security situation. In the first year, therefore, the number of minority returns was offset by movements of continued ethnic separation (HR, 1996a). As of 31 August 1999, minority returns numbered merely 100,714 people, but in the last quarter of 1999 the long-awaited breakthrough appeared, and minority returns took place even in areas that had experienced genocidal violence (ICG, 2000: 8). In 1999, the number of registered minority returns was 41,007; in 2000 it was 67,445; and in 2001 it was 92,061.¹⁹ This does not mean that minority returns are now unproblematic, but outright obstruction has waned, and the security situation has improved considerably (HR, 1999, 2000a,b, 2002). Despite this progress, minority returns are not likely to recreate the prewar ethnic mix. The numbers are still too small, and those who return often return to minority enclaves rather than mix with the majority ethnic group (Bose, 2002: 36).

An Integrative Electoral System?

On the basis of the Dayton Agreement, the OSCE adopted an electoral system that used a PR system for most elections, but was combined with ethnically defined lists for the election of the three-person Presidency. Furthermore, members of the Upper Houses of the Bosnian Parliament and the Federation Parliament are elected by the ethnic representatives in the Lower Houses (i.e. Croats elect Croats, Serbs elect Serbs, etc.). However, after the nationalist victory in the 1996 and 1997 elections, debates soon began over the possibility of changing the electoral system in a way that would foster moderation and multi-ethnicity. The problem was

that the law should be passed by the Bosnian Parliament, and the nationalist parties were far from interested in an electoral system designed to undermine their power-base. Different draft laws were rejected three times before a law that preserved the consociational procedures was adopted in August 2001 (see <http://www.izbori.ba>).²⁰

The issues that proved contentious in the draft laws were the articles introducing some form of preferential system and watering down of the consociational structures. Most controversial have been suggestions to adopt a preferential system for the election of the Presidency and the suggestion to allow all representatives to vote for delegates for the House of Peoples (BiH Media Round-up, 22 August 2001). The HDZ argues that the introduction of a preferential system would abolish the Croat veto, since Croats would not exclusively elect their representatives, and they saw the draft election law as promoting the 'for Croats ... absolutely unacceptable voting principle of one man one vote' (HDZ, 2000: 50, 60). Since a permanent election law had not been adopted for the 2000 elections, the OSCE Head of Mission, Ambassador Barry, adopted the draft election law for the election of delegates for the House of Peoples, and this caused a prolonged crisis between the HDZ and the OSCE, which the HDZ were able to use to consolidate their electoral base. Therefore, the attempt to impose an integrative solution backfired.

Like the HDZ, the Serb parties have expressed opposition to the introduction of integrative elements in the electoral system (Bose, 2002: 239). The Bosniac parties, on the other hand, voted against the draft law in June 2001, because of the *lack* of integrative

¹⁸ The PIC comprises 55 countries and agencies that sponsor and direct the peace implementation process.

¹⁹ Numbers from UNHCR's website, <http://www.unhcr.ba>.

²⁰ The law left empty the procedures for the election of the Presidency, the House of Peoples and the Presidents of RS and FBiH, pending the implementation of the Constitutional Court Decision. However, apart from ethnic quota requirements in RS, the changes imposed by the HR in 2002 are minor (OHR, 2002a).

measures, and they regard as discriminatory the consociational provisions (BiH Media Round-up, 14, 22 June 2001).

The Constitutional Court Decision

A ruling in July 2000 by the BiH Constitutional Court forced the issues of consociational and integrative structures on to the political agenda. In its decision on the constitutionality of the Entity Constitutions, the court found elements of both constitutions to be unconstitutional, since the Bosnian Constitution designates Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats as *constituent peoples* throughout the territory of BiH. They must, therefore, have political equality in both entities (Perry, 2002: 2).²¹

All-party talks were held in order to reach agreement on the implementation, and on 27 March 2002 the so-called Sarajevo Agreement was signed.²² The agreement maintains the consociational structure in the Federation, but now also with representation of Serbs and 'Others'. In the Federation Government, there are quotas for representation of each constituent people, but the consociational guarantees have been slightly weakened since the use of the minority veto has been limited.²³ In Republika Srpska, a Council of Peoples is established, which has veto rights when vital national interests are concerned, and ethnic quotas in government are required. The ethnic-quota requirement has integrative aspects, since decisionmaking is majoritarian, and it gives the parties incentives to run on multi-ethnic slates. The

changes disconnect group-based representation from territory, but despite the slight weakening of the consociational guarantees and the introduction of some integrative elements in the formation of government, the changes maintain a structure based on ethnicity. The effects still remain to be seen, but it is nevertheless interesting to analyse the position of the parties, since there was a sharp division along ethnic lines as to the proper mix of consociational and integrative elements.

The parties with a Croat prefix submitted a joint proposal in February 2002, but the HDZ did not sign the Sarajevo Agreement, owing to the limits put on the minority veto and the integrative elements in the government structure. As Ante Jelavić, then HDZ President, put it: 'If the Croats get some ministerial positions . . . practically, it will be the Ministers who suit the Serb and Bosniak parliamentary majority' (quoted in BiH Media Round-up, 28 March 2002).

The Serb parties argued that they were willing to change the RS Constitution in a *civic* direction, based on majoritarian and formally non-ethnic principles.²⁴ They did not sign the parts of the agreement pertaining to the definition of vital national interests, which was considered too broad – that is, the structure was too consociational. In addition, the provisions on ethnic quotas in government were not signed. When the Serb parties of the RS Assembly unanimously amended the RS Constitution, these elements departed from the Sarajevo Agreement. The parties declared themselves willing to accept multi-ethnic representation, but not to the extent suggested.²⁵

²¹ For example, the court found the wording in the preamble of the RS Constitution 'State of the Serb people' to be unconstitutional.

²² On 19 April 2002, the HR decided to impose completely the amendments of the Federation Constitution (OHR, 2002b,c). The amendments of the RS Constitution made by the RS Assembly were partially altered (OHR, 2002d).

²³ The use of the 'vital national interest clause' has now been limited. Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituent Peoples' Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27 March 2002, art. 4, 5 (<http://www.ohr.int>).

²⁴ For example, Simić from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) was dissatisfied with the agreement because it emphasized the 'concept of the nation rather than that of man and his liberties' (quoted in BiH Media Round-up, 3 April 2002).

²⁵ The then RS Prime Minister Ivanić announced during the negotiations that the government should be made more multi-ethnic (BiH Media Round-up, 26 December 2001).

The proposal from the FBiH Constitutional Commission emphasized the civic nature of the Federation and de-emphasized the concept of collective rights (BiH Federation House of Representatives, Constitutional Commission, 2002).²⁶ Thus, where Bosniacs are a majority, a more integrative structure is advocated. In RS, on the other hand, the Bosniac parties have put more emphasis on the protection of national interests.²⁷ What matters to the SDA is that the solutions in the entities are symmetrical, and the party rejected the multiparty agreement, owing to its asymmetry (BiH Media Round-up, 28 March 2002). One could argue that this is because such symmetry would make the entities redundant and make Bosniacs most powerful as the largest group overall. To this end, the party would accept solutions that reduce the consociational elements.²⁸

Responses to Integrative Measures

The analysis of the responses to integrative measures showed that, on the central level, the Croat and the Serb representatives prefer consociational structures whereas the Bosniac representatives prefer a more integrative structure. This supports the assertion that minority groups support a consociational structure, especially parties that have espoused secessionist ideologies. Although they are the largest group, the Bosniacs do not constitute a majority. However, they may be approaching a majority, and under the current political structure, their plurality is of no political value at the central level (Bose, 2002: 257). In addition, the Bosniac parties' preference for an integrative solution should

²⁶ The FBiH Commission also had Croat, Serb and 'Other' members. However, Bosniacs dominated it, owing to HDZ's boycott, and the Croat members chose to submit their own proposal.

²⁷ The SDA criticized the RS constitutional amendments for being discriminatory and ensuring Serb domination (BiH Media Round-up, 15 April 2002).

²⁸ The SDA suggested that they would accept non-legislative bodies in both entities as mechanisms for the protection of vital national interests (*Bosnia Daily*, 2002).

be seen in the context of their unitary goal. Thus, the variable numerical balance interacts with maximalist goals. On the local level, the preferences are different, but also based on minority–majority positions. The Serb parties are opposed to a consociational structure in RS, whereas the Bosniac parties support such a structure in RS, but a more integrative structure in the Federation. The Croat parties demand a more consociational structure, and the HDZ perceives integrative measures as Bosniac domination 'under the guise of civic majority' (Jelavić quoted in BiH Media Round-up, 20 April 2001).

As regards the integrative elements (returns and the integrative institutions) contained in the Dayton Agreement, the passing of time and the more forceful international strategy have led to improvements. The introduction of new integrative elements has, however, met with sharp resistance and seems likely to cause instability rather than stability. It is unlikely that significant integrative elements will be voluntarily agreed to as long as the Croat and Serb nationalist parties hold sufficient voting power. Even if the HR is prepared to face a standoff with the nationalist parties, the imposition of an unpopular integrative structure may make it even more difficult to create a self-sustaining peace. In the resistance to integrative elements, an important element would seem to be the interest of the political elites in preserving their hold on power. They are, therefore, far removed from Lijphart's elites that choose to cooperate in the face of threatening mass antagonisms and are much closer to Horowitz's electorally motivated politicians. But it is precisely motivations such as these that make them resist a change to a more integrative structure.

Conclusion: Good Fences Sometimes Make Good Neighbours

The debate between the supporters of the consociational model and supporters of the

integrative model has at times been harsh, and the choice between the models is an important one: should structures designed to promote stability be built on ethnic groups or should they transcend them. Both approaches suffer from an under-specification of the empirical conditions that affect their effectiveness, and in this article, I have sought to identify possible variables by comparing the approaches in postwar Bosnia.

The comparison of the approaches in the two phases showed that they had quite different effects on stability. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities, the integrative approach fostered instability rather than stability. In later phases of de-escalation, however, this effect seemed to wane, and in the longer term the integrative approach may foster more moderate attitudes and create incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation. The effect of the phases of the conflict and the local experience of violence pointed to an important variable: the intensity of the conflict and the resulting divisions. But even in the later phase, the incentives for multi-ethnic appeals were not sufficiently strong. Integrative institutions worked more smoothly than consociational institutions in both phases, and their establishment was remarkably problem-free, but this seemed to depend on the ultimate international control.

While the integrative elements came to work better in the second phase, the introduction of new integrative elements has been rejected by the Croat and Serb parties. The positions on consociational and integrative solutions are sharply divided along ethnic lines and follow local majority–minority constellations. The numerical balance matters, along with the maximalist objectives of the dominant parties.

Therefore, in the Bosnian case, the consociational model has been more effective in promoting stability, despite the international presence that makes the need for local

acceptance less pressing. The greater effectiveness of the consociational model has been due to the deep divisions in the population, the dominance of self-determination claims in the conflict and the absence of a majority group. Attitudes in the general population and the maximalist objectives of the dominant forces are not unrelated: the ability of leaders to sustain radical demands is affected by sentiments in the mass population, but these are strongly influenced by the goals and rhetoric prevalent among the political leaders. Furthermore, both of these variables can be influenced by the two approaches, but they are predominantly exogenous. The last variable, numerical balance between the groups, is wholly exogenous to the approaches.

In Bosnia, a change to an integrative structure clearly seems premature, but a mix of the approaches has been demonstrated to be able to foster moderation. Given time and the international presence, it is possible to gradually change the balance of the mix of consociational and integrative elements, and by including these two variables in the analysis, the two approaches can be regarded as compatible. Such combinations may prove more effective in fostering stability – more effective in building fences low enough for good neighbourliness to develop.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Acronyms and Abbreviations

FBiH: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

HDZ (BiH): Croatian Democratic Community

HR: High Representative

OHR: Office of the High Representative

OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

RS: Republika Srpska

SBiH: Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina

SDA: Party of Democratic Action (Bosniac)
 SDP: Social Democratic Party
 SDS: Serb Democratic Party
 SRS: Serb Radical Party

Appendix 2. Comparing Nationalist Support in Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Municipalities

Identification of Municipalities as Homogeneous or Heterogeneous Coding was based on the voting patterns in the municipalities. The SDP is the only significant party with some multi-ethnic appeal, but its appeal beyond Bosniac voters is assessed to be limited, and it was therefore coded as Bosniac. Ideally, census results would have been used, but the last census is from 1991 and does not reflect the postwar ethnic composition.

Nationalist Parties Nationalist party support was coded as support for SDA, HDZ, SRS (only 1997) and SDS. The SDA ran in coalition with the more moderate SBiH in some municipalities, but since SDA was the dominant party, this was coded as nationalist support. Other extreme nationalist parties ran in some municipalities (e.g. the Croat Party of Rights), but their support is negligible and has not been included in the nationalist vote share.

Parties and Independent Candidates Included In 2000, 68 parties and 18 independent candidates took part in the elections. Due to this vast number, only parties and independent candidates with a vote share of at least 3% were included.

Coding of Municipalities with Very High Level of Violence The list of areas identified as having experienced a very high level of violence looks as follows: Banja Luka, Bratunac, Brčko, Doboј, Foča, Gacko, Gorazde, Konjic, Kotor Varoš, Ključ,

Kozarac, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Srebrenica, Travnik, Trebinje, Višegrad, Visoko, Vitez, Vlasnica, Zvornik. These correspond with 26 municipalities in 2000, since six of the areas are divided into more than one municipal unit.

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