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Russia: A Country Study
Glenn E. Curtis
Federal
Research Division of the Library of Congress
August 20, 1997. Data as of July 1996
Chapter 1. Historical Setting: Early History to
1917
EACH OF THE MANY NATIONALITIES of Russia has a separate
history and complex origins. The historical origins of the
Russian state, however, are chiefly those of the East Slavs,
the ethnic group that evolved into the Russian, Ukrainian,
and Belorussian peoples. The major pre-Soviet states of the
East Slavs were, in chronological order, medieval Kievan
Rus', Muscovy, and the Russian Empire. Three other
states--Poland, Lithuania, and the Mongol Empire--also
played crucial roles in the historical development of
Russia.
The first East Slavic state, Kievan Rus', emerged along
the Dnepr River valley, where it controlled the trade route
between Scandinavia and the Byzantine Empire. Kievan Rus'
adopted Christianity from the Byzantine Empire in the tenth
century, beginning the synthesis of Byzantine and Slavic
cultures that defined Russian culture for the next thousand
years. Kievan Rus' ultimately disintegrated as a state
because of the armed struggles among members of the princely
family that collectively possessed it. Conquest by the
Mongols in the thirteenth century was the final blow in this
disintegration; subsequently, a number of states claimed to
be the heirs to the civilization and dominant position of
Kievan Rus'. One of those states, Muscovy, was a
predominantly Russian territory located at the far northern
edge of the former cultural center. Muscovy gradually came
to dominate neighboring territories, forming the basis for
the future Russian Empire.
Muscovy had significant impact on the civilizations that
followed, and they adopted many of its characteristics,
including the subordination of the individual to the state.
This idea of the dominant state derived from the Slavic,
Mongol, and Byzantine heritage of Muscovy, and it later
emerged in the unlimited power of the tsar. Both individuals
and institutions, even the Russian Orthodox Church, were
subordinate to the state as it was represented in the person
of the autocrat.
A second characteristic of Russian history has been
continual territorial expansion. Beginning with Muscovy's
efforts to consolidate Russian territory as Tatar control
waned in the fifteenth century, expansion soon went beyond
ethnically Russian areas; by the eighteenth century, the
principality of Muscovy had become the huge Russian Empire,
stretching from Poland eastward to the Pacific Ocean. Size
and military might made Russia a major power, but its
acquisition of large territories inhabited by non-Russian
peoples began an enduring pattern of nationality
problems.
Expansion westward sharpened Russia's awareness of its
backwardness and shattered the isolation in which the
initial stages of expansion had taken place. Muscovy was
able to develop at its own pace, but the Russian Empire was
forced to adopt Western technology to compete militarily in
Europe. Under this exigency, Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725)
and subsequent rulers attempted to modernize the country.
Most such efforts struggled with indifferent success to
raise Russia to European levels of technology and
productivity. The technology that Russia adopted brought
with it Western cultural and intellectual currents that
changed the direction in which Russian culture developed. As
Western influence continued, native and foreign cultural
values began a competition that survives in vigorous form in
the 1990s. The nature of Russia's relationship with the West
became an enduring obsession of Russian intellectuals.
Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56) triggered
another attempt at modernization, including the emancipation
of the peasants who had been bound to the land in the system
of serfdom. Despite major reforms enacted in the 1860s,
however, agriculture remained inefficient, industrialization
proceeded slowly, and new social problems emerged. In
addition to masses of peasants seeking land to till, a new
class of industrial workers--the proletariat--and a small
but influential group of middle-class professionals were
dissatisfied with their positions. The non-Russian
populations resented periodic official Russification
campaigns and struggled for autonomy. Successive regimes of
the nineteenth century responded to such pressures with a
combination of halfhearted reform and repression, but no
tsar was willing to cede autocratic rule or share power.
Gradually, the monarch and the state system that surrounded
him became isolated from the rest of society. In the last
decades of the nineteenth century, some intellectuals became
more radical, and groups of professional revolutionaries
emerged.
In spite of its internal problems, Russia continued to
play a major role in international politics. However,
unexpected defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05
sparked a revolution in 1905. At that stage, professionals,
workers, peasants, minority ethnic groups, and soldiers
demanded fundamental reforms. Reluctantly, Nicholas II
responded to the first of Russia's revolutions by granting a
limited constitution, but he increasingly circumvented its
democratic clauses, and autocracy again took command in the
last decade of the tsarist state. World War I found Russia
unready for combat but full of patriotic zeal. However, as
the government proved incompetent and conditions worsened,
war weariness and revolutionary pressures increased, and the
defenders of the autocracy grew fewer.
Chapter 2. Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991
THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA between 1922 and 1991 is
essentially the history of the Soviet Union (the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics--USSR). This ideologically based
empire was roughly coterminous with the Russian Empire,
whose last monarch, Tsar Nicholas II, ruled until 1917. The
Soviet Union was established in December 1922 by the leaders
of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). At that time,
the new nation included the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian,
and Transcaucasian republics.
Revolutions and Civil War
The chaos and hardship that resulted from Russia's entry
into World War I in 1914 were exacerbated in the years that
followed. Russians saw the fall of the Romanov Dynasty,
which had ruled for more than 300 years, followed by a long
struggle for power between the Bolsheviks and a series of
disparate armies, known collectively as the Whites,
supported by Russia's erstwhile wartime allies. The
combination of military occupation and economic disorder
bled the country for three years until the Bolsheviks
triumphed and began to establish a new order.
The February Revolution
By early 1917, the existing order in Russia was verging
on collapse. The country's involvement in World War I had
already cost millions of lives and severely disrupted
Russia's already struggling economy. In an effort to reverse
the worsening military situation, Nicholas II took personal
command of Russian forces at the front, leaving the conduct
of government in Petrograd (St. Petersburg before 1914;
Leningrad after 1924; St. Petersburg after 1991) to his
unpopular wife and a series of incompetent ministers. As a
consequence of these conditions, the morale of the people
rapidly deteriorated.
The spark to the events that ended tsarist rule was
ignited on the streets of Petrograd in February 1917
(according to the Julian calendar then still in use in
Russia; according to the modern Gregorian calendar, which
was adopted in February 1918, these events occurred in
March). Driven by shortages of food and fuel, crowds of
hungry citizens and striking workers began spontaneous
rioting and demonstrations. Local reserve troops, called in
to suppress the riots, refused to fire on the crowds, and
some soldiers joined the workers and other rioters. A few
days later, with tsarist authority in Petrograd
disintegrating, two distinct groups emerged, each claiming
to represent the Russian people. One was the Executive
Committee, which the Duma (see Glossary), the lower house of
the Russian parliament, had established in defiance of the
tsar's orders. The other body was the Petrograd Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
With the consent of the Petrograd Soviet, the Executive
Committee of the Duma organized the Provisional Government
on March 15. The government was a cabinet of ministers
chaired by aristocrat and social reformer Georgiy L'vov. A
legislature, the Constituent Assembly, also was to be
created, but election of the first such body was postponed
until the fall of 1917. Delegates of the new government met
Nicholas that evening at Pskov, where rebellious railroad
workers had stopped the imperial train as the tsar attempted
to return to the capital. Advised by his generals that he
lacked the support of the country, Nicholas informed the
delegates that he was abdicating in favor of his brother,
Grand Duke Michael. When Michael in turn refused the throne,
imperial rule in Russia came to an end.
The Period of Dual Power
The collapse of the monarchy left two rival political
institutions--the Provisional Government and the Petrograd
Soviet--to share administrative authority over the country.
The Petrograd Soviet, drawing its membership from socialist
deputies elected in factories and regiments, coordinated the
activities of other soviets that sprang up across Russia at
this time. The Petrograd Soviet was dominated by moderate
socialists of the Socialist Revolutionary Party and by the
Menshevik (see Glossary) faction of the Russian Social
Democratic Labor Party. The Bolshevik (see Glossary) faction
of the latter party provided the opposition. Although it
represented the interests of Russia's working class, the
Petrograd Soviet at first did not seek to undermine the
Provisional Government's authority directly. Nevertheless,
the Petrograd Soviet's first official order, which came to
be known as Order Number One, instructed soldiers and
sailors to obey their officers and the government only if
their orders did not contradict the decrees of the Petrograd
Soviet--a measure formulated to prevent continuation of
Russia's war effort by crippling the Provisional
Government's control of the military.
The Provisional Government, in contrast to the socialist
Petrograd Soviet, chiefly represented the propertied
classes. Headed by ministers of a moderate or liberal bent,
the new government pledged to convene a constituent assembly
that would usher in a new era of bourgeois democracy modeled
on European constitutionalism. In the meantime, the
government granted unprecedented rights--full freedom of
speech, press, and religion, as well as legal equality--to
all citizens. The government did not take up the matter of
land redistribution, however, leaving that issue for the
Constituent Assembly. Even more damaging, the ministers
favored keeping Russia's military commitments to its allies,
a position that became increasingly unpopular as the war
dragged on. The government suffered its first crisis in the
"April Days," when demonstrations against the government's
war aims forced two ministers to resign, an event that led
to the appointment of Aleksandr Kerenskiy--the only
socialist among the government's ministers--as war minister.
Quickly assuming de facto leadership of the government,
Kerenskiy ordered the army to launch a major offensive in
June. After early successes, that offensive turned into a
full-scale retreat in July.
While the Provisional Government grappled with foreign
foes, the Bolsheviks, who were opposed to bourgeois
democracy, gained new strength. Lenin, the Bolshevik leader,
returned to Petrograd in April 1917 from his wartime
residence in Switzerland. Although he had been born into a
noble family, from his youth Lenin espoused the cause of the
common workers. A committed revolutionary and pragmatic
Marxist thinker, he astounded the Bolsheviks in Petrograd
with his April Theses , in which he boldly called for the
overthrow of the Provisional Government, the transfer of
"all power to the soviets," and the expropriation of
factories by workers and of land belonging to the church,
the nobility, and the gentry by peasants. Lenin's dynamic
presence quickly won the other Bolshevik leaders to his
position, and the radicalized orientation of the Bolshevik
faction attracted new members.
Inspired by Lenin's slogans, crowds of workers, soldiers,
and sailors took to the streets of Petrograd in July to
wrest power from the Provisional Government. But the
spontaneity of the "July Days" caught the Bolshevik leaders
by surprise, and the Petrograd Soviet, controlled by
moderate Mensheviks, refused to take power or to enforce
Bolshevik demands. After the uprising had died down, the
Provisional Government outlawed the Bolsheviks and jailed
Leon Trotsky, leader of a leftist Menshevik faction. Lenin
fled to Finland.
In the aftermath of the "July Days," conservatives sought
to reassert order in society. The army's commander in chief,
General Lavr Kornilov, who protested the influence of the
soviets on both the army and the government, appeared as a
counterrevolutionary threat to Kerenskiy, now prime
minister. Kerenskiy dismissed Kornilov from his command, but
Kornilov, disobeying the order, launched an extemporaneous
revolt on September 10 (August 28). To defend the capital,
Kerenskiy sought help from all quarters and relaxed his ban
on Bolshevik activities. Railroad workers sympathetic to the
Bolsheviks halted Kornilov's troop trains, and Kornilov soon
surrendered, ending the only serious challenge to the
Provisional Government from the right.
The Bolshevik Revolution
Although the Provisional Government survived the Kornilov
revolt, popular support for the government faded rapidly as
the national mood swung to the left in the fall of 1917.
Workers took control of their factories through elected
committees; peasants expropriated lands belonging to the
state, church, nobility, and gentry; and armies melted away
as peasant soldiers deserted to take part in the land
seizures. The Bolsheviks, skillfully exploiting these
popular trends in their propaganda, achieved domination of
the Petrograd and Moscow soviets by September. Trotsky,
freed from prison after the Kornilov revolt, was recruited
as a Bolshevik and named chairman of the Petrograd
Soviet.
Realizing that the time was ripe to seize power by force,
Lenin returned to Petrograd in October and convinced a
majority of the Bolshevik Central Committee, which had hoped
to take power legally, to accept armed uprising in
principle. Trotsky won the Petrograd garrison over to the
soviet, depriving the Provisional Government of its main
military support in Petrograd.
The actual insurrection--the Bolshevik Revolution--began
on November 6, when Kerenskiy ordered the Bolshevik press
closed. Interpreting this action as a counterrevolutionary
move, the Bolsheviks called on their supporters to defend
the Petrograd Soviet. By evening, the Bolsheviks had taken
control of utilities and most government buildings in
Petrograd, thus enabling Lenin to proclaim the downfall of
the Provisional Government on the morning of the next day,
November 7. The Bolsheviks captured the Provisional
Government's cabinet at its Winter Palace headquarters that
night with hardly a shot fired in the government's defense.
Kerenskiy left Petrograd to organize resistance, but his
countercoup failed and he fled Russia. Bolshevik uprisings
soon took place elsewhere; Moscow was under Bolshevik
control within three weeks. The Second Congress of Soviets
met in Petrograd to ratify the Bolshevik takeover after
moderate deputies (mainly Mensheviks and right-wing members
of the Socialist Revolutionary Party) quit the session. The
remaining Bolsheviks and left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries
declared the soviets the governing bodies of Russia and
named the Council of People's Commissars (Sovet narodnykh
kommissarov--Sovnarkom) to serve as the cabinet. Lenin
became chairman of this council. Trotsky took the post of
commissar of foreign affairs; Stalin, a Georgian, became
commissar of nationalities. Thus, by acting decisively while
their opponents vacillated, the Bolsheviks succeeded in
effecting their coup d'état.
On coming to power, the Bolsheviks issued a series of
revolutionary decrees ratifying peasants' seizures of land
and workers' control of industries, abolished laws
sanctioning class privileges, nationalized the banks, and
set up revolutionary tribunals in place of the courts. At
the same time, the revolutionaries now constituting the
regime worked to secure power inside and outside the
government. Deeming Western forms of parliamentary democracy
irrelevant, Lenin argued for a "dictatorship of the
proletariat" based on single-party Bolshevik rule, although
for a time left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries also
participated in the Sovnarkom. The new government created a
secret police agency, the VChK (commonly known as the
Cheka), to persecute enemies of the state (including
bourgeois liberals and moderate socialists). Having convened
the Constituent Assembly, which finally had been elected in
November with the Bolsheviks winning only a quarter of the
seats, the Soviet government dissolved the assembly in
January after a one-day session, ending a short-lived
experiment in parliamentary democracy.
In foreign affairs, the Soviet government, seeking to
disengage Russia from World War I, called on the belligerent
powers for an armistice and peace without annexations. The
Allied Powers rejected this appeal, but Germany and its
allies agreed to a cease-fire. Negotiations began in
December 1917. After dictating harsh terms that the Soviet
government would not accept, however, Germany resumed its
offensive in February 1918, meeting scant resistance from
disintegrating Russian armies. Lenin, after bitter debate
with leading Bolsheviks who favored prolonging the war in
hopes of precipitating class warfare in Germany, persuaded a
slim majority of the Bolshevik Central Committee that peace
must be made at any cost. On March 3, Soviet government
officials signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, relinquishing
Poland, the Baltic lands, Finland, and Ukraine to German
control and giving up a portion of the Caucasus region to
Turkey. With the new border dangerously close to Petrograd,
the government was soon transferred to Moscow. An enormous
part of the population and resources of the Russian Empire
was lost by this treaty, but Lenin understood that no other
alternative could ensure the survival of the fledgling
Soviet state.
Civil War and War Communism
Soon after buying peace with Germany, the Soviet state
found itself under attack from other quarters. By the spring
of 1918, elements dissatisfied with the radical policies of
the communists (as the Bolsheviks started calling
themselves) established centers of resistance in southern
and Siberian Russia. Beginning in April 1918, anticommunist
forces, called the Whites and often led by former officers
of the tsarist army, began to clash with the Red Army, which
Trotsky, named commissar of war in the Soviet government,
organized to defend the new state. A civil war to determine
the future of Russia had begun.
The White armies enjoyed varying degrees of support from
the Allied Powers. Desiring to defeat Germany in any way
possible, Britain, France, and the United States landed
troops in Russia and provided logistical support to the
Whites, whom the Allies trusted would resume Russia's
struggle against Germany after overthrowing the communist
regime. (In March 1918, the Russian Social Democratic Labor
Party officially was renamed the Russian Communist Party
[Bolshevik].) After the Allies defeated Germany in
November 1918, they opted to continue their intervention in
the Russian Civil War against the communists, in the
interests of averting what they feared might become a world
socialist revolution.
During the Civil War, the Soviet regime also had to deal
with struggles for independence in regions that it had given
up under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (which the regime
immediately repudiated after Germany's defeat by the Allies
in November 1918). By force of arms, the communists
established Soviet republics in Belorussia (January 1919),
Ukraine (March 1919), Azerbaijan (April 1920), Armenia
(November 1920), and Georgia (March 1921), but they were
unable to take back the Baltic region, where the independent
states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had been founded
shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution. In December 1917,
the Soviet government recognized the independence of Finland
as a gesture of support to the Finnish Reds. However, that
strategy failed when Finland became a parliamentary republic
in 1918. Poland, reborn after World War I, fought a
successful war with Soviet Russia from April 1920 to March
1921 over the location of the frontier between the two
states.
During its struggle for survival, the Soviet state relied
heavily on the prospect that revolution would spread to
other European industrialized countries. To coordinate the
socialist movement under Soviet auspices, Lenin founded the
Communist International (Comintern) in March 1919. Although
no successful socialist revolutions occurred elsewhere
immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Comintern
provided the communist leadership with the means for later
control of foreign communist parties.
By the end of 1920, the communists had clearly triumphed
in the Civil War. Although in 1919 Soviet Russia had shrunk
to the size of sixteenth-century Muscovy, the Red Army had
the advantage of defending the heartland with Moscow at its
center (see fig. 4). The White armies, divided
geographically and without a clearly defined cause, went
down to defeat one by one. Hopes of restoring the monarchy
ended effectively when communists executed the imperial
family in July 1918. The Allied governments, lacking support
for intervention from their nations' war-weary citizenry,
withdrew most of their forces by 1920. The last foreign
troops departed Siberia in 1922, leaving the Soviet state
unchallenged from abroad.
During the Civil War, the communist regime took
increasingly repressive measures against its domestic
opponents. The constitution of 1918 deprived members of the
former "exploiting classes"--nobles, priests, and
capitalists--of civil rights. Left-wing Socialist
Revolutionaries, formerly partners of the Bolsheviks, became
targets for persecution during what came to be known as the
Red Terror, which followed an attempt on Lenin's life in
August 1918 and lasted into 1920. In those desperate times,
both Reds and Whites murdered and executed without trial
large numbers of suspected enemies. The party also took
measures to ensure greater discipline among its members by
tightening its organization and creating specialized
administrative organs.
In the economic life of the country, too, the communist
regime sought to exert control through a series of drastic
measures that came to be known as war communism. To
coordinate what remained of Russia's economic resources
after years of war, in 1918 the government nationalized
industry and subordinated it to central administrations in
Moscow. Rejecting workers' control of factories as
inefficient, the regime brought in expert managers to run
the factories and organized and directed the factory workers
as in a military mobilization. To feed the urban population,
the Soviet government requisitioned quantities of grain from
the peasantry.
The results of war communism were unsatisfactory.
Industrial production continued to fall. Workers received
wages in kind because inflation had made the ruble
practically worthless. In the countryside, peasants rebelled
against payments in valueless currency by curtailing or
consuming their agricultural production. In late 1920,
strikes broke out in the industrial centers, and peasant
uprisings sprang up across the land as famine ravaged the
countryside. To the Soviet government, however, the most
disquieting manifestation of dissatisfaction with war
communism was the rebellion in March 1921 of sailors at the
naval base at Kronshtadt (near Petrograd), which had earlier
won renown as a bastion of the Bolshevik Revolution.
Although Trotsky and the Red Army succeeded in putting down
the mutiny, it signaled to the party leadership that war
communism had to end. The harsh economic policies of the
Civil War period, however, would have a profound influence
on the future development of the country.
The Era of the New Economic Policy
The period of war communism was followed in the 1920s by
a partial retreat from Bolshevik principles. The New
Economic Policy (Novaya ekonomicheskaya politika--NEP; see
Glossary) permitted certain types of private economic
activity, so that the country might recover from the ravages
of the Civil War. The interval was cut short, however, by
the death of Lenin and the sharply different approach to
governance of his successor, Joseph Stalin.
Lenin's Leadership
With the Kronshtadt base rebelling against war communism,
the Tenth Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party
(Bolshevik) met in March 1921 to hear Lenin argue for a new
course in Soviet policy. Lenin realized that the radical
approach to communism (see Glossary) was unsuited to
existing conditions and jeopardized the survival of his
regime. Now the Soviet leader proposed a tactical retreat,
convincing the congress to adopt a temporary compromise with
capitalism under the NEP program. Under the NEP, market
forces and the monetary system regained their importance.
The state scrapped its policy of grain requisitioning in
favor of taxation, permitting peasants to dispose of their
produce as they pleased. The NEP also denationalized service
enterprises and much small-scale industry, leaving the
"commanding heights" of the economy--large-scale industry,
transportation, and foreign trade--under state control.
Under the mixed economy called for under the NEP,
agriculture and industry staged recoveries, with most
branches of the economy attaining prewar levels of
production by the late 1920s. In general, standards of
living improved during this time, and the "NEP man"--the
independent private trader--became a symbol of the era.
About the time that the party sanctioned partial
decentralization of the economy, it also approved a
quasi-federal structure for the state. During the Civil War,
the non-Russian Soviet republics on the periphery of Russia
were theoretically independent, but in fact they were
controlled by the central government through the party and
the Red Army. Some communists favored a centralized Soviet
state, while nationalists wanted autonomy for the
borderlands. A compromise between the two positions was
reached in December 1922 with the formation of the USSR. The
constituent republics of this "Soviet Union" (the Russian,
Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Transcaucasian republics--the
last combining Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) exercised a
degree of cultural and linguistic autonomy, while the
communist, predominantly Russian, leadership in Moscow
retained political authority over the entire country. The
giant Central Asian territory was given republic status
piecemeal, beginning with the inclusion of the Turkmen and
Uzbek republics in 1924 and concluding with the separation
of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1936. By that year, the
Soviet Union included eleven republics, all with government
structures and ruling communist parties identical to the one
in the Russian Republic.
The party consolidated its authority throughout the
country, becoming a monolithic presence in state and
society. Potential rivals outside the party, including
prominent members of the abolished Menshevik faction and the
Socialist Revolutionary Party, were exiled. Within the
party, Lenin denounced the formation of factions,
particularly by radical-left party members. Central party
organs subordinated local soviets to their authority. Party
members perceived as less committed periodically were purged
from the rosters. The Politburo (Political Bureau), which
became the elite policy-making agency of the nation, created
the new post of general secretary for the supervision of
personnel matters and assigned Stalin to this office in
April 1922. A minor member of the party's Central Committee
at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, Stalin was thought
to be a rather lackluster personality and therefore well
suited to the routine work required of the general
secretary.
From the time of the Bolshevik Revolution and into the
early NEP years, the actual leader of the Soviet state was
Lenin. Although a collective of prominent communists
nominally guided the party and the Soviet Union, Lenin
commanded such prestige and authority that even such
brilliant theoreticians as Trotsky and Nikolay Bukharin
generally yielded to his will. But when Lenin became
temporarily incapacitated after a stroke in May 1922, the
unity of the Politburo fractured, and a troika (triumvirate)
formed by Stalin, Lev Kamenev, and Grigoriy Zinov'yev
assumed leadership in opposition to Trotsky. Lenin recovered
late in 1922 and found fault with the troika, and
particularly with Stalin. In Lenin's view, Stalin had used
coercion to force non-Russian republics to join the Soviet
Union, he was uncouth, and he was accumulating too much
power through his office of general secretary. Although
Lenin recommended that Stalin be removed from that position,
the Politburo decided not to take action, and Stalin still
was in office when Lenin died in January 1924.
As important as Lenin's activities were to the
establishment of the Soviet Union, his legacy to the Soviet
future was perhaps even more significant. By willingly
changing his policies to suit new situations, Lenin had
developed a pragmatic interpretation of Marxism (later
called Marxism-Leninism--see Glossary) that implied that the
party should follow any course that would ultimately lead to
communism. His party, while still permitting
intraorganizational debate, insisted that its members adhere
to the organization's decisions once they were adopted, in
accordance with the principle of democratic centralism.
Finally, because the party embodied the dictatorship of the
proletariat, organized opposition could not be tolerated,
and adversaries would be prosecuted. Thus, although the
Soviet regime was not totalitarian when he died, Lenin had
nonetheless laid the foundation upon which such a tyranny
would later arise.
Stalin's Rise to Power
After Lenin's death, two conflicting schools of thought
about the future of the Soviet Union arose in party debates.
Left-wing communists believed that world revolution was
essential to the survival of socialism in the economically
backward Soviet Union. Trotsky, one of the primary
proponents of this position, called for Soviet support of a
permanent world revolutionary movement. As for domestic
policy, the left wing advocated the rapid development of the
economy and the creation of a socialist society. In contrast
to these militant communists, the right wing of the party,
recognizing that world revolution was unlikely in the
immediate future, favored the gradual development of the
Soviet Union through continuation of pragmatic programs like
the NEP. Yet even Bukharin, one of the major right-wing
theoreticians, believed that socialism could not triumph in
the Soviet Union without assistance from more economically
advanced socialist countries.
Against this backdrop of contrasting perceptions of the
Soviet future, the leading figures of the All-Union
Communist Party (Bolshevik)--the new name of the Russian
Communist Party (Bolshevik) as of December 1925--competed
for influence. The Kamenev-Zinov'yev-Stalin troika, although
it supported the militant international program,
successfully maneuvered against Trotsky and engineered his
removal as commissar of war in 1925. In the meantime, Stalin
gradually consolidated his power base and, when he had
sufficient strength, broke with Kamenev and Zinov'yev.
Belatedly recognizing Stalin's political power, Kamenev and
Zinov'yev made amends with Trotsky in order to join against
their former partner. But Stalin countered their attacks on
his position with his well-timed formulation of the theory
of "socialism in one country." This doctrine, calling for
construction of a socialist society in the Soviet Union
regardless of the international situation, distanced Stalin
from the left and won support from Bukharin and the party's
right wing. With this support, Stalin ousted the leaders of
the "Left Opposition" from their positions in 1926 and 1927
and forced Trotsky into exile in 1928. As the NEP era ended,
open debate within the party became increasingly limited as
Stalin gradually eliminated his opponents.
Transformation and Terror
The gradual accession of Stalin to power in the 1920s
eventually brought an end to the liberalization of society
and the economy, leading instead to a period of
unprecedented government control, mobilization, and
terrorization of society in Russia and the other Soviet
republics. In the 1930s, agriculture and industry underwent
brutal forced centralization, and Russian cultural activity
was highly restricted. Purges eliminated thousands of
individuals deemed dangerous to the Soviet state by Stalin's
operatives.
Industrialization and Collectivization
At the end of the 1920s, a dramatic new phase in economic
development began when Stalin decided to carry out a program
of intensive socialist construction. To some extent, Stalin
pressed economic development at this point as a political
maneuver to eliminate rivals within the party. Because
Bukharin and some other party members would not give up the
gradualistic NEP in favor of radical development, Stalin
branded them "right-wing deviationists" and during 1929 and
1930 used the party organization to remove them from
influential positions. Yet Stalin's break with the NEP also
revealed that his doctrine of building "socialism in one
country" paralleled the line that Trotsky had originally
supported early in the 1920s. Marxism supplied no basis for
Stalin's model of a planned economy, although the
centralized economic controls of the war communism years
seemingly furnished a Leninist precedent. Between 1927 and
1929, the State Planning Committee (Gosudarstvennyy planovyy
komitet--Gosplan) worked out the First Five-Year Plan (see
Glossary) for intensive economic growth; Stalin began to
implement this plan--his "revolution from above"--in
1928.
The First Five-Year Plan called for rapid
industrialization of the economy, with particular emphasis
on heavy industry. The economy was centralized: small-scale
industry and services were nationalized, managers strove to
fulfill Gosplan's output quotas, and the trade unions were
converted into mechanisms for increasing worker
productivity. But because Stalin insisted on unrealistic
production targets, serious problems soon arose. With the
greatest share of investment put into heavy industry,
widespread shortages of consumer goods occurred, and
inflation grew.
To satisfy the state's need for increased food supplies,
the First Five-Year Plan called for the organization of the
peasantry into collective units that the authorities could
easily control. This collectivization program entailed
compounding the peasants' lands and animals into collective
farms (kolkhozy; sing., kolkhoz --see Glossary) and state
farms (sovkhozy; sing., sovkhoz --see Glossary) and
restricting the peasants' movement from these farms. The
effect of this restructuring was to reintroduce a kind of
serfdom into the countryside. Although the program was
designed to affect all peasants, Stalin in particular sought
to eliminate the wealthiest peasants, known as kulaks.
Generally, kulaks were only marginally better off than other
peasants, but the party claimed that the kulaks had ensnared
the rest of the peasantry in capitalistic relationships. In
any event, collectivization met widespread resistance not
only from the kulaks but from poorer peasants as well, and a
desperate struggle of the peasantry against the authorities
ensued. Peasants slaughtered their cows and pigs rather than
turn them over to the collective farms, with the result that
livestock resources remained below the 1929 level for years
afterward. The state in turn forcibly collectivized
reluctant peasants and deported kulaks and active rebels to
Siberia. Within the collective farms, the authorities in
many instances exacted such high levels of procurement that
starvation was widespread.
By 1932 Stalin realized that both the economy and society
were under serious strain. Although industry failed to meet
its production targets and agriculture actually lost ground
in comparison with 1928 yields, Stalin declared that the
First Five-Year Plan had successfully met its goals in four
years. He then proceeded to set more realistic goals. Under
the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-37), the state devoted
attention to consumer goods, and the factories built under
the first plan helped increase industrial output in general.
The Third Five-Year Plan, begun in 1938, produced poorer
results because of a sudden shift of emphasis to armaments
production in response to the worsening international
climate. In general, however, the Soviet economy had become
industrialized by the end of the 1930s. Agriculture, which
had been exploited to finance the industrialization drive,
continued to show poor returns throughout the decade.
The Purges
The complete subjugation of the party to Stalin, its
leader, paralleled the subordination of industry and
agriculture to the state. Stalin had assured his preeminent
position by squelching Bukharin and the "right-wing
deviationists" in 1929 and 1930. To secure his absolute
control over the party, however, Stalin began to purge
leaders and rank-and-file members whose loyalty he
doubted.
Stalin's purges began in December 1934, when Sergey
Kirov, a popular Leningrad party chief who advocated a
moderate policy toward the peasants, was assassinated.
Although details remain murky, many Western historians
believe that Stalin instigated the murder to rid himself of
a potential opponent. In any event, in the resultant mass
purge of the local Leningrad party, thousands were deported
to camps in Siberia. Zinov'yev and Kamenev, Stalin's former
political partners, received prison sentences for their
alleged role in Kirov's murder. At the same time, the
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodnyy
komissariat vnutrennikh del--NKVD), the secret police agency
that was heir to the Cheka of the early 1920s, stepped up
surveillance through its agents and informers and claimed to
uncover anti-Soviet conspiracies among prominent long-term
party members. At three publicized show trials held in
Moscow between 1936 and 1938, dozens of these Old
Bolsheviks, including Zinov'yev, Kamenev, and Bukharin,
confessed to improbable crimes against the Soviet state.
Their confessions were quickly followed by execution. (The
last of Stalin's old enemies, Trotsky, who supposedly had
masterminded the conspiracies against Stalin from abroad,
was murdered in Mexico in 1940, presumably by the NKVD.)
Coincident with the show trials of the original leadership
of the party, unpublicized purges swept through the ranks of
younger leaders in party, government, industrial management,
and cultural affairs. Party purges in the non-Russian
republics were particularly severe. The Yezhovshchina ("era
of Yezhov," named for NKVD chief Nikolay Yezhov) ravaged the
military as well, leading to the execution or incarceration
of about half the officer corps. The secret police also
terrorized the general populace, with untold numbers of
common people punished after spurious accusations. By the
time the purges subsided in 1938, millions of Soviet
leaders, officials, and other citizens had been executed,
imprisoned, or exiled.
The reasons for the period of widespread purges, which
became known as the Great Terror, remain unclear. Western
historians variously hypothesize that Stalin created the
terror out of a desire to goad the population to carry out
his intensive modernization program, or to atomize society
to preclude dissent, or simply out of brutal paranoia.
Whatever the causes, the purges must be viewed as having
weakened the Soviet state.
In 1936, just as the Great Terror was intensifying,
Stalin approved a new Soviet constitution to replace that of
1924. Hailed as "the most democratic constitution in the
world," the 1936 document stipulated free and secret
elections based on universal suffrage and guaranteed the
citizenry a range of civil and economic rights. But in
practice the freedoms implied by these rights were denied by
provisions elsewhere in the constitution that indicated that
the basic structure of Soviet society could not be changed
and that the party retained all political power.
The power of the party, in turn, now was concentrated in
the persons of Stalin and the members of his handpicked
Politburo. As if to symbolize the lack of influence of the
party rank and file, party congresses were convened less and
less frequently. State power, far from "withering away"
after the revolution as Karl Marx had prescribed, instead
grew. With Stalin consciously building what critics would
later describe as a cult of personality, the reverence
accorded him in Soviet society gradually eclipsed that given
to Lenin.
Mobilization of Society
Concomitant with industrialization and collectivization,
society also experienced wide-ranging regimentation.
Collective enterprises replaced individualistic efforts
across the board. Not only did the regime abolish private
farms and businesses, but it collectivized scientific and
literary endeavors as well. As the 1930s progressed, the
revolutionary experimentation that had characterized many
facets of cultural and social life gave way to conservative
norms.
Considerations of order and discipline dominated social
policy, which became an instrument of the modernization
effort. Workers came under strict labor codes demanding
punctuality and discipline, and labor unions served as
extensions of the industrial ministries. At the same time,
higher pay and privileges accrued to productive workers and
labor brigades. To provide greater social stability, the
state aimed to strengthen the family by restricting divorce
and abolishing abortion.
Literature and the arts came under direct party control
during the 1930s, with mandatory membership in unions of
writers, musicians, and other artists entailing adherence to
established standards. After 1934 the party dictated that
creative works had to express socialistic spirit through
traditional forms. This officially sanctioned doctrine,
called "socialist realism," applied to all fields of art.
The state repressed works that were stylistically innovative
or lacked appropriate content.
The party also subjected science and the liberal arts to
its scrutiny. Development of scientific theory in a number
of fields had to be based upon the party's understanding of
the Marxist dialectic, which derailed serious research in
certain disciplines. The party took a more active role in
directing work in the social sciences. In the writing of
history, the orthodox Marxist interpretation employed in the
late 1920s was modified to include nationalistic themes and
to stress the role of great leaders to create legitimacy for
Stalin's dictatorship.
Education returned to traditional forms as the party
discarded the experimental programs of Lunacharskiy after
1929. Admission procedures underwent modification:
candidates for higher education now were selected on the
basis of their academic records rather than their class
origins. Religion suffered from a state policy of increased
repression, starting with the closure of numerous churches
in 1929. Persecution of clergy was particularly severe
during the purges of the late 1930s, when many of the
faithful went underground (see The Russian Orthodox Church,
ch. 4).
The Khrushchev Era
The end of the Stalin era brought immediate
liberalization in several aspects of Soviet life. Party
leader Nikita S. Khrushchev denounced Stalin's tyrannical
reign in 1956, signaling a sharp break with the past.
Because Khrushchev lacked the all-encompassing power of
Stalin, his time in office was marked by continuous
maneuvering against political enemies much more real than
Stalin's had been. Party control of cultural activity became
much less restrictive with the onset of the first "thaw" in
the mid-1950s. Khrushchev attempted reforms in both domestic
and foreign policy, with mixed results. During his tenure
(1953-64), world politics became much more complex as the
insecurities of the Cold War persisted; Khrushchev
ultimately was undone by a combination of failed policy
innovations in agriculture, party politics, and
industry.
Collective Leadership and the Rise of Khrushchev
Stalin died without naming an heir, and none of his
associates had the power to make an immediate claim to
supreme leadership. At first the deceased dictator's
colleagues tried to rule jointly, with Malenkov holding the
top position of prime minister. The first challenge to this
arrangement occurred in 1953, when the powerful Beria
plotted a coup. However, Beria, who had made many enemies
during his bloody term as security chief, was arrested and
executed by order of the Presidium. His death reduced the
inordinate power of the secret police, although the party's
strict control over the state security organs ended only
with the demise of the Soviet Union itself (see Internal
Security Before 1991, ch. 10).
After the elimination of Beria, the succession struggle
became more subtle. Malenkov found a formidable rival in
Khrushchev, whom the Presidium elected first secretary
(Stalin's title of general secretary was abolished after his
death) in September 1953. Of peasant background, Khrushchev
had served as head of the Ukrainian party organization
during and after World War II, and he was a member of the
Soviet political elite during the late Stalin period. The
rivalry between Malenkov and Khrushchev manifested itself
publicly in the contrast between Malenkov's support for
increased production of consumer goods and Khrushchev's
stand-pat backing for continued development of heavy
industry. After a poor showing by light industry and
agriculture, Malenkov resigned as prime minister in February
1955. Because the new prime minister, Nikolay Bulganin, had
little influence or real power, the departure of Malenkov
made Khrushchev the most important figure within the
collective leadership.
At the Twentieth Party Congress, held in February 1956,
Khrushchev further advanced his position within the party by
denouncing Stalin's crimes in a dramatic "secret speech."
Khrushchev revealed that Stalin had arbitrarily liquidated
thousands of party members and military leaders, thereby
contributing to the initial Soviet defeats in World War II,
and had established what Khrushchev characterized as a
pernicious cult of personality. With this speech, Khrushchev
not only distanced himself from Stalin and from Stalin's
close associates, Molotov, Malenkov, and Lazar Kaganovich,
but he also abjured the dictator's use of terror as an
instrument of policy. As a direct result of the
"de-Stalinization" campaign launched by Khrushchev's speech,
the release of political prisoners, which had begun in 1953,
was stepped up, and some of Stalin's victims were
posthumously rehabilitated. Khrushchev intensified his
campaign against Stalin at the Twenty-Second Party Congress
in 1961, winning approval to remove Stalin's body from the
Lenin Mausoleum, where it had originally been interred.
De-Stalinization encouraged many in artistic and
intellectual circles to speak out against the abuses of the
former regime. Although Khrushchev's tolerance for critical
creative works varied during his tenure, the new cultural
period--known as the "thaw"--represented a clear break with
the repression of the arts under Stalin.
After the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev continued
to expand his influence, although he still faced opposition.
His rivals in the Presidium, spurred by reversals in Soviet
foreign policy in Eastern Europe in 1956, potentially
threatening economic reforms, and the de-Stalinization
campaign, united to vote him out of office in June 1957.
Khrushchev, however, demanded that the matter be put to the
Central Committee of the CPSU, where he enjoyed strong
support. The Central Committee overturned the Presidium's
decision and expelled Khrushchev's opponents (Malenkov,
Molotov, and Kaganovich), whom Khrushchev labeled the
"antiparty group." In a departure from Stalinist procedure,
Khrushchev did not order the imprisonment or execution of
his defeated rivals but instead placed them in relatively
minor offices.
Khrushchev moved to consolidate his power further in the
ensuing months. In October he removed Marshal Zhukov (who
had helped Khrushchev squelch the "antiparty group") from
the office of defense minister, presumably because he feared
Zhukov's influence in the armed forces. Khrushchev became
prime minister in March 1958 when Bulganin resigned, thus
formally confirming his predominant position in the state as
well as in the party.
Despite his rank, Khrushchev never exercised the
dictatorial authority of Stalin, nor did he ever completely
control the party, even at the peak of his power. His
attacks on members of the "antiparty group" at the
Twenty-First Party Congress in 1959 and the Twenty-Second
Party Congress in 1961 suggest that his opponents retained
support within the party. Khrushchev's relative political
insecurity probably accounted for some of his grandiose
pronouncements, for example his 1961 promise that the Soviet
Union would attain communism by 1980. His desire to
undermine opposition and mollify critics explained the
nature of many of his domestic reforms and the vacillations
in his foreign policy toward the West.
The Brezhnev Era
The regime that followed Khrushchev took a much more
conservative approach to most problems. Stalinism did not
return, but there was less latitude for individual
expression. Foreign relations continued to roller-coaster,
with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 constituting a
major setback for relations with the West. The Soviet
economy continued to falter, reaping no apparent benefit
from the end of Khrushchev's economic experimentation.
Collective Leadership and the Rise of Brezhnev
After removing Khrushchev from power, the leaders of the
Politburo (as the Presidium was renamed in 1966 by the
Twenty-Third Party Congress) and Secretariat again
established a collective leadership. As was the case
following Stalin's death, several individuals, including
Aleksey Kosygin, Nikolay Podgornyy, and Leonid I. Brezhnev,
contended for power behind a facade of unity. Kosygin
accepted the position of prime minister, which he held until
his retirement in 1980. Brezhnev, who took the post of first
secretary, may have been viewed originally by his colleagues
as an interim appointee.
Born to a Russian worker's family in 1906, Brezhnev
became a Khrushchev protégé early in his
career and through his patron's influence rose to membership
in the Presidium. As his own power grew, Brezhnev built up a
coterie of followers whom he, as first secretary, gradually
maneuvered into powerful positions. At the same time,
Brezhnev slowly demoted or isolated possible contenders for
his office. For instance, in December 1965 he succeeded in
elevating Podgornyy to the ceremonial position of chairman
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the highest
legislative organization in the government, thus eliminating
him as a rival. But Brezhnev's rise was very gradual; only
in 1971, when he succeeded in appointing four close
associates to the Politburo, did it become clear that his
was the most influential voice in the collective leadership.
After several more personnel changes, Brezhnev assumed the
chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1977,
confirming his primacy in both party and state.
The years after Khrushchev were notable for the stability
of the cadres, groups of activists in responsible and
influential positions in the party and state apparatus. By
introducing the slogan "Trust in Cadres" in 1965, Brezhnev
won the support of many bureaucrats wary of the constant
reorganizations of the Khrushchev era and eager for security
in established hierarchies. Indicative of the stability of
the period is the fact that nearly half of the Central
Committee members in 1981 were holdovers from fifteen years
earlier. The corollary to this stability was the aging of
Soviet leaders; the average age of Politburo members rose
from fifty-five in 1966 to sixty-eight in 1982. The Soviet
leadership (or the "gerontocracy," as it was referred to in
the West) became increasingly conservative and ossified.
Conservative policies characterized the regime's agenda
in the years after Khrushchev. Upon assuming power, the
collective leadership not only reversed such Khrushchev
policies as the bifurcation of the party, it also halted
de-Stalinization. Indeed, favorable references to the dead
dictator began to appear. The Soviet constitution of 1977,
although differing in certain respects from the 1936 Stalin
document, retained the general thrust of the latter. In
contrast to the relative cultural freedom permitted during
the early Khrushchev years, Brezhnev and his colleagues
continued the more restrictive line of the later Khrushchev
era. The leadership was unwilling or unable to employ
Stalinist means to control Soviet society; instead, it opted
to use repressive tactics against political dissidents even
after the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Accords of 1975,
which bound signatory nations to higher standards of human
rights observance. Dissidents persecuted during this time
included writers and activists in outlawed religious,
nationalist, and human rights movements. In the latter part
of the Brezhnev era, the regime tolerated popular
expressions of anti-Semitism. Under conditions of "developed
socialism" (the historical stage that the Soviet Union
attained in 1977, according to the CPSU), the precepts of
Marxism-Leninism were taught and reinforced as a means to
bolster the authority of the regime rather than as a tool
for revolutionary action.
Perestroika
Domestic policy in the Gorbachev era was conducted
primarily under three programs, whose names became household
words: perestroika (rebuilding--see Glossary), glasnost
(public voicing--see Glossary), and demokratizatsiya
(democratization--see Glossary). The first of these was
applied primarily to the economy, but it was meant to refer
to society in general. Over the course of Soviet rule,
society in the Soviet Union had grown more urbanized, better
educated, and more complex. Old methods of exhortation and
coercion were inappropriate, yet Brezhnev's government had
denied change rather than mastered it. Despite Andropov's
efforts to reintroduce some measure of discipline, the
communist superpower remained stagnant. Once Gorbachev began
to call for bolder reforms, the "acceleration" gave way to
perestroika .
Throughout the early years of his rule, Gorbachev spoke
of perestroika , but only in early 1987 did the slogan
become a full-scale campaign and yield practical results. At
that time, measures were adopted on the formation of
cooperatives and joint ventures (see The Perestroika
Program, ch. 6). At a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee
in January 1987, Gorbachev explicitly applied the label to
his program to devolve economic and political control. In
economics, perestroika meant greater leeway in decision
making for plant managers, allowance for a certain degree of
individual initiative and the chance to make a profit.
In January 1988, the new Law on State Enterprises went
into effect, allowing enterprises to set many of their own
prices and wages. Results were disappointing, however,
because workers demanded steep wage increases. As the
government printed more money, products fetched higher
prices outside the official economy. Thus, goods usually
sold in state stores at fixed prices quickly disappeared as
speculators snatched them up or producers ceased making
deliveries. By September 1988, many staple products could
not be found even in Moscow. During 1988-89 Gorbachev also
issued orders to the oblast party committees to cease
interfering in the economy, and he cut the staffs of state
committees and ministries involved in the economy in order
to prevent them from further tampering with it. Without the
state and the party to hold it together and guide it, the
economy went into free-fall (see Unforeseen Results of
Reform, ch. 6).
In the summer of 1990, Yeltsin, who had been elected
chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic in
May, backed a radical economic reform plan that would have
spelled the end of many special interests within the party.
Gorbachev in turn presented a much less extreme
"Presidential Plan," which the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet
Union passed. Yeltsin threatened that the Russian Republic
would proceed with the initial radical plan, but shortly
thereafter he suspended it.
In January 1991, Gorbachev replaced Prime Minister
Nikolay Ryzhkov, who had become identified with the regime's
economic failures, with Valentin Pavlov, an opponent of
radical reform. Pavlov immediately created a mass panic by
withdrawing large-denomination banknotes from circulation
and limiting the public's ability to convert them to
lower-denomination notes. The move, designed to reduce the
vast sums of money circulating and to punish "black
marketeers" hoarding large banknotes, only intensified the
people's mistrust of the Soviet government. The economy
continued to spiral downward, and Gorbachev and Shevardnadze
had to ask the West for financial aid in order to stave off
collapse. Gorbachev's retreat marked the last time economic
reform dominated the agenda of a Soviet government.
Glasnost
As perestroika was failing, the two policies designed to
promote it, glasnost and demokratizatsiya , were moving out
of control. To mobilize the populace in support of
perestroika , Gorbachev and his aide Aleksandr Yakovlev
introduced glasnost , a policy of liberalized information
flow aimed at publicizing the corruption and inefficiency of
Brezhnev's policies and colleagues--qualities that the
Russian public long had recognized and accepted in its
leadership but that had never been acknowledged by the
Kremlin. Like perestroika , this policy had unintended
results. Gorbachev had meant to shape the new information
emanating from his government in a way that would encourage
political participation in support of his economic and
social programs. Instead, the process of calling into
question the whole Stalinist system inevitably led to
questions about the wisdom of Lenin, the man who had allowed
Stalin to rise in the first place. Because Lenin was the
undisputed founder of the Soviet Union, the process then
moved even farther as open questioning signified that
somehow the Soviet Union, supposedly immune to such doubts,
had lost its raison d'être.
The official announcement of glasnost , scheduled for
mid-1986, was overtaken by an event that lent new meaning to
the term. In April 1986, a reactor explosion at the
Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station, located in northern
Ukraine, covered Belorussia, the Baltics, parts of Russia,
and Scandinavia with a cloud of radioactive dust (see table
3, Appendix). The efforts to contain the accident and its
attendant publicity were handled with exceptional
ineptitude, setting glasnost back by six months as official
news sources scrambled to control the flow of information to
the public.
Despite the clumsy reaction of the Soviet government to
the Chernobyl' episode, Gorbachev turned the accident in his
favor by citing it as an example of the need for economic
perestroika . Taking their cue from Gorbachev, throughout
the Soviet Union the news media reported numerous examples
of mismanagement of resources, waste, ecological damage, and
the effects of this damage on public health. In the Soviet
republics, these revelations had the unintended effect of
accelerating the formation of popular fronts pushing for
autonomy or independence.
The officially controlled phase of glasnost began the
examination of "blank pages" in Soviet history. Literary
journals filled up with long-suppressed works by writers
such as Anna Akhmatova, Joseph Brodsky, Mikhail Bulgakov,
Boris Pasternak, and Andrey Platonov. Newspapers and
magazines carried stories of Stalin-era acts of repression,
concentration camps, and mass graves. The works of Marxist
theoretician Nikolay Bukharin, shot in 1938 for alleged
rightist deviation, appeared. By revealing communist party
crimes against the Soviet peoples, and the peasants in
particular, glasnost further undermined Soviet federalism
and contributed to the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Demokratizatsiya
By 1987 Gorbachev had concluded that introducing his
reforms required more than discrediting the old guard. He
changed his strategy from trying to work through the CPSU as
it existed and instead embraced a degree of political
liberalization. In January 1987, he appealed over the heads
of the party to the people and called for demokratizatsiya ,
the infusion of "democratic" elements into the Soviet
Union's sterile, monolithic political process. For
Gorbachev, demokratizatsiya meant the introduction of
multicandidate--not multiparty--elections for local party
and soviet offices. In this way, he hoped to rejuvenate the
party with progressive personnel who would carry out his
institutional and policy reforms. The CPSU would retain sole
custody of the ballot box.
Despite Gorbachev's intentions, the elements of a
multiparty system already were crystallizing. In contrast to
previous Soviet rulers, Gorbachev had permitted the
formation of unofficial organizations. In October 1987, the
newspaper of the CPSU youth, Komsomol'skaya pravda ,
reported that informal groups, so-called neformaly , were
"growing as fast as mushrooms in the rain." The concerns of
these groups included the environment, sports, history,
computers, philosophy, art, literature, and the preservation
of historical landmarks. In August 1987, forty-seven
neformaly held a conference in Moscow without interference
from the authorities. In fact, one of the unofficial
attendees was Yeltsin. In early 1988, some 30,000 neformaly
existed in the Soviet Union. One year later, their number
had more than doubled. These informal groups begot popular
fronts, which in turn spawned political parties. The first
of those parties was the Democratic Union, formed in May
1988.
Gorbachev's Reform Dilemma
Gorbachev increasingly found himself caught between
criticism by conservatives who wanted to stop reform and
liberals who wanted to accelerate it. When one of these
groups pressed too hard, Gorbachev resorted to political
methods from the Brezhnev era. For example, when Yeltsin
spoke out in 1987 against the slow pace of reform, he was
stripped of his Politburo and Moscow CPSU posts. At the
party meeting where Yeltsin was removed from his post,
Gorbachev personally subjected him to verbal abuse
reminiscent of the Stalin era.
Despite some setbacks, reform efforts continued. In June
1988, at the CPSU's Nineteenth Party Conference, the first
held since 1941, Gorbachev launched radical reforms meant to
reduce party control of the government apparatus. He again
called for multicandidate elections for regional and local
legislatures and party first secretaries and insisted on the
separation of the government apparatus from party bodies at
the regional level as well. In the face of an overwhelming
majority of conservatives, Gorbachev still was able to rely
on party discipline to force through acceptance of his
reform proposals. Experts called the conference a successful
step in promoting party-directed change from above.
At an unprecedented emergency Central Committee plenum
called by Gorbachev in September 1988, three stalwart
old-guard members left the Politburo or lost positions of
power. Andrey Gromyko retired from the Politburo, Yegor
Ligachev was relieved of the ideology portfolio within the
Secretariat, and Boris Pugo replaced Politburo member
Mikhail Solomentsev as chairman of the powerful Party
Control Committee. The Supreme Soviet then elected Gorbachev
chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. These
changes meant that the Secretariat, until that time solely
responsible for the development and implementation of party
policies, had lost much of its power.
Meaningful changes also occurred in governmental
structures. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet approved
formation of a Congress of People's Deputies, which
constitutional amendments had established as the Soviet
Union's new legislative body. The Supreme Soviet then
dissolved itself. The amendments called for a smaller
working body of 542 members, also called the Supreme Soviet,
to be elected from the 2,250-member Congress of People's
Deputies. To ensure a communist majority in the new
parliament, Gorbachev reserved one-third of the seats for
the CPSU and other public organizations.
The March 1989 election of the Congress of People's
Deputies marked the first time that voters of the Soviet
Union ever chose the membership of a national legislative
body. The results of the election stunned the ruling elite.
Throughout the country, voters crossed off the ballot
unopposed communist candidates, many of them prominent party
officials, taking advantage of the nominal privilege of
withholding approval of the listed candidates. However, the
Congress of People's Deputies that emerged still contained
87 percent CPSU members. Genuine reformists won only some
300 seats.
In May the initial session of the Congress of People's
Deputies electrified the country. For two weeks on live
television, deputies from around the country railed against
every scandal and shortcoming of the Soviet system that
could be identified. Speakers spared neither Gorbachev, the
KGB, nor the military. Nevertheless, a conservative majority
maintained control of the congress. Gorbachev was elected
without opposition to the chairmanship of the new Supreme
Soviet; then the Congress of People's Deputies elected a
large majority of old-style party apparatchiks to fill the
membership of its new legislative body. Outspoken party
critic Yeltsin obtained a seat in the Supreme Soviet only
when another deputy relinquished his position. The first
Congress of People's Deputies was the last moment of real
control for Gorbachev over the political life of the Soviet
Union.
Chapter 7. Government and Politics
SINCE GAINING ITS INDEPENDENCE with the collapse of the
Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Russia (formally, the
Russian Federation) has faced serious challenges in its
efforts to forge a political system to follow nearly
seventy-five years of centralized, totalitarian rule. For
instance, leading figures in the legislative and executive
branches have put forth opposing views of Russia's political
direction and the governmental instruments that should be
used to follow it. That conflict reached a climax in
September and October 1993, when President Boris N. Yeltsin
used military force to dissolve the parliament and called
for new legislative elections. This event marked the end of
Russia's first constitutional period, which was defined by
the much-amended constitution adopted by the Russian
Republic in 1978. A new constitution, creating a strong
presidency, was approved by referendum in December 1993.
With a new constitution and a new parliament representing
diverse parties and factions, Russia's political structure
subsequently showed signs of stabilization. However, since
that time Russians have continued to debate the future of
their political system, with Western-style democracy and
authoritarianism being two widely considered alternatives.
As the transition period extended into the mid-1990s, the
power of the national government continued to wane as
Russia's regions gained political and economic concessions
from Moscow. Although the struggle between the executive and
the legislative branches was partially resolved by the new
constitution, the two branches continued to represent
fundamentally opposing visions of Russia's future. The
executive was the center of reform, and the lower house of
the parliament, the State Duma, was a bastion of antireform
communists and nationalists.
Historical Background
The Soviet Union formally came into being under the
treaty of union in December 1922, which was signed by Russia
and three other union republics--Belorussia (now Belarus),
Ukraine, and what was then the Transcaucasian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic (an entity including Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia). Under the treaty, Russia became
known officially as the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic (RSFSR). The treaty of union was incorporated into
the first Soviet constitution, which was promulgated in
1924. Nominally, the borders of each subunit were drawn to
incorporate the territory of a specific nationality. The
constitution endowed the new republics with sovereignty,
although they were said to have voluntarily delegated most
of their sovereign powers to the Soviet center. Formal
sovereignty was evidenced by the existence of flags,
constitutions, and other state symbols, and by the
republics' constitutionally guaranteed "right" to secede
from the union. Russia was the largest of the union
republics in terms of territory and population. Ethnic
Russians dominated Soviet politics and government; they also
controlled local administration.
Because of the Russians' dominance in the affairs of the
union, the RSFSR failed to develop some of the institutions
of governance and administration that were typical of public
life in the other republics: a republic-level communist
party, a Russian academy of sciences, and Russian branches
of trade unions, for example. As the titular nationalities
of the other fourteen union republics began to call for
greater republic rights in the late 1980s, however, ethnic
Russians also began to demand the creation or strengthening
of various specifically Russian institutions in the RSFSR.
Certain policies of Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev (in
office 1985-91) also encouraged nationalities in the union
republics, including the Russian Republic, to assert their
rights. These policies included glasnost (literally, public
voicing--see Glossary), which made possible open discussion
of democratic reforms and long-ignored public problems such
as pollution. Glasnost also brought constitutional reforms
that led to the election of new republic legislatures with
substantial blocs of pro-reform representatives.
In Russia a new legislature, called the Congress of
People's Deputies, was elected in March 1990 in a largely
free and competitive vote. Upon convening in May, the
congress elected Boris N. Yeltsin, a onetime Gorbachev
protégé who had been exiled from the top party
echelon because of his radical reform proposals, as
president of the congress's permanent working body, the
Supreme Soviet. The next month, the congress declared
Russia's sovereignty over its natural resources and the
primacy of Russia's laws over those of the central Soviet
government. During 1990-91, the RSFSR enhanced its
sovereignty by establishing republic branches of
organizations such as the communist party, the Academy of
Sciences (see Glossary) of the Soviet Union, radio and
television broadcasting facilities, and the Committee for
State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti--KGB;
see Glossary). In 1991 Russia created a new executive
office, the presidency, following the example of Gorbachev,
who had created such an office for himself in 1990. Russia
held a popular election that conferred legitimacy on the
office, whereas Gorbachev had eschewed such an election and
had himself appointed by the Soviet parliament. Despite
Gorbachev's attempts to discourage Russia's electorate from
voting for him, Yeltsin was popularly elected as president
in June 1991, handily defeating five other candidates with
more than 57 percent of the vote.
Yeltsin used his role as president to trumpet Russian
sovereignty and patriotism, and his legitimacy as president
was a major cause of the collapse of the coup by hard-line
government and party officials against Gorbachev in August
1991. The coup leaders had attempted to overthrow Gorbachev
in order to halt his plan to sign a confederation treaty
that they believed would wreck the Soviet Union. Yeltsin
defiantly opposed the coup plotters and called for
Gorbachev's restoration, rallying the Russian public. Most
important, Yeltsin's opposition led elements in the "power
ministries" that controlled the military, the police, and
the KGB to refuse to obey the orders of the coup plotters.
The opposition led by Yeltsin, combined with the
irresolution of the plotters, caused the coup to collapse
after three days.
Following the failed coup, Gorbachev found a
fundamentally changed constellation of power, with Yeltsin
in de facto control of much of a sometimes recalcitrant
Soviet administrative apparatus. Although Gorbachev returned
to his position as Soviet president, events began to bypass
him. Communist party activities were suspended. Most of the
union republics quickly declared their independence,
although many appeared willing to sign Gorbachev's vaguely
delineated confederation treaty. The Baltic states achieved
full independence, and they quickly received diplomatic
recognition from many nations. Gorbachev's rump government
recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania in August and September 1991.
In late 1991, the Yeltsin government assumed budgetary
control over Gorbachev's rump government. Russia did not
declare its independence, and Yeltsin continued to hope that
some form of confederation could be established. In
December, one week after the Ukrainian Republic approved
independence by referendum, Yeltsin and the leaders of
Ukraine and Belarus met to form the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS--see Glossary). In response to calls
by the Central Asian and other union republics for
admission, another meeting was held in Alma-Ata, on December
21, to form an expanded CIS. At that meeting, all parties
declared that the 1922 treaty of union creating the Soviet
Union was annulled and that the Soviet Union had ceased to
exist. Gorbachev announced the decision officially December
25. Russia gained international recognition as the principal
successor to the Soviet Union, receiving the Soviet Union's
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and
positions in other international and regional organizations.
The CIS states also agreed that Russia initially would take
over Soviet embassies and other properties abroad.
In October 1991, during the "honeymoon" period after his
resistance to the Soviet coup, Yeltsin convinced the
legislature to grant him important special executive powers
for one year so that he might implement his economic
reforms. In November 1991, he appointed a new government,
with himself as acting prime minister, a post he held until
the appointment of Yegor Gaydar as acting prime minister in
June 1992.
During 1992 Yeltsin and his reforms came under increasing
attack by former communist party members and officials,
extreme nationalists, and others calling for reform to be
slowed or halted in Russia. A locus of this opposition was
increasingly the bicameral parliament, whose upper house was
the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) and lower house the
Supreme Soviet. The lower house was headed by Ruslan
Khasbulatov, who became Yeltsin's most vocal opponent. Under
the 1978 constitution, the parliament was the supreme organ
of power in Russia. After Russia added the office of
president in 1991, the division of powers between the two
branches was ambiguous.
Although Yeltsin managed to beat back most challenges to
his reform program when the CPD met in April 1992, in
December he suffered a significant loss of his special
executive powers. The CPD ordered him to halt appointments
of administrators in the localities and also the practice of
naming additional local oversight emissaries (termed
"presidential representatives"). Yeltsin also lost the power
to issue special decrees concerning the economy, while
retaining his constitutional power to issue decrees in
accordance with existing laws. When his attempt to secure
confirmation of Gaydar as prime minister was rejected,
Yeltsin appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin, whom the parliament
approved because he was viewed as more economically
conservative than Gaydar. After contentious negotiations
between the parliament and Yeltsin, the two sides agreed to
hold a national referendum to allow the population to
determine the basic division of powers between the two
branches of government. In the meantime, proposals for
extreme limitation of Yeltsin's power were tabled.
However, early 1993 saw increasing tension between
Yeltsin and the parliament over the language of the
referendum and power sharing. In mid-March 1993, an
emergency session of the CPD rejected Yeltsin's proposals on
power sharing and canceled the referendum, again opening the
door to legislation that would shift the balance of power
away from the president. Faced with these setbacks, Yeltsin
addressed the nation directly to announce a "special
regime," under which he would assume extraordinary executive
power pending the results of a referendum on the timing of
new legislative elections, on a new constitution, and on
public confidence in the president and vice president. After
the Constitutional Court declared his announcement
unconstitutional, Yeltsin backed down (see The Judiciary,
this ch.).
Despite Yeltsin's change of heart, a second extraordinary
session of the CPD took up discussion of emergency measures
to defend the constitution, including impeachment of the
president. Although the impeachment vote failed, the CPD set
new terms for a popular referendum. The legislature's
version of the referendum asked whether citizens had
confidence in Yeltsin, approved of his reforms, and
supported early presidential and legislative elections.
Under the CPD's terms, Yeltsin would need the support of 50
percent of eligible voters, rather than 50 percent of those
actually voting, to avoid an early presidential election. In
the vote on April 25, Russians failed to provide this level
of approval, but a majority of voters approved Yeltsin's
policies and called for new legislative elections. Yeltsin
termed the results, which were a serious blow to the
prestige of the parliament, a mandate for him to continue in
power.
In June 1993, Yeltsin decreed the creation of a special
constitutional convention to examine the draft constitution
that he had presented in April. This convention was designed
to circumvent the parliament, which was working on its own
draft constitution. As expected, the two main drafts
contained contrary views of legislative-executive relations.
The convention, which included delegates from major
political and social organizations and the eighty-nine
subnational jurisdictions, approved a compromise draft
constitution in July 1993, incorporating some aspects of the
parliament's draft. The parliament failed to approve the
draft, however.
In late September 1993, Yeltsin responded to the impasse
in legislative-executive relations by repeating his
announcement of a constitutional referendum, but this time
he followed the announcement by dissolving the parliament
and announcing new legislative elections for December. The
CPD again met in emergency session, confirmed Vice President
Aleksandr Rutskoy as president, and voted to impeach
Yeltsin. On September 27, military units surrounded the
legislative building (popularly known as the White House),
but 180 delegates refused to leave the building. After a
two-week standoff, Rutskoy urged supporters outside the
legislative building to overcome Yeltsin's military forces.
Firefights and destruction of property resulted at several
locations in Moscow. The next day, under the direction of
Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, tanks fired on the White
House, and military forces occupied the building and the
rest of the city. This open, violent confrontation remained
a backdrop to Yeltsin's relations with the legislative
branch for the next three years.
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