A common feature of works that compare democratization across countries is the use of data from multinational surveys such as the New Democracies Barometer, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and other similar sources. Such comparisons are fraught with difficulty not only because of the problems of translation and culturally unique interpretations of particular questions but also for another reason: the aggregation of opinions may hide deeper structures of opinion, ways in which opinions cluster together among respondents and respondents cluster together in particular groups. The clustering of particular sets of opinions may differ from one country to another, and identical overall results may therefore fail to capture fundamental differences in the broad themes of a country's politics. Likewise, the broad aggregate measures do not reveal whether the holders of particular opinions join together in the support of a particular political party or movement.
The deeper structures of public opinion have received considerable attention in established democracies, and increasingly rich literature on "alignment" offers insight into the ways in which opinions cluster together and affect political parties, but these techniques have applied to new democracies by only a few intrepid scholars. Their rarity is unfortunate because, as I show in this paper, the deeper structures of public opinion can offer extremely important insights into the course of democratization. Connections between dimensions of political competition and the outcomes of democratization are powerful but poorly studied.
The role of opinion clusters and, particularly, of dimensions of political party competition becomes particularly apparent in a comparison of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. These two countries, until recently a single unit, appear almost identical in aggregate measures of public opinion, yet their political outcomes differ markedly. Attention to the underlying structures of public opinion help to explain the increasing gaps in levels of democracy in the two countries since they parted company. Although the Slovak and Czech populations show the same overall level of support for statements about the role of the nation, they differ to some extent in how those opinions cluster together. Furthermore, the themes that most closely correspond to the main dimension of political competition differ substantially. The Czech Republic party competition reflects primarily economic and social questions, while in Slovakia competition focuses on national and authority issues.
It is tempting to attribute these divergent courses to differences in the political opinions among the inhabitants of the two countries. Kusy cites conventional wisdom regarding Slovaks and Czechs which suggests that Slovaks are more "nationalistically oriented," "Christian-oriented," "left-wing" and "eastwardly oriented"(Kusy 1995, 140). Others suggest that Slovaks are also more likely to be more oriented toward authority and less enthusiastic toward democracy (Carpenter 1997).
The results of political opinion surveys offer very limited direct support for these arguments. In most cases, the differences between Slovaks and Czechs prove to be extremely small and in many cases the differences are the opposite of those that might be expected. Moreover, the differences that did appear remained stable or even diminished even after political outcomes in the two cases had begun to diverge. Table 1 shows the mean levels of support given by Slovaks and Czechs for twelve statements of political opinion asked in regular surveys sponsored by Central European University (CEU).(1) As this table shows, the range of differences between Slovaks and Czechs is in most cases extremely narrow, ranging from 0.00 to 0.16 on a 1.00 scale. The mean difference for all questions over all four periods is 0.08 on a 1.00 scale. On six of the twelve questions, the direction of difference between the two countries conform to the conventional wisdom cited by Kusy. On the other six questions, however, the difference is negligible or actually opposite of general expectation on one or more surveys. By the 1996 survey, Slovaks were more likely than Czechs to believe that the church had too much influence, that it would be better if the Czech and Slovak republics were not separated, that nationalism is harmful, and that reducing inequalities between rich and poor is dangerous. Czechs were more likely to prefer a patriot to an expert and to prefer concern for crime and deteriorating morals over individual freedom and human rights.
In addition to being small and in some cases at odds with expectations, overall opinion differences between Slovaks and Czechs on these twelve questions actually declined over time. The mean difference on these twelve questions dropped from 0.10 to 0.07 between 1992 and 1994 before rising slightly to 0.08 in 1996. Only two of the twelve questions--those regarding income inequality and the Czech-Slovak split--show a consistent increase. Responses on seven of the twelve show a consistent decrease. While these results do not indicate that the two countries are identical, they do show an extremely high degree of similarity and they suggest that any differences which did emerge between 1992 and 1996 did not find reflection in the mean opinions of Slovaks and Czechs. Any connection between political outcomes and public opinion must be sought in those structures that emerge within public opinion.
A study by Markowski using factor analysis on CEU survey data collected in 1993 finds that both countries "have a clear economic factor (economic liberalism versus populism), a religious factor, a libertarian-cosmopolitan factor, and a factor indicating alienation from democratic politics.". In Slovakia, Markowski also finds an "idiosyncratic" and "weak fifth element that relates "to the division of Czechoslovakia"(Markowski 1997, 229). Markowski's efforts provide an excellent starting point for further work on the question of issue dimensions, but it is necessary to modify his work through certain deletions and additions. As I have discussed above, the full set of eighteen issue questions included in the CEU survey includes six questions which ask respondents to assess their personal well-being and their own degree of disaffection toward politics. Although the questions themselves provide an important assessment mechanism, they cannot be grouped together with the other twelve questions because they call for assessments of respondents' condition rather than respondents' opinion. While assessment of condition may be highly influenced by opinion, there is no way of isolating this difference. At the same time, Markowski's efforts can be profitably expanded by using three other CEU data sets collected over the period from 1992 to 1996 to create a time-series of issue dimensions. Tables 2 through 9 present the results of factor analysis using varimax rotation for each of the four data sets in both Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The results are striking in both their clarity and their consistency over time.
On each of the four samples Slovakia exhibits four relatively strong factors. These factors do not change significantly over time. In fact the division of questions into particular factors is identical for the 1993, 1994 and 1996 data sets. Only the 1992 results differ slightly from the others and the differences in this case are slight. These four dimensions are relatively compact both in the number and the thematic consistency of their main components and it is possible to provide factor labels with relatively little risk of the oversimplification common to much factor analysis. In order of clarity and consistency over time, the factors are:
? A religious factor (REL) which involves questions on church influence, abortion, atheists in politics. In the 1993 and 1994 samples a question of restitution also appears relatively significant within this factor.
? A national factor (NAT) which includes questions about nationalism and the split of Czechoslovakia and the relative importance of expertise and patriotism among politicians.
? An economic policy factor (ECON) which includes a question on privatization and one on factory-closings. In every sample except 1992 a question on the reduction of income differential also plays a significant role. In 1992 and 1993 privatization and factory-closing questions also factor together closely with the above-mentioned question of restitution. In the 1992 survey, questions about government responsibility for reducing unemployment and for reducing crime play a more significant role in this factor than they do in factor analyses of later surveys.
? A more heterogeneous factor that defies
easy labeling. In the 1993, 1994 and 1996 survey results, this factor centers
around above-mentioned questions of the role of government in unemployment
and crime and also around the question of restitution. This factor is also
shaped, though to a lesser degree, by the question of political expertise
and patriotism and by questions from the above-mentioned economic and religious(2) Although these
questions differ considerably in their subject matter, they share several
common themes. They refer to the degree of state involvement in the society
and the economy as well as to the major changes in the immediate conditions
of daily life involved in the transition away from communism: crime, unemployment,
ownership. As shorthand, I will refer to this dimension in terms of willingness
to accept these transitions (TRANS), but it is important to remember that
the commonalities expressed in this factor can be described in a number
of ways.
Results for the Czech Republic show less consistency in their number and coherence over time, but certain patterns do emerge. The data for 1992 and 1994 yield three relatively strong factors for the Czech Republic. The data for 1993 and 1996 yield four factors, but in each case two of these four factors register weakly. Two groupings of questions factor together consistently in all four surveys while other questions shift groupings and produce the weaker and less enduring factors. In order of clarity and consistency over time, these factors are:
? A religious factor (REL) composed mainly of questions on atheists in public service and abortion. The question of church influence also plays a relatively strong if less consistent role. More so than in Slovakia, this factor involves the question of patriotism and expertise in politics. Since this factor is influenced by questions about both patriots and atheists in politics, it seems to be linked more strongly to aspects of political leadership than its more strictly religious counterpart in Slovakia
? A broad and heterogeneous factor that includes questions on restitution and government responsibility in fighting unemployment and crime and declining morals as well as the question of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and--on some occasions--questions about factory closures and privatization. It is difficult to characterize these different issues under a common heading, but they do share the above-mentioned concerns for the consequences of transformation and may actually bear the label (TRANS) better than the analogous factor in Slovakia
? An economic factor (ECON) that is almost identical in its composition to Slovakia's economic factor. This factor is shaped primarily by questions on factory closures, privatization and income differential. It appears as a separate factor in 1992, 1994 and 1996. In 1992 this factor also includes the question of Czechoslovakia's dissolution. In 1996 it includes the question of government responsibility for unemployment. The composition of this factor tends toward strong overlap with the TRANS factor discussed above. In 1993 the two factors appear to merge, with the main components of ECON playing a stronger than normal role in shaping the TRANS and not appearing as a separate factor.
? A national factor (NAT) that appears only in 1993 and 1996 and is shaped almost exclusively by a single question about the harmfulness of nationalism. This particular question appears to have no stable home among the other factors. In 1992 it factors most strongly with TRANS and in 1994 it factors most strongly with ECON.
? A factor that appears only in 1993 and follows largely the same pattern as the TRANS factor, but with less attention to economic questions and stronger attention to questions of patriotism, crime, church influence, and atheism in a seemingly inconsistent(3) Since a factor bearing these characteristics appears only once and in that instance the factor explains very little of the variance of the sample, it does not require much additional consideration here.
In light of these results it is possible to confirm and expand upon certain of Markowski's findings regarding the comparison of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. As Markowski found for 1993, the questions asked by the CEU survey cluster into more dimensions in Slovakia than they do in the Czech Republic. The addition of surveys for 1992, 1994 and 1996 shows that this difference is stable over time. For the most part, the factors that emerge are similar in both countries. Respondents in both countries cluster religious and economic questions together in largely the same way and do the same with questions related to threats and opportunities presented by the transformation from communism.
In light of these similarities, the difference that does emerges is striking. The NAT dimension that emerges weakly and sporadically in the Czech Republic differs sharply from the strong and consistent NAT dimension that emerges in Slovakia. In every survey between 1992 and 1996, Slovaks closely link a preference for an independent Slovakia with a preference for patriots and an acceptance of nationalism. In the Czech Republic, these links are virtually nonexistent. Among Czechs, by contrast, views on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia relate more closely to views on issues of economic change and transformation. Czech views on patriots in politics relate more closely to views on both atheists in politics and the role of the Church. The general question of nationalism in the Czech Republic relates poorly to any other question. Analysis of CEU surveys for these two countries over time shows a difference between Slovaks and Czechs on national questions that is far more significant than the "idiosyncratic" and "weak" factor noted by Markowski. Citizens of the two countries differ significantly in how they understand the connections between national-related questions. This difference becomes even more significant in light of the patterns revealed below.
With dimensions thus defined, it is possible to show more clearly the interplay between public opinion and party support over time in these two countries. Tables 14 and 15 provide the mean scores of party supporters on each of the four factors in each country. Figures 1 through 8 offer a graphic representation of those scores and offer significant insight into the nature of political party competition in the two countries. Striking differences appear on virtually every factor. Most noticeable are the contrasts in the range of party supporters' positions. This becomes particularly apparent on the ECON and TRANS factors. In the Czech Republic, the distribution of parties on these two clusters of questions consistently occupies more than one third of the possible range. In Slovakia, by contrast, the range of party supporters' opinions is much narrower, consistently occupying less than one fifth of the possible range and dropping at some points to one tenth. The reverse of this pattern appears on the NAT factor. Here it is Slovakia's parties that occupy more than one third of the possible range. The spread in the Czech republic is nearly as wide, but the spread results largely from outlying positions held by supporters of the Republican Party (SPR-RSC). The range occupied by other parties, although increasing slowly over time, remains considerably narrower than its Slovak counterpart. Even REL--the factor that exhibits the greatest degree of similarity across the two countries--exhibits certain differences. In both cases, the party labeling itself as Christian Democratic occupies one extreme of the range and stands at a considerable distance from the other parties. In the Czech Republic, all other parties cluster together in an almost indistinguishable mass. In the Slovak Republic, however, several parties other than the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) occupy distinct locations. In particular, the Hungarian Coalition, which includes a strong Hungarian Christian Democratic party, stands away from the cluster in the direction of the KDH while the former communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) stands at the opposite extreme.
A look at relative positions of parties over time reveals certain analogous conclusions. In the Czech Republic, the relative positions of parties on the ECON and TRANS factors remain extremely similar over time with only some minor interchange of positions between parties located close together. Much the same is true of the NAT factor in the Czech Republic with the exception of an abrupt change of position by the Liberal Social Union (LSU) between 1992 and 1993. Only on the REL do parties exchange positions with any frequency, and then never in relationship with the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-CSL). Slovakia's parties, by contrast, exhibit greater stability than their Czech counterparts on the NAT and REL factors and far less on the ECON and TRANS factors where parties shift significantly with relationship to one another. Tables 16 and 17 list the correlations between the relative positions of parties(4) from year to year and confirm the relatively low levels of stability over time on Slovakia's ECON and TRANS, compared to the uniformly high stability of all other factors in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic.
These measurements offer grounds for judgements regarding the distribution of public opinion along party lines in the two countries. In the Czech Republic, the ECON and TRANS factors exhibit a robust competition between many parties, each representing a distinct position along a relatively large array of opinions. The REL and NAT factors, by contrast, involve competition between one party and all the rest. In their study of Czech political elites, Kitschelt et al. refer to such factors as "market niches"(Kitschelt et al. 1997, 207). In Slovakia, by contrast, only the REL factor could be classed as a market niche, and even there the opinions of party supporters are more distinct and widely spaced than in its Czech counterpart. The TRANS and ECON factors do not include significant outliers, but also do not match the breadth and stability of their Czech counterparts. It is Slovakia's NAT factor that shows the widest and most stable competition of political parties.
Slovakia and the Czech Republic offer an important case in point. The study conducted by Hubert and Inglehart asked experts to rank political parties from one to ten on a left-right scale on which the experts were allowed to define the meaning of left and right. Czech parties on this scale ranged from 1.33 to 9.80, a span of 8.47 or 94% of the total range. Slovakia's parties, by contrast ranged from 4.67 to 7.00, a span of 2.33 or 26% of the total range. In theory, this difference could represent a much closer consensus of parties in Slovakia on the main issues of contention. A closer look at the data, however, lends weight to a rival conclusion. Both the range and the standard deviations for rankings of parties in Slovakia far exceed those of their Czech counterparts, indicating that the expert respondents in Slovakia had a considerably more difficult time agreeing on where parties belonged on the left-right continuum. For one major party in Slovakia, the placements ranged from two to eight on a one to ten scale. The difference between Slovakia and the Czech Republic within the framework of Inglehart and Huber therefore appears to have less to do with the degree of overall party competition on the major axis than with the amount of meaningful information that "left" and "right" provide about the relationship among political parties within the two countries. The disparity hints at differences in the underlying dynamics of the two cases and offers a compelling reason for leaving left-right questions aside and attempting to make a direct identification of the central axis of political competition.
and Kitschelt et al. begin, as I have done above, with a factor analysis of responses on particular issues both at the mass and elite levels. They recognize, with Lijphart, that parties may differ on political issues without those differences playing a role in political competition (Kitschelt et al. 1997, 222; Lijphart 1984, 128). Having identified the "political divides," they therefore go on to identify which of these can be considered as "competitive dimensions." On the basis of data from political elites, they argue that a political divide is likely to constitute a competitive dimension if it "(1) bundles many salient issues," "(2) yields a high dispersion of party appeals," "(3) makes parties express coherent positions," and "(4) serves as a strong predictor of parties' left-right placements"(Kitschelt et al. 1997, 224). On the basis of mass level data from opinion surveys, they again discuss the importance of left-right placements and the diffusion of party positions, and they add a criterion of low diffuseness of positions within parties as measured by the standard deviation of party responses on particular questions.
Leaving aside the problematic issue of left-right placements, this use of several independent indicators provides a strong basis for assessing the strength of a competitive dimension. In many works authors make statements about the competitiveness of a dimension based on the degree to which a given factor explains variance in factor analysis (Markowski 1997). Kitschelt et al. recognize that the results of factor analysis measure only the coherence of a dimension and not the degree to which it shapes party competition. The degree of spread and the degree of salience provide important counterweights by showing the degree to which party positions differ and the importance that party leaders place on political issues. These indicators, however, have limitations of their own. As Kitschelt et al. note, the degree of spread among parties and the concentration of positions within parties offer "necessary though not sufficient" conditions for a competitive dimension (Kitschelt et al. 1997, 246). Low degree of spread can deny the status of competitive dimension; high degree of spread does not necessarily confirm such status. The same can be said for a high degree of agreement on particular issues among party supporters. Salience offers a stronger indicator, but it is one of the most difficult pieces of information to obtain since it requires lengthy interviews and respondents who are capable of making relatively sophisticated political judgements. Even evaluations of salience by political elites may not offer the desired degree of sensitivity. Kitschelt et al. note distinct differences in "the capacity of political leaders to distinguish between more important and less important political issues"(Kitschelt et al. 1997, 137).
Fortunately, there is an alternative approach. Instead of beginning with the issues and attempting to locate the main dimension of competition, it is possible to locate the main dimension and identify the meaning of that dimension on the basis of those issues which correspond most closely to it. This method, explored by Enelow and Hinich (Enelow and Hinich 1984) and by others in numerous subsequent works, combines the advantages of Huber and Inglehart's tabula rasa exploration of left-right dimensions with those of the issue-centered approach of Kitschelt et al., while avoiding many of their respective disadvantages.
The raw material for identifying the main dimension of political competition is the "thermometer score" measurement in which respondents record their general level of sympathy toward leaders or parties without reference to any particular political issue. On the basis of the thermometer scores of respondents toward all major political parties, it is possible to determine a main axis of competition and locate parties thereupon. This placement can be done in a variety of ways including simple pairwise comparisons of party means,(6) multidimensional scaling (MDS) and factor analysis. Another potential method suggested by the work of Lijphart (Lijphart 1984, 146) and alluded to in Kitschelt et al. is to assume that the primary dimension of competition dictates the composition of governing coalitions.
The placements that result are internally consistent and remain so over time. In Slovakia, all four methods suggest a dimensional array that locates the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the parties of the Hungarian Coalition (HK) and after 1993, the Democratic Union (DU) all in close proximity on one side. On the other side, the methods locate the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Slovak National Party (SNS) and after 1993 the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS). The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) fluctuates between these two poles, beginning in 1992 near HZDS-SNS, moving toward KDH-MK and then back toward the center. This pattern becomes particularly clear in the graphic presentation of factors presented in Figure 9. In the Czech Republic, the pattern is likewise clear and consistent. On one side the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) stand in close proximity to one another and near the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party (KDU-CSL). In 1993 and 1994 the pairwise method locates the KDU-CSL at the extreme but all other methods in all other time periods locate it toward the center with the ODS at the extreme. On the other side of the center line stands the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) and, further to the extreme, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM). The Republican Party (SPR-RSC) also stands on this side of the center line but fluctuates from near the center to near the extreme depending on the method. For each method the locations of these parties prove stable over time. Figure 10 provides a graphic representation of factor scores for these parties in each of the four measurement periods.
The factor analysis of thermometer scores offers an abstract but far more nuanced tool for understanding the relationship between underlying factors and party competition. Its numerical scores for party location can be compared directly to numerical scores on particular issue factors. Tables 22 and 23 list the correlations between party positions on issue factors and party positions on the main competitive dimension for both countries over time. Figures 11 and 12 provide a graphic representation of the results.
The significance of those results is striking. They show that in the Czech Republic the party positions on the ECON and TRANS factors closely parallel party positions on the main dimension of competition. This evidence strongly confirms the conclusions of both Kitschelt et al. and Huber and Inglehart that the Czech Republic's main competitive dimension relates to economic and socio-economic questions. The correlation of the main competitive dimension with the REL dimension began low and actually declined during this period, while its correlation with NAT increased substantially between 1993 and 1996.
Even more striking are the results for the Slovak case. The figures for 1992 show three factors that correlate closely with the main dimension of competition: REL, ECON and NAT. By 1993, however, the correlation with REL and ECON had declined significantly and the correlation with NAT had increased markedly. The NAT factor continued to produce the strongest correlations in 1994 and 1996, considerably higher than those of any other factor, even after those other factor correlations increased strongly between 1994 and 1996. Although they are not unexpected in light of more descriptive accounts of Slovakia's party system (Carpenter 1997; Krause 1996a; Leff 1996; Meseznikov 1997), these results provide the first replicable evidence that the main competitive dimension of Slovakia's political party system concerned national questions more than economic, social or religious questions.
The results mesh nicely with accounts that characterize the 1992 elections in Slovakia as an election about both economic policy and national sovereignty with overtones of the anti-communist struggle of 1990. To the extent that the question of religion correlated strongly in 1992 with the question of anti-communism, there is evidence that all three of these issues shaped Slovakia's main competitive dimension in 1992.(7) By 1993 and especially by 1994, these other issues had largely fallen aside and national questions had come to the fore, a development that is echoed in the rise in references to national issues in the programs of most of Slovakia's political parties between 1992 and 1994 (Krause 1998).
Although they differ significantly in their overall results, both Slovakia and the Czech Republic show signs of an increase in correlation between the main competitive dimension and party scores on factors other than the main ones. In the Czech Republic this concerns the NAT factor and in Slovakia it concerns all three non-NAT factors. In theory it is possible that these represent a shift in party positions on the main competitive access to resemble positions on the factor scores, but with the exception of Slovakia's Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), parties move very little on the main competitive dimension. Rather, it is the scores of these parties on the factors that change as the position of party supporters on other factors form clusters that resemble the clusters on the dominant factor. In the Czech Republic, the movement of parties relative to one another on the NAT factor is greater than their movement on the ECON and TRANS factors. Between 1992 and 1996 the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) shift toward one another while other parties shift away from that position toward the opposite pole, bringing the NAT factor into a closer approximation with the ECON and TRANS factors. In Slovakia some of the same dynamics come into play as the shift of parties on the ECON and TRANS factors brings them toward a closer resemblance to the NAT factor. In addition to the shift of party positions, the change in the correlation of the ECON and TRANS factors between 1993 and 1994 also reflects the appearance of two new parties at opposite ends of the main competitive dimension that also held sharply opposing views on questions of ECON and TRANS. Over time those two factors show increasing resemblance to the relatively stable NAT factor and therefore also to the main competitive dimension.
In the case of Slovakia it is much more difficult to establish the similarity between the mass and elite levels because of the lack of elite level surveys. The question of the similarity between the opinions of party supporters and party leaders can be established to some degree, however, by attention to the programs and statements of the political parties in question. In another work, I argue that there is an extremely close connection between the positions of party leaders and party supporters on nearly all aspects of national questions (Krause 1998). Whether this strong similarity exists in other areas remains to be studied in detail, but a cursory look at programs and party statements on economic questions reveals an extremely narrow range of policy options that matches the narrow spread of party supporters' opinions.
The question of the main dimension of competition among cannot be established with certainty, but informal interviews with political leaders tend to confirm the groupings and even some of the specific rankings that emerge at the mass level. An official of the Slovak National Party (SNS) argues that the primary dimension of competition is a national one and groups Slovakia's parties into national and non- or anti- national in the same pattern as the CEU results. Asked to rank parties in terms of sympathy, an official of the Hungarian party Coexistence (ESWS) ranked other Hungarian parties to be closest, followed by the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) the Democratic Union (DU), followed by the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), and finally, at the least degree of sympathy, SNS, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), and the Association of Workers of Slovakia. A parliamentary deputy of HZDS ranked his sympathy for parties in almost precisely the reverse order: SNS and ZRS, followed by SDL, and then at a considerable distance DU followed by the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM) and, at bottom, KDH and ESWS. In public statements HZDS officials have made extremely similar statements. Particularly instructive is an analysis of Slovakia's political scene by HZDS parliamentary deputy Hofbauer. Hofbauer argues that "the Slovak political scene is ... completely different" from the bipolar left-right party systems of the west. He describes his own party as a "a dominant and massive centrist party, with markedly pro-national, Christian, ecological and social orientation." Other parties he characterizes as follows:
? "The so-called right-wing groups [KDH and DU] in reality are not right-wing forces but rather forces which were and are uncompromisingly opposed to our statehood..."
? "The left-wing spectrum is composed of the post-communist SDL with leftist phraseology and rightist behavior, and the SDSS [Social Democratic Party of Slovakia] with a markedly pro-Czech orientation...."
? "A special political enclave is comprised of the three subjects of the Hungarian Coalition, who are structured on the basis of Magyar nationalism, and do not communicate with the Slovak government. Their partners are the Hungarian government in Budapest...."(Hofbauer 1998)
Thus while defining his own party as centrist he goes on to focus only the contrast between his party's pro-national sentiments and the anti-national or anti-Slovak sentiments of the other parties. Hofbauer clearly understands Slovakia's main competitive dimension to be a national one. On this dimension he appears to express the least antipathy for SDL, more toward KDH and DU and the most toward the parties of the Hungarian Coalition (MK). Although these isolated statements cannot prove the similarity between mass and elite understandings of the main competitive dimension, they indicate that such similarity exist at least among certain prominent leaders.
At present there is no available set of survey data that asks factor-related questions that are comparable to those of the CEU study in both Slovakia and the Czech Republics, but there do exist several surveys that ask questions whose results resemble thermometer scores. These overwhelmingly confirm the CEU studies' placement of parties on the main competitive dimension. A 1995 survey conducted jointly by the Slovak Academy of Sciences (SAV) and the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (AVCR) asks respondents to specify the degree to which they trust their country's major parties.(8) For the Czech Republic, the array of parties that emerges from a factor analysis of this data correlates at 0.98 with results of the nearest CEU survey. For Slovakia the correlation is 0.99. Two other surveys conducted by the firm FOCUS also help to confirm the CEU results. A FOCUS surveys conducted in 1994 and 1996 asked respondents about the degree to which they liked each major party.(9) The results of factor analysis on both of these surveys correlate with the results of the CEU study at a level of 0.98. There is, therefore, good reason to accept the CEU results as representative of the public opinion of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, at least in the evaluation of the relative merits of political parties.
The strong commonality of questions on the 1994 FOCUS and 1994 CEU surveys allows for an extremely close comparison. From the list of questions that appear on both it is possible to construct rough analogs for the ECON and REL factors used above. It is also possible to create a three question factor which looks at the importance of democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, a wealth of questions on national issues allows the creation of three separate factors which concern specific aspects of the broader NAT used above. This includes a factor concerning European integration, a factor concerning the position of the Hungarian minority, and a factor concerning the split of Czechoslovakia. Table 26 lists the specific composition of these factors. Table 27 and Figure 13 offer text and graphic representations of the results that emerge when the mean positions of party supporters on these factors are correlated with the main competitive dimension as produced by thermometer scores on the respective surveys. The results conform to the overall patterns of the other CEU results but with important differences. One or more NAT-related factors shows extremely high correlation with ECON and REL at much lower levels of correlation, particularly in the second of the surveys. Among the NAT-related factors, Hungarian issues correlate much more closely with the main dimension of competition than questions about the split of Czecho-Slovakia or about European integration. The two surveys differ, however, about the relative placement of the latter two.
The two surveys do not disagree about the correlation between the main dimension of competition and the questions included in the AUTH factor. In both sets of results this factor far exceeds the level of correlation of any other factor including questions related to Slovakia's Hungarian minority. Responses of party supporters about democracy and the rule of law provide the strongest single correlation with party competition in Slovakia.
Since neither of these surveys was conducted in the Czech Republic, it is necessary to turn to other surveys to determine whether this same factor shapes political party competition there. There are no surveys conducted in both countries that allow for the creation of analogs for the factors used above, but the SAV/AVCR does include both thermometer scores and a large number of questions regarding democracy and the use of authority in both countries. Table 28 lists the correlation between them main dimension of competition and party positions on these questions in order of the difference between the two countries. These results show an extremely large gap in the degree to which certain issues correspond to Slovak and Czech party competition. Questions of firm use of power, rights of political minorities, the need for a parliamentary opposition, and control of mass media all appear to have little bearing on the competition among Czech political parties and a great deal of relevance to Slovakia's political struggles. Other questions relate to party competition to a similar extent in both countries, but these are milder questions which discuss the delay tactics of opposition parties and the level of democracy. Only one issue--the question of decommunization--is significantly more relevant to Slovak than to Czech party competition.
As with previously discussed factors, it is not easy to determine whether these relationships at the mass level exist also at the elite level and to compare the two countries at that level. In my 1996 survey of Czech parliamentary elites, I included three questions designed to explore attitudes toward law and democracy by contrasting patient negotiation against decisiveness, strict observance of law against the achievement of good results for citizens, and expectation that the democratic system would function according to western models against expectations that the system's youth would affect its functioning. Compared with other questions asked in the same survey, these questions correlated poorly with party positions on the main dimension of competition, taking 9th, 13th and 14th place, respectively, in a fifteen question list. The correlation on these questions stood at lower levels than all questions that could be assigned to the ECON, REL or NAT categories. In light of the mass surveys, it is likely that the opposite situation prevails among Slovakia's party elite, but it is possible to rely only on anecdotal evidence. The parties of Slovakia's opposition make daily references to the anti-democratic behavior of the governing coalition. The electoral programs of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) contain strong references to breaches of democratic principles committed by coalition parties (1998a; 1998b; 1998c). For their part, coalition leaders have denied charges of wrongdoing but have not shied away from expressing the sentiment that "Slovakia at the beginning of its existence as a state needed a strong personality" (Malecova 1998) and that "even in the most democratic order it is always necessary that the minority must subject itself to the majority"(Hofbauer 1996, 1).
Although the nature of political dimensions
in East Central Europe has been the subject of frequent investigation since
Kitschelt's 1992 work on party systems, there has been little effort devoted
to how the nature of those dimensions--particularly the primary dimension--affect
the development of democracy. An argument that is highly consistent with
Kitschelt's multi-dimensional approach can be found in the work by Offe.
Without explicit reference to political parties, Offe argues that the political
change in Central and Eastern Europe occurs simultaneously on three levels
which he defined as "the territorial issue," "the issue of democracy,"
and "the issue of economic and prosperity order" corresponding to the vital
questions concerning "who 'we' are," what are the "rules, procedures and
rights," and "who gets what, when, and how"(Offe 1991). Offe furthermore
defines these levels of decision-making as hierarchical and places the
territorial and citizenship questions at the "fundamental" level, built
on by the constitutional and institutional framework and finally the distribution
of economic resources. By Offe's analysis, the type of issue dimension
which dominates a country's politics must matter a great deal. The focus
of the Czech parties on economic issues along with certain limited questions
of rights and government activity suggests a willingness to refrain from
making changes in more fundamental institutional and national arrangements.
In Slovakia, by contrast, both the more fundamental levels of democratization
have become the primary axis of party competition. It is much easier for
enterprising political leaders to alter institutional relationships in
settings where questions about citizenship and institutions are still "in
play" than in settings where the matter is considered resolved. Unlike
their Czech counterparts, Slovak political elites who wished to change
institutional relationships did not first have to overcome presumptions
against raising such issues in the first place. They have become, rather,
Slovakia's prime medium of political exchange.
In addition to increasing institutional instability, a national-authority competitive dimension also helps to stack the deck in its favor. In practice, a main competitive dimension tends to shape the internal composition of political parties by forcing them to clarify their position on that dimension in relation to other parties. Leaders and supporters who do not agree with a party's position may feel compelled to move elsewhere on the political spectrum, and parties and the position of the party on the main dimension becomes even more defined, though on other questions those same parties may remain quite diverse. In most western democracies, the main dimension of competition has tended to revolve around socio-economic questions, and parties have developed strong profiles as classically "left" or "right" In these polities, the socio-economic conflicts may become bitter, even extreme, but questions about institutions and citizenship tend to remain muted because parties rarely risk dividing their support base by taking strong positions in other areas. In such cases, the departure from power by one set of parties may usher in a significant change in socio-economic policy but not, in most cases, a fundamental change in political organization of the state. This is the pattern followed in the Czech Republic in the first years of its independent existence. Parties developed marked economic profiles at both the mass and elite levels and did not develop marked profiles on national or authority questions.
Slovakia's reversed this pattern. One result
of competition on national and authority issues is the notable moderation
of Slovakia's parties and governing coalitions on socio-economic issues.
Since such issues represent a secondary dimension in Slovakia and do not
have a formative effect on parties or coalitions, these tend to adopt moderate
and, by most standards, successful positions that differ little from coalition
to opposition. A second result, however, is an increased degree of difference
between coalition and opposition parties on national and authority issues
and a narrowing of the range of opinions within those parties. The continued
competition of Slovakia's parties along national and authority lines resulted
in a self-sorting of party elites, party activists and party voters along
those same lines. The shifts increased the possibility for sharp swings
in political behavior analogous to the sharp swings in economic policy
found in other countries with an economic dimension of competition. Instead
of general, if grudging, agreement among all parties about the importance
and nature of democracy, Slovakia's system split into two halves, one that
expressed preference for strong use of authority and restrictive definitions
of nationhood and another that expressed strong support for accommodation,
negotiation, and observance of law. The latter group took power in a parliamentary
vote of no confidence in 1994 but could not win the election that followed.
Because Slovakia's self-sorting process occurred in the political rather
than the economic dimension, the newly elected coalition possessed few
internal counterbalances against national and institutional extremes. The
result has been a slow erosion of democratic institutions to the point
that even the fairness of future elections stands in question.
Though the link seems to be accidental rather than inherent to competition along national and authority lines, there is a third issue that nevertheless merits attention. One potential effect of differences in the main dimension of competition is a difference in the degree of common ground on other dimensions. Slovakia's shift toward a competitive dimension that was primarily related to national and authority questions involved the formation of formal and informal coalitions of parties on the basis of their positions on national and authority issues. Because such coalitions unite primarily on the basis of the main competitive dimension, their positions on other dimensions may prove vastly different and may remain that way indefinitely. Although it cannot be proven here, it can be hypothesized that the cohesion and effectiveness of a group of parties may depend on their degree of agreement on all major political divides. Table 29 shows the average range of positions on major political divides within the two primary groups of political parties in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. These figures show relatively similar ranges within coalition and opposition groups on all factors except REL. Here the two countries differ substantially. The difference in range is less than half as large in Czech Republic as it is in Slovakia. Furthermore, in the Czech Republic the range of positions on REL is widest among the coalition of parties in power. In Slovakia, by contrast, the broader range is concentrated among the parties that remained out of power for nearly all of Slovakia's post-independence existence. These same parties stand on the anti-authority and anti-national side of the main competitive dimension. As a result, the broader religious divide (along with closely related question of decommunization) may have presented yet another obstacle to effective cooperation against the abuse of authority. Slovakia's REL dimension possesses the characteristics of a cross-cutting divide--a characteristic though to moderate political conflict--but cuts across only half of the political spectrum, dividing the opposition against itself and strengthening the opposition. Although it is not discussed here, much the same can be said of certain questions related to Slovakia's Hungarian minority. These issues, too, result in a division of opposition forces while coalition unanimity remains intact (Krause 1998).
All of these arguments help to some extent
to reconcile the similarity of Slovaks and Czechs with the differences
in Slovak and Czech political outcomes. They help to square the "surprising"
(Tucek 1995) finding of the SAV/AVCR study that Czechs are more likely
than Slovaks to prefer a "firm hand" and "strong personality" with the
political reality of Slovakia's all too firm handed government. The key
difference, they suggest, lies not solely in political beliefs but also
in how they are organized and contested, not only in opinions but also
in dimensions.
1998b. Volebny program. Party of the Democratic Left web site, http://www.sdl.sk/v_program32.htm. .
1998c. Volebny program: Spolu za lepsie Slovensko. Slovak Democratic Coalition web site, http://www.sdk.sk/program/uvod.txt. .
Carpenter, Michael. 1997. Slovakia and the Triumph of Nationalist Populism. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30 (2): 205-220.
Central European University. 1992. Party Systems and Electoral Alignments in East Central Europe [Computer file].
Central European University. 1993. Party Systems and Electoral Alignments in East Central Europe [Computer file].
Central European University. 1994. Party Systems and Electoral Alignments in East Central Europe [Computer file].
Central European University. 1996. Party Systems and Electoral Alignments in East Central Europe [Computer file].
Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich. 1984. The spatial theory of voting. Canbridge: Cambridge University Press.
FOCUS. 1994. Public opinion survey [Computer file].
Hofbauer, Roman. 1996. Kto organizuje natlak na stat? Slovensko do toho!, 18 July, 1.
Hofbauer, Roman. 1998. Pa:t rokov obnovenej statnosti Slovenska. Slovensko do toho! web site, http://www.hzds.sk/spravy/Spravy/4_98/HOF0401.html. 29 January 1998.
Huber, John, and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies. Party Politics 1 (1): 93-111.
Institute of Sociology. 1995. Transformation and Modernization [Computer file]: Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.
Kitschelt, Herbert, Lubomir Brokl, and Zdenka Mansfeldova. 1994. Survey of Czech Political Party Elites: Duke Univesity and the Academy of Science of the Czech Republic.
Kitschelt, Herbert, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radek Markowski, and Gabor Toka. 1997. Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation: Unpublished manuscript.
Krause, Kevin. 1996a. Dimensions of Party Competition in Slovakia. Slovak Sociological Review 1 (Fall 1996): 169-186.
Krause, Kevin. 1996b. Survey of Czech Members of Parliament: University of Notre Dame.
Krause, Kevin Deegan. 1998. "...their own worst enemies..." National issues and party system polarization in Slovakia. Paper read at American Political Science Association, at Boston, Massachusetts.
Kusy, Mirosav. 1995. Slovak Exceptionalism. In The End of Czechoslovakia, edited by J. Musil. Budapest: Central European Press.
Leff, Carol Skalnik. 1996. Dysfunctional democracy: Institutional conflict in post-communist Slovakia. Problems of Post-Communism, September/October.
Lijphart, Arend. 1984. Democracies. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Malecova, Jarmilla. 1998. Opozícia by chcela vladnut Slovensku s pomocou zahranicnych mecenasov. Slovensko do toho! web site, http://www.hzds.sk/spravy/Spravy/5_98/HOST0506.html. 5 February 1998.
Markowski, Radoslaw. 1997. Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in East Central Europe. Communist and Post Communist Studies ??? (???): 221-254.
Meseznikov. 1997. The Open Ended Formation of Slovakia's Political Party System. In Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation and the Struggle for the Rules of the Game, edited by S. Szomolanyi and J. Gould. Bratislava: Slovak Political Science Association.
Tucek, Milan. 1995. Transformace a modernizace v Ceske a Slovenske republice. Data & Fakta, September 1995, 1-4.
2. In
1992 there is considerable overlap between such questions and the economic
dimension above, but even here these two dimensions are clearly distinguishable
from the remaining two.
Back
3.
The factor links agreement with the statement that "The Church
has too much influence" to agreement with the statement that "Politicians
who do not believe in God should not perform public functions."
Back
4. The
correlations include only those parties for which there are measurements
from all four periods. This excludes the Czech Republic's Liberal Social
Union (LSU) and Movement for Self-Administering Democracy-Society for Moravia
and Silesia (HSD-SMS) and Slovakia's Democratic Union (DU) and Association
of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS).
Back
5. Despite
their initial assurances of cooperation, parliamentary deputies of parties
that comprised Slovakia's governing majority ultimately refused to take
part in a systematic survey with questions that corresponded to those used
in Kitschelt et al. [Kitschelt, 1997 #740].
Back
6. One method which does not involve complicated methodology involves the comparison of the mean degree of sympathy that supporters of each party give to all other parties. In a system consisting of parties A, B and C, in which the parties compete on a single dimension as follows
|
|
|||
| A and B | A and C | B and C | |
| For supporters of party A | A > B | A > C | B > C |
| For supporters of party B | A < B | not predictable | B > C |
| For supporters of party C | A < B | A < C | B < C |
7. Correlation
between party supporters positions on the REL factor and their support
for "Removing former communist party members from positions of influence"
is 0.81 in 1992 and 0.93 in 1993, dropping to 0.76 in 1994 and 0.60 in
1996. In the Czech Republic, by contrast, the levels of correlation are
lower--0.64 in 1992, 0.54 in 1993 and 1994 and 0.48 in 1996--suggesting
a weaker tie between religious issues and anti-communism.
Back
8. The
survey made this request for all major parties in Slovakia and all parties
except the Republican Party (SPR-RSC) in the Czech Republic.
Back
9. The
1994 FOCUS did not ask about the parties of the Hungarian Coalition (MK)
or about the coalition as a whole.
Back
| Code | Question | Country | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1996 |
| Q16C | It should be the government's
responsibility to provide jobs for everyone who wants one.
(Henceforth: "Provide job"). |
Slovakia | .87 | .82 | .81 | .82 |
| Czech Republic | .75 | .68 | .70 | .72 | ||
| Difference | .12 | .14 | .11 | .10 | ||
| Q16D | It is harmful for the
economy if the government tries to reduce income differences between rich
and poor.
(Henceforth: "Reducing inequality harmful"). |
Slovakia | .55 | .50 | .47 | .51 |
| Czech Republic | .55 | .50 | .48 | .45 | ||
| Difference | .00 | .00 | -.01 | .06 | ||
| Q16F | Giving the former state-owned companies into private hands is going to help very much in solving the economic problems of our country. (Henceforth: "Privatization will help"). | Slovakia | .53 | .55 | .53 | .41 |
| Czech Republic | .68 | .65 | .56 | .53 | ||
| Difference | -.15 | -.10 | -.03 | -.12 | ||
| Q16G | Unprofitable factories
and mines should be closed down immediately even if this leads to unemployment.
(Henceforth: "Close factories"). |
Slovakia | .36 | .44 | .42 | .41 |
| Czech Republic | .52 | .57 | .52 | .52 | ||
| Difference | -.16 | -.13 | -.10 | -.11 | ||
| Q16H | Politicians who do not
believe in God should not perform public functions.
(Henceforth: "No atheist politicians"). |
Slovakia | .26 | .24 | .24 | .25 |
| Czech Republic | .15 | .16 | .15 | .15 | ||
| Difference | .11 | .08 | .08 | .10 | ||
| Q16I | Nationalism is harmful
for the development of our country.
(Henceforth: "Nationalism is harmful"). |
Slovakia | .73 | .71 | .69 | .73 |
| Czech Republic | .81 | .78 | .72 | .70 | ||
| Difference | -.08 | -.07 | -.03 | .03 | ||
| Q16M | Politicians should care
more about rising crime and deteriorating morality than about individual
freedom and human rights.
(Henceforth: "Care about crime"). |
Slovakia | .73 | .75 | .70 | .69 |
| Czech Republic | .68 | .72 | .73 | .71 | ||
| Difference | .05 | .03 | -.03 | -.03 | ||
| Q16N | A woman should be allowed
to have an abortion in the early weeks of pregnancy if she decides so.
(Henceforth: "Permit abortion"). |
Slovakia | .70 | .71 | .69 | .68 |
| Czech Republic | .84 | .82 | .82 | .82 | ||
| Difference | -.14 | -.12 | -.12 | -.14 | ||
| Q16O | In the case of a politician
I prefer a strong patriot to an expert.
(Henceforth: "Patriot over expert"). |
Slovakia | .33 | .22 | .23 | .25 |
| Czech Republic | .28 | .26 | .27 | .27 | ||
| Difference | .05 | -.04 | -.04 | -.02 | ||
| Q16P | The church has too much
influence in our country
(Henceforth: "Church too influential"). |
Slovakia | .57 | .60 | .55 | .54 |
| Czech Republic | .41 | .49 | .46 | .46 | ||
| Difference | .15 | .11 | .10 | .09 | ||
| Q16Q | It would be better if
the Czech and Slovak republics were not separated.
(Henceforth: "Czecho-Slovak separation bad"). |
Slovakia | .66 | .67 | .62 | .59 |
| Czech Republic | .59 | .58 | .54 | .49 | ||
| Difference | .07 | .09 | .08 | .11 | ||
| Q16R | It would be better if
former owners do not receive compensation
(Henceforth: "Restitution bad"). |
Slovakia | .51 | .53 | .53 | .49 |
| Czech Republic | .39 | .41 | .47 | .44 | ||
| Difference | .11 | .12 | .06 | .05 |
| Code | Question | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | Factor 4 |
| Q16F | Giving the former state-owned companies into private hands is going to help very much in solving the economic problems of our country. | 0.715 | |||
| Q16G | Unprofitable factories and mines should be closed down immediately even if this leads to unemployment. | 0.604 | |||
| Q16C | It should be the government's responsibility to provide jobs for everyone who wants one. | -0.529 | 0.321 | ||
| Q16R | It would be better if former owners do not receive compensation | -0.455 | |||
| Q16N | A woman should be allowed to have an abortion in the early weeks of pregnancy if she decides so. | 0.801 | |||
| Q16H | Politicians who do not believe in God should not perform public functions. | -0.69 | 0.394 | ||
| Q16P | The church has too much influence in our country | 0.469 | 0.391 | ||
| Q16O | In the case of a politician I prefer a strong patriot to an expert. | 0.676 | -0.372 | ||
| Q16D | It is harmful for the economy if the government tries to reduce income differences between rich and poor. | 0.558 | |||
| Q16M | Politicians should care more about rising crime and deteriorating morality than about individual freedom and human rights | -0.332 | 0.407 | ||
| Q16I | Nationalism is harmful for the development of our country | 0.766 | |||
| Q16Q | It would be better if the Czech and Slovak republics were not separated. | 0.703 | |||
| Statistics | |||||
| Factor | Eigenvalue | % of Variance | Cumulative % | ||
| 1.0 | 1.735 | 14.5 | 14.5 | ||
| 2.0 | 1.564 | 13.0 | 27.5 | ||
| 3.0 | 1.348 | 11.2 | 38.7 | ||
| 4.0 | 1.191 | 9.9 | 48.7 | ||
| Code | Question | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | Factor 4 |
| Q16N | Allow abortions | 0.785 | |||
| Q16H | Atheists unfit for service | -0.711 | 0.309 | ||
| Q16P | Church too influential | 0.707 | |||
| Q16C | Jobs for all | 0.688 | |||
| Q16M | Crime and morals key | 0.581 | |||
| Q16R | Restitution bad | 0.401 | 0.416 | -0.37 | |
| Q16F | Privatization helpful | -0.343 | 0.671 | ||
| Q16G | Close unprofitable firms | 0.642 | |||
| Q16D | Less inequality harmful | 0.306 | 0.597 | ||
| Q16Q | Czechoslovak split bad | 0.734 | |||
| Q16I | Nationalism harmful | 0.72 | |||
| Q16O | Patriots not experts | 0.425 | -0.541 | ||
| Statistics | |||||
| Factor | Eigenvalue | % of Variance | Cumulative % | ||
| 1.0 | 2.177 | 18.1 | 18.1 | ||
| 2.0 | 1.61 | 13.4 | 31.6 | ||
| 3.0 | 1.383 | 11.5 | 43.1 | ||
| 4.0 | 1.184 | 9.9 | 52.9 | ||
| Code | Question | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | Factor 4 |
| Q16N | Allow abortions | 0.795 | |||
| Q16H | Atheists unfit for service | -0.695 | |||
| Q16P | Church too influential | 0.638 | 0.346 | ||
| Q16I | Nationalism harmful | 0.757 | |||
| Q16Q | Czechoslovak split bad | 0.73 | |||
| Q16O | Patriots not experts | -0.65 | 0.349 | ||
| Q16M | Crime and morals key | 0.678 | |||
| Q16C | Jobs for all | 0.613 | |||
| Q16R | Restitution bad | 0.359 | 0.435 | ||
| Q16G | Close unprofitable firms | 0.702 | |||
| Q16D | Less inequality harmful | 0.651 | |||
| Q16F | Privatization helpful | -0.375 | 0.599 | ||
| Statistics | |||||
| Factor | Eigenvalue | % of Variance | Cumulative % | ||
| 1.0 | 2.065 | 17.2 | 17.2 | ||
| 2.0 | 1.719 | 14.3 | 31.5 | ||
| 3.0 | 1.382 | 11.5 | 43.0 | ||
| 4.0 | 1.31 | 10.9 | 54.0 | ||
| Variable | Question | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | Factor 4 |
| Q16M | Crime and morals key | 0.592 | |||
| Q16C | Jobs for all | 0.574 | |||
| Q16R | Restitution bad | 0.504 | |||
| Q16N | Allow abortions | 0.789 | |||
| Q16H | Atheists unfit for service | -0.689 | |||
| Q16P | Church too influential | 0.452 | 0.583 | ||
| Q16Q | Czechoslovak split bad | 0.733 | |||
| Q16I | Nationalism harmful | 0.712 | |||
| Q16O | Patriots not experts | 0.384 | -0.59 | ||
| Q16F | Privatization helpful | 0.72 | |||
| Q16G | Close unprofitable firms | -0.387 | 0.638 | ||
| Q16D | Less inequality harmful | 0.538 | |||
| Statistics | |||||
| Factor | Eigenvalue | % of Variance | Cumulative % | ||
| 1.0 | 1.847 | 15.4 | 15.4 | ||
| 2.0 | 1.6 | 13.3 | 28.7 | ||
| 3.0 | 1.491 | 12.4 | 41.2 | ||
| 4.0 | 1.162 | 9.7 | 50.8 | ||
| Code | Question | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | |
| Q16P | The church has too much influence in our country | 0.629 | |||
| Q16M | Politicians should care more about rising crime and deteriorating morality than about individual freedom and human rights | 0.578 | |||
| Q16R | It would be better if former owners do not receive compensation | 0.576 | |||
| Q16C | It should be the government's responsibility to provide jobs for everyone who wants one. | 0.533 | |||
| Q16Q | It would be better if the Czech and Slovak republics were not separated. | 0.476 | -0.416 | ||
| Q16I | Nationalism is harmful for the development of our country | ||||
| Q16D | It is harmful for the economy if the government tries to reduce income differences between rich and poor. | 0.666 | |||
| Q16F | Giving the former state-owned companies into private hands is going to help very much in solving the economic problems of our country. | -0.393 | 0.619 | ||
| Q16G | Unprofitable factories and mines should be closed down immediately even if this leads to unemployment. | -0.358 | 0.492 | ||
| Q16H | Politicians who do not believe in God should not perform public functions. | 0.757 | |||
| Q16N | A woman should be allowed to have an abortion in the early weeks of pregnancy if she decides so. | -0.732 | |||
| Q16O | In the case of a politician I prefer a strong patriot to an expert. | 0.349 | 0.499 | ||
| Statistics | |||||
| Factor | Eigenvalue | % Variance | Cumulative % | ||
| 1.0 | 2.426 | 20.2 | 20.2 | ||
| 2.0 | 1.483 | 12.4 | 32.6 | ||
| 3.0 | 1.133 | 9.4 | 42.0 | ||
| Code | Question | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | Factor 4 |
| Q16F | Privatization helpful | -0.707 | |||
| Q16G | Close unprofitable firms | -0.672 | |||
| Q16D | Less inequality harmful | -0.632 | 0.355 | ||
| Q16R | Restitution bad | 0.581 | 0.331 | ||
| Q16Q | Czechoslovak split bad | 0.542 | |||
| Q16C | Jobs for all | 0.537 | 0.322 | ||
| Q16N | Allow abortions | 0.779 | |||
| Q16H | Atheists unfit for service | -0.691 | 0.317 | ||
| Q16P | Church too influential | 0.573 | 0.392 | ||
| Q16O | Patriots not experts | -0.301 | 0.63 | ||
| Q16M | Crime and morals key | 0.35 | 0.568 | ||
| Q16I | Nationalism harmful | 0.928 | |||
| Factor | Eigenvalue | % Variance | Cumulative % | ||
| 1.0 | 2.789 | 23.2 | 23.2 | ||
| 2.0 | 1.577 | 13.1 | 36.4 | ||
| 3.0 | 1.036 | 8.6 | 45.0 | ||
| 4.0 | 1.016 | 8.5 | 53.5 |
| Code | Question | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | |
| Q16R | Restitution bad | 0.729 | |||
| Q16Q | Czechoslovak split bad | 0.613 | |||
| Q16C | Jobs for all | 0.607 | |||
| Q16M | Crime and morals key | 0.607 | |||
| Q16F | Privatization helpful | -0.573 | 0.42 | ||
| Q16P | Church too influential | 0.555 | |||
| Q16H | Atheists unfit for service | 0.785 | |||
| Q16N | Allow abortions | -0.613 | |||
| Q16O | Patriots not experts | 0.597 | |||
| Q16I | Nationalism harmful | 0.689 | |||
| Q16D | Less inequality harmful | 0.603 | |||
| Q16G | Close unprofitable firms | -0.408 | 0.491 | ||
| Statistics | |||||
| Factor | Eigenvalue | % of Variance | Cumulative % | ||
| 1.0 | 2.863 | 23.9 | 23.9 | ||
| 2.0 | 1.536 | 12.8 | 36.7 | ||
| 3.0 | 1.114 | 9.3 | 45.9 | ||
| Code | Question | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | Factor 4 |
| Q16R | Restitution bad | 0.646 | |||
| Q16Q | Czechoslovak split bad | 0.62 | |||
| Q16M | Crime and morals key | 0.614 | |||
| Q16C | Jobs for all | 0.583 | -0.341 | ||
| Q16P | Church too influential | 0.51 | 0.432 | -0.366 | |
| Q16O | Patriots not experts | 0.485 | -0.436 | ||
| Q16H | Atheists unfit for service | -0.758 | |||
| Q16N | Allow abortions | 0.713 | |||
| Q16D | Less inequality harmful | 0.726 | |||
| Q16F | Privatization helpful | -0.516 | 0.55 | ||
| Q16G | Close unprofitable firms | -0.378 | 0.538 | ||
| Q16I | Nationalism harmful | 0.91 | |||
| Statistics | |||||
| Factor | Eigenvalue | % of Variance | Cumulative % | ||
| 1.0 | 2.931 | 24.4 | 24.4 | ||
| 2.0 | 1.513 | 12.6 | 37.0 | ||
| 3.0 | 1.046 | 8.7 | 45.8 | ||
| 4.0 | 1.036 | 8.6 | 54.4 | ||
| Country | Abbreviation | Party name |
| Slovakia | DU | Democratic Union |
| HZDS | Movement for a Democratic Slovakia | |
| KDH | Christian Democratic Movement | |
| MK | Hungarian Coalition, includes supporters of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MDKM), the Hungarian Civic Party (MPP) and Coexistence (ESWS) | |
| SDL | Party of the Democratic Left | |
| SNS | Slovak National Party | |
| ZRS | Association of Workers of Slovakia | |
| Czech Republic | CSSD | Czech Social Democratic Party |
| HSD-SMS | Movement for Self-Administering Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia | |
| LSU | Liberal Social Union | |
| KDU-CSL | Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party | |
| KSCM | Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia | |
| ODA | Civic Democratic Alliance | |
| ODS | Civic Democratic Party | |
| SPR-RSC | Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia | |
| Code | Question | Year | Political Party | ||||||
| DU | HZDS | KDH | MK | SDL | SNS | ZRS | |||
| 16C | Provide job | 1992 | - | .88 | .88 | .92 | .93 | .92 | - |
| 1993 | - | .76 | .82 | .96 | .85 | .77 | - | ||
| 1994 | .69 | .87 | .78 | .88 | .83 | .68 | .89 | ||
| 1996 | .77 | .86 | .75 | .80 | .86 | .76 | .91 | ||
| 16D | Reducing | 1992 | - | .53 | .55 | .68 | .55 | .56 | - |
| 1993 | - | .51 | .54 | .52 | .46 | .52 | - | ||
| 1994 | .51 | .44 | .53 | .56 | .42 | .58 | .38 | ||
| 1996 | .46 | .53 | .54 | .56 | .45 | .54 | .52 | ||
| 16F | Privatization | 1992 | - | .55 | .58 | .60 | .42 | .55 | - |
| 1993 | - | .60 | .59 | .65 | .47 | .60 | - | ||
| 1994 | .61 | .48 | .65 | .60 | .43 | .60 | .38 | ||
| 1996 | .50 | .43 | .47 | .39 | .36 | .46 | .39 | ||
| 16G | Close | 1992 | - | .34 | .44 | .52 | .26 | .40 | - |
| 1993 | - | .45 | .52 | .46 | .38 | .51 | - | ||
| 1994 | .51 | .35 | .43 | .51 | .33 | .45 | .36 | ||
| 1996 | .49 | .35 | .49 | .47 | .40 | .37 | .30 | ||
| 16H | No atheist | 1992 | - | .20 | .61 | .46 | .21 | .25 | - |
| 1993 | - | .20 | .52 | .50 | .13 | .20 | - | ||
| 1994 | .20 | .20 | .47 | .36 | .09 | .25 | .28 | ||
| 1996 | .19 | .22 | .42 | .50 | .15 | .27 | .26 | ||
| 16I | Nationalism | 1992 | - | .68 | .79 | .97 | .83 | .50 | - |
| 1993 | - | .65 | .75 | .94 | .74 | .56 | - | ||
| 1994 | .81 | .54 | .80 | .89 | .74 | .52 | .68 | ||
| 1996 | .82 | .69 | .81 | .93 | .76 | .61 | .66 | ||
| 16M | Care about | 1992 | - | .73 | .77 | .74 | .77 | .65 | - |
| 1993 | - | .72 | .75 | .70 | .79 | .76 | - | ||
| 1994 | .63 | .72 | .67 | .80 | .72 | .67 | .75 | ||
| 1996 | .57 | .73 | .65 | .81 | .69 | .74 | .77 | ||
| 16N | Permit | 1992 | - | .70 | .35 | .72 | .85 | .72 | - |
| 1993 | - | .72 | .42 | .70 | .81 | .73 | - | ||
| 1994 | .80 | .71 | .37 | .62 | .83 | .72 | .72 | ||
| 1996 | .74 | .66 | .33 | .65 | .81 | .72 | .76 | ||
| 16O | Patriot over | 1992 | - | .38 | .34 | .39 | .26 | .38 | - |
| 1993 | - | .26 | .24 | .20 | .18 | .32 | - | ||
| 1994 | .16 | .35 | .23 | .22 | .15 | .37 | .20 | ||
| 1996 | .10 | .35 | .22 | .21 | .22 | .40 | .31 | ||
| 16P | Church too | 1992 | - | .57 | .41 | .43 | .66 | .55 | - |
| 1993 | - | .58 | .41 | .57 | .72 | .61 | - | ||
| 1994 | .50 | .58 | .31 | .60 | .69 | .57 | .64 | ||
| 1996 | .46 | .62 | .26 | .50 | .66 | .61 | .59 | ||
| 16Q | Czecho- | 1992 | - | .57 | .71 | .78 | .76 | .41 | - |
| 1993 | - | .48 | .76 | .92 | .74 | .40 | - | ||
| 1994 | .74 | .48 | .70 | .85 | .74 | .30 | .62 | ||
| 1996 | .71 | .42 | .70 | .89 | .67 | .37 | .59 | ||
| 16R | Restitution | 1992 | - | .49 | .42 | .48 | .65 | .50 | - |
| 1993 | - | .51 | .40 | .39 | .66 | .50 | - | ||
| 1994 | .49 | .58 | .41 | .43 | .62 | .52 | .65 | ||
| 1996 | .40 | .53 | .37 | .41 | .61 | .39 | .59 | ||
| Code | Question | Year | Political Party | |||||||
| CSSD | HSD-SMS | LSU | KDU- | KSCM | ODA | ODS | SPR- | |||
| 16C | Provide job | 1992 | .86 | .88 | .83 | .71 | .93 | .55 | .67 | .74 |
| 1993 | .78 | - | .80 | .70 | .87 | .57 | .56 | .78 | ||
| 1994 | .78 | - | - | .72 | .89 | .61 | .55 | .76 | ||
| 1996 | .78 | - | - | .70 | .92 | .65 | .57 | .78 | ||
| 16D | Reducing | 1992 | .43 | .67 | .51 | .54 | .51 | .57 | .58 | .61 |
| 1993 | .44 | - | .41 | .49 | .34 | .54 | .57 | .46 | ||
| 1994 | .44 | - | - | .44 | .35 | .54 | .57 | .46 | ||
| 1996 | .43 | - | - | .41 | .32 | .52 | .54 | .47 | ||
| 16F | Privatizatio | 1992 | .68 | .64 | .55 | .71 | .39 | .81 | .79 | .53 |
| 1993 | .54 | - | .45 | .68 | .38 | .70 | .79 | .55 | ||
| 1994 | .48 | - | - | .57 | .33 | .64 | .72 | .46 | ||
| 1996 | .46 | - | - | .58 | .26 | .60 | .74 | .40 | ||
| 16G | Close | 1992 | .49 | .43 | .41 | .58 | .34 | .68 | .62 | .40 |
| 1993 | .49 | - | .42 | .55 | .32 | .64 | .71 | .44 | ||
| 1994 | .47 | - | - | .46 | .30 | .65 | .62 | .49 | ||
| 1996 | .45 | - | - | .52 | .32 | .60 | .65 | .51 | ||
| 16H | No atheist | 1992 | .10 | .08 | .13 | .29 | .09 | .04 | .17 | .23 |
| 1993 | .13 | - | .20 | .43 | .16 | .15 | .14 | .15 | ||
| 1994 | .15 | - | - | .45 | .14 | .09 | .13 | .15 | ||
| 1996 | .12 | - | - | .35 | .10 | .11 | .13 | .17 | ||
| 16I | Nationalis | 1992 | .82 | .79 | .80 | .85 | .83 | .90 | .84 | .77 |
| 1993 | .77 | - | .84 | .79 | .77 | .81 | .79 | .62 | ||
| 1994 | .72 | - | - | .75 | .72 | .75 | .76 | .50 | ||
| 1996 | .67 | - | - | .68 | .66 | .74 | .74 | .56 | ||
| 16M | Care about | 1992 | .70 | .76 | .76 | .70 | .80 | .53 | .64 | .83 |
| 1993 | .80 | - | .79 | .76 | .86 | .68 | .62 | .82 | ||
| 1994 | .79 | - | - | .76 | .84 | .69 | .63 | .82 | ||
| 1996 | .76 | - | - | .75 | .82 | .67 | .61 | .83 | ||
| 16N | Permit | 1992 | .87 | .85 | .86 | .44 | .90 | .94 | .86 | .79 |
| 1993 | .87 | - | .86 | .42 | .83 | .85 | .85 | .87 | ||
| 1994 | .83 | - | - | .50 | .82 | .85 | .82 | .82 | ||
| 1996 | .85 | - | - | .50 | .83 | .82 | .86 | .84 | ||
| 16O | Patriot over | 1992 | .25 | .26 | .34 | .33 | .30 | .15 | .28 | .40 |
| 1993 | .25 | - | .18 | .38 | .32 | .21 | .21 | .33 | ||
| 1994 | .27 | - | - | .40 | .35 | .21 | .25 | .36 | ||
| 1996 | .28 | - | - | .33 | .36 | .17 | .20 | .35 | ||
| 16P | Church too | 1992 | .54 | .46 | .47 | .33 | .58 | .27 | .33 | .48 |
| 1993 | .60 | - | .42 | .26 | .66 | .44 | .42 | .66 | ||
| 1994 | .50 | - | - | .24 | .64 | .38 | .42 | .54 | ||
| 1996 | .48 | - | - | .23 | .62 | .44 | .40 | .59 | ||
| 16Q | Czecho- | 1992 | .79 | .82 | .70 | .55 | .85 | .41 | .42 | .64 |
| 1993 | .69 | - | .74 | .54 | .82 | .52 | .46 | .67 | ||
| 1994 | .62 | - | - | .59 | .80 | .41 | .38 | .60 | ||
| 1996 | .54 | - | - | .53 | .75 | .35 | .29 | .57 | ||
| 16R | Restitution | 1992 | .50 | .51 | .43 | .40 | .63 | .30 | .29 | .39 |
| 1993 | .53 | - | .56 | .32 | .66 | .30 | .28 | .53 | ||
| 1994 | .59 | - | - | .36 | .72 | .37 | .34 | .57 | ||
| 1996 | .51 | - | - | .32 | .71 | .38 | .29 | .49 | ||
| Factor | Questions comprising factors | |||
| Slovakia | Czech Republic | |||
| ECON | 16D | Reducing inequality harmful | 16D | Reducing inequality harmful |
| 16F | Privatization will help | 16F | Privatization will help | |
| 16G | Close factories | 16G | Close factories | |
| NAT | 16I | Nationalism is harmful | 16I | Nationalism is harmful |
| 16O | Patriot over expert (reversed) | 16O | Patriot over expert (reversed) | |
| 16Q | Czecho-Slovak separation bad | |||
| REL | 16H | No atheist politicians (reversed) | 16H | No atheist politicians (reversed) |
| 16N | Permit abortion | 16N | Permit abortion | |
| 16P | Church too influential | 16P | Church too influential | |
| TRANS | 16C | Provide job for all | 16C | Provide job for all |
| 16M | Care about crime | 16M | Care about crime | |
| 16R | Restitution bad | 16R | Restitution bad | |
| 16Q | Czecho-Slovak separation bad | |||
| Factor | Year | Political Party | ||||||||
| DU | HZDS | KDH | MK | SDL | SNS | ZRS | Range | |||
| ECON | 1992 | - | .47 | .53 | .60 | .41 | .50 | - | .19 | |
| 1993 | - | .52 | .56 | .54 | .44 | .54 | - | .12 | ||
| 1994 | .55 | .43 | .54 | .56 | .40 | .55 | .37 | .19 | ||
| 1996 | .48 | .44 | .50 | .47 | .40 | .45 | .40 | .10 | ||
| NAT | 1992 | - | .62 | .72 | .78 | .78 | .51 | - | .27 | |
| 1993 | - | .63 | .76 | .89 | .76 | .54 | - | .35 | ||
| 1994 | .80 | .55 | .76 | .84 | .77 | .48 | .70 | .36 | ||
| 1996 | .81 | .59 | .76 | .87 | .73 | .53 | .65 | .34 | ||
| REL | 1992 | - | .69 | .38 | .56 | .77 | .67 | - | .39 | |
| 1993 | - | .70 | .44 | .59 | .80 | .71 | - | .36 | ||
| 1994 | .70 | .70 | .40 | .62 | .81 | .68 | .70 | .41 | ||
| 1996 | .67 | .69 | .39 | .55 | .78 | .69 | .70 | .39 | ||
| TRANS | 1992 | - | .70 | .69 | .71 | .78 | .69 | - | .09 | |
| 1993 | - | .66 | .65 | .69 | .77 | .67 | - | .10 | ||
| 1994 | .60 | .72 | .62 | .70 | .73 | .63 | .77 | .17 | ||
| 1996 | .58 | .71 | .59 | .68 | .72 | .63 | .76 | .18 | ||
| Factor | Year | Political Party | |||||||||
| CSSD | HSD-SMS* | LSU** | KDU-CSL-CSL | KSCM | ODA | ODS | SPR-RSC | Range | |||
| ECON | 1992 | .54 | - | .48 | .61 | .41 | .68 | .66 | .51 | .27 | |
| 1993 | .49 | .52 | - | .58 | .34 | .62 | .69 | .49 | .35 | ||
| 1994 | .47 | - | - | .50 | .37 | .61 | .64 | .47 | .27 | ||
| 1996 | .45 | - | - | .51 | .30 | .57 | .64 | .46 | .34 | ||
| NAT | 1992 | .70 | - | .63 | .69 | .68 | .83 | .70 | .57 | .26 | |
| 1993 | .64 | .56 | - | .60 | .61 | .71 | .68 | .45 | .30 | ||
| 1994 | .59 | - | - | .55 | .54 | .65 | .64 | .32 | .32 | ||
| 1996 | .53 | - | - | .51 | .48 | .66 | .64 | .38 | .28 | ||
| REL | 1992 | .77 | - | .71 | .53 | .78 | .76 | .68 | .68 | .25 | |
| 1993 | .77 | .63 | - | .47 | .75 | .73 | .73 | .76 | .30 | ||
| 1994 | .73 | - | - | .47 | .79 | .73 | .72 | .71 | .32 | ||
| 1996 | .73 | - | - | .51 | .75 | .75 | .73 | .73 | .24 | ||
| TRANS | 1992 | .71 | - | .68 | .59 | .80 | .45 | .50 | .65 | .35 | |
| 1993 | .70 | .73 | - | .58 | .81 | .52 | .48 | .70 | .33 | ||
| 1994 | .69 | - | - | .61 | .75 | .52 | .48 | .68 | .27 | ||
| 1996 | .65 | - | - | .58 | .80 | .52 | .44 | .67 | .36 | ||
| Years | Factor | |||
| ECON | NAT | REL | TRANS | |
| 1992 to 1993 | .80 | .94 | 1.00 | .98 |
| 1993 to 1994 | .86 | .98 | .99 | .59 |
| 1994 to 1996 | .84 | .98 | .98 | .97 |
| Mean | .84 | .97 | .99 | .85 |
| Years | Factor | |||
| ECON | NAT | REL | TRANS | |
| 1992 to 1993 | .97 | .92 | .90 | .96 |
| 1993 to 1994 | .97 | .99 | .96 | .99 |
| 1994 to 1996 | .98 | .99 | .98 | .99 |
| Mean | .97 | .97 | .95 | .98 |
| Year | Criterion | Rank ordering of parties by criterion | Correlation between MDS and Factor | ||||||
| 1992 | Coalition-Opposition | Opposition:
KDH MK |
Neutral:
SDL SNS |
Coalition:
HZDS |
|||||
| Pairwise | MK | KDH | SDL | HZDS | SNS | ||||
| MDS | MK
(-1.33) |
KDH
(-1.03) |
SDL
(.55) |
SNS
(.60) |
HZDS
(1.22) |
||||
| Factor
analysis |
KDH
(-.60) |
MK
(-.59) |
SDL
(.47) |
SNS
(.71) |
HZDS
(.81) |
0.98 | |||
| 1993 | Coalition-Opposition | Opposition:
KDH MK SDL |
Coalition:
HZDS SNS |
||||||
| Pairwise | MK | KDH | SDL | SNS | HZDS | ||||
| MDS | MK
(-1.47) |
KDH
(-.95) |
HZDS
(.80) |
SNS
(.80) |
SDL
(.80) |
||||
| Factor
analysis |
MK
(-.68) |
KDH
(-.62) |
SDL
(.25) |
HZDS
(.72) |
SNS
(.75) |
0.95 | |||
| 1994 | Coalition-Opposition | Coalition:
DU KDH SDL |
Neutral:
MK (ZRS) |
Opposition:
HZDS SNS |
|||||
| Pairwise | MK | KDH | DU | SDL | ZRS | SNS | HZDS | ||
| MDS | MK
(-1.15) |
DU
(-.95) |
KDH
(-.92) |
SDL
(-.31) |
ZRS
(.82) |
SNS
(1.17) |
HZDS
(1.34) |
||
| Factor
analysis |
DU
(-.77) |
KDH
(-.69) |
MK
(-.66) |
SDL
(-.47) |
ZRS
(.66) |
HZDS
(.77) |
SNS
(.77) |
0.98 | |
| 1996 | Coalition-Opposition | Opposition:
DU KDH MK SDL |
Coalition:
HZDS SNS ZRS |
||||||
| Pairwise | MK | KDH | DU | SDL | ZRS | SNS | HZDS | ||
| MDS | DU
(-0.75) |
KDH
(-0.67) |
MK
(-0.63) |
SDL
(.05) |
SNS
(.76) |
ZRS
(0.77) |
HZDS
(.84) |
||
| Factor
analysis |
KDH
(-1.09) |
MK
(-1.09) |
DU
(-1.05) |
SDL
(.07) |
SNS
(.88) |
ZRS
(.88) |
HZDS
(1.40) |
0.99 | |
| Year | Criterion | Rank ordering of parties by criterion | Correlation between MDS and Factor | |||||||
| 1992 | Coalition-Opposition | Opposition:
CSSD KSCM SPR-RSC |
Coalition:
KDU-CSL ODA ODS |
|||||||
| Pairwise | SPR-RSC | KSCM | CSSD | KDU-CSL | ODA | ODS | ||||
| MDS | KSCM
(-1.21) |
SPR-RSC
(-.88) |
LSU
(-.55) |
HSD-SMS
(-.54) |
CSSD
(-.54) |
KDU-CSL
(.90) |
ODA
(1.24) |
ODS
(1.58) |
||
| Factor
analysis |
KSCM
(-.78) |
LSU
(-.59) |
CSSD
(-.56) |
SPR-RSC
(0.54) |
HSD-SMS
(-.49) |
KDU-CSL
(.39) |
ODA
(.72) |
ODS
(.81) |
0.99 | |
| 1993 | Coalition-Opposition | Opposition:
CSSD KSCM SPR-RSC |
Coalition:
KDU-CSL ODA ODS |
|||||||
| Pairwise | SPR-RSC | KSCM | CSSD | ODA | ODS | KDU-CSL | ||||
| MDS | SPR-RSC
(-1.22) |
KSCM
(-1.20) |
HSD-SMS
(-.49) |
LSU
(-.48) |
CSSD
(.10) |
KDU-CSL
(.58) |
ODA
(1.26) |
ODS
(1.64) |
||
| Factor
analysis |
KSCM
(-.76) |
CSSD
(-.71) |
LSU
(-.63) |
SPR-RSC
(-.58) |
HSD-SMS
(-.57) |
KDU-CSL
(.40) |
ODA
(.71) |
ODS
(.78) |
0.90 | |
| 1994 | Coalition-Opposition | Opposition:
CSSD KSCM SPR-RSC |
Coalition:
KDU-CSL ODA ODS |
|||||||
| Pairwise | SPR-RSC | KSCM | CSSD | ODA | ODS | KDU-CSL | ||||
| MDS | KSCM
(-1.28) |
SPR-RSC
(-1.28) |
CSSD
(.05) |
KDU-CSL
(.23) |
ODA
(.97) |
ODS
(1.32) |
||||
| Factor
analysis |
KSCM
(-.72) |
SPR-RSC
(-.53) |
CSSD
(-.50) |
KDU-CSL
(.51) |
ODA
(.79) |
ODS
(.85) |
0.91 | |||
| 1996 | Coalition-Opposition | Opposition:
CSSD KSCM SPR-RSC |
Coalition:
KDU-CSL ODA ODS |
|||||||
| Pairwise | SPR-RSC | KSCM | CSSD | KDU-CSL | ODA | ODS | ||||
| MDS | KSCM
(-1.36) |
SPR-RSC
(-1.05) |
CSSD
(-.32) |
KDU-CSL
(.51) |
ODA
(.79) |
ODS
(1.44) |
||||
| Factor
analysis |
KSCM
(-.73) |
CSSD
(-.58) |
SPR-RSC
(-.56) |
KDU-CSL
(.47) |
ODA
(.76) |
ODS
(.86) |
0.96 | |||
| Factor | Year | Rank order of parties
according to scores on factor
Underline and bold mark parties within governing coalitions |
|||||||
| ECON | 1992 | MK | KDH | HZDS | SNS | SDL | |||
| 1993 | KDH | MK | SNS | HZDS | SDL | ||||
| 1994 | MK | DU / SNS | KDH | HZDS | SDL | ZRS | |||
| 1996 | KDH | DU | MK | SNS | HZDS | SDL / ZRS | |||
| NAT | 1992 | MK | SDL | KDH | HZDS | SNS | |||
| 1993 | MK | KDH / SDL | HZDS | SNS | |||||
| 1994 | MK | DU | SDL | KDH | ZRS | HZDS | SNS | ||
| 1996 | MK | DU | KDH | SDL | ZRS | HZDS | SNS | ||
| REL | 1992 | SDL | HZDS | SNS | MK | KDH | |||
| 1993 | SDL | SNS | HZDS | MK | KDH | ||||
| 1994 | SDL | SNS | DU / HZDS / ZRS | MK | KDH | ||||
| 1996 | SDL | ZRS | HZDS / SNS | DU | MK | KDH | |||
| TRANS | 1992 | SDL | MK | HZDS | KDH / SNS | ||||
| 1993 | SDL | MK | SNS | HZDS | KDH | ||||
| 1994 | ZRS | SDL | HZDS | MK | SNS | KDH | DU | ||
| 1996 | ZRS | SDL | HZDS | MK | SNS | KDH | DU | ||
| Factor | Year | Rank order of parties
according to scores on factor
Underline and bold mark parties within governing coalitions |
||||||||
| ECON | 1992 | KSCM | LSU | SPR-RSC | CSSD | HSD-SMS | KDU-CSL | ODS | ODA | |
| 1993 | KSCM | CSSD / SPR-RSC | HSD-SMS | KDU-CSL | ODA | ODS | ||||
| 1994 | KSCM | CSSD | SPR-RSC | KDU-CSL | ODA | ODS | ||||
| 1996 | KSCM | CSSD | SPR-RSC | KDU-CSL | ODA | ODS | ||||
| NAT | 1992 | SPR-RSC | LSU | HSD-SMS | KSCM | KDU-CSL | CSSD / ODS | ODA | ||
| 1993 | SPR-RSC | HSD-SMS | KDU-CSL-CSL-CSL | KSCM | CSSD | ODS | ODA | |||
| 1994 | SPR-RSC | KSCM | KDU-CSL | CSSD | ODS | ODA | ||||
| 1996 | SPR-RSC | KSCM | KDU-CSL | CSSD | ODS | ODA | ||||
| REL | 1992 | KDU-CSL | ODS / SPR-RSC | LSU | HSD-SMS | ODA | CSSD | KSCM | ||
| 1993 | KDU-CSL | HSD-SMS / ODA / ODS | KSCM | SPR-RSC | CSSD | |||||
| 1994 | KDU-CSL | SPR-RSC | ODS | CSSD / ODA | KSCM | |||||
| 1996 | KDU-CSL | CSSD / ODS / SPR-RSC | KSCM / ODA | |||||||
| TRANS | 1992 | KSCM | HSD-SMS | CSSD | LSU | SPR-RSC | KDU-CSL | ODS | ODA | |
| 1993 | KSCM | CSSD / SPR-RSC | HSD-SMS | KDU-CSL | ODA | ODS | ||||
| 1994 | KSCM | CSSD | SPR-RSC | KDU-CSL | ODA | ODS | ||||
| 1996 | KSCM | SPR-RSC | CSSD | KDU-CSL | ODA | ODS | ||||
| Factor | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1996 |
| ECON | .73 | .33 | .45 | .70 |
| NAT | .64 | .87 | .88 | .91 |
| REL | .82 | .75 | .31 | .59 |
| TRANS | .26 | .10 | .39 | .62 |
| Factor | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1996 |
| ECON | .95 | .94 | .92 | .88 |
| NAT | .64 | .59 | .67 | .80 |
| REL | .53 | .50 | .42 | .47 |
| TRANS | .93 | .98 | .97 | .92 |
| Mass
survey factor |
Elite
survey code |
Elite survey question | Correlation between party supporters' mean position on mass survey factor and party leaders' mean position on elite survey question | |
| 1994 | 1996 | |||
| ECON | Ki2/Kr2 | The majority of firms should
be private. State firms which are not viable should go bankrupt. v.
Many state enterprises should remain state property |
.97 | .91 |
| Ki16/Kr9 | State interventionism v.
Liberal market economy |
.93 | .98 | |
| Ki3 | In privatization, social and
moral criteria of justice should have priority v.
In privatization economic criteria--speed and effectiveness--should have priority |
.98 | ||
| NAT | Ki18/Kr11 | Emphasis on national consciousness,
history and cultural legacy v.
Emphasis on connection to western Europe and global problems of humanity. |
.65 | .87 |
| REL | Ki10/Kr7 | Religious organizations protect
new post-communist morality and should have influence on the content of
education in state schools. v.
Religious organizations are a private matter and should not have influence on the content of education in state schools. |
.97 | .98 |
| Ki9 | The state should declare artificial
termination of pregnancy to be an illegal and criminal act v.
A pregnant woman should decide herself whether abortion is moral. |
.96 | ||
| Ki19 | The party accepts the influence
of religious groups on its policies. v.
The party rejects the influence of religious organizations on its policies. |
.91 | ||
| TRANS | Ki1/Kr1 | Social policy should not mean
compete protection. Citizens should take on themselves some of the burden
of health care. v.
Complete protection against risk through social policy. General health insurance should absorb much of the burden for health care. |
.99 | .89 |
| lite
survey code |
Elite
survey qestion |
Correlation between party position on elite survey question and party position on elite survey competitive dimension | |
| 1994 | 1996 | ||
| Ki2/Kr2 | Private v. public firms | .98 | .99 |
| Ki16/Kr9 | State intervention v. Market economy | .99 | .90 |
| Ki3 | Justice v. Speed in privatization | .91 | |
| Ki18/Kr11 | National feeling v. European and international feeling | .88 | .82 |
| Ki10/Kr7 | Religious influence on education v. No influence | .47 | .68 |
| Ki9 | Abortion illegal v. legal | .46 | |
| Ki19 | Religious influence on party v. no influence | .57 | |
| Ki1/Kr1 | Individual burden v. Social policy in health care | .99 | .92 |
| Factor Label | Questions comprising factor | |
| FOCUS 1994 | CEU 1994 | |
| ECON | 26l. State ownership of enterprises should prevail. (Reversed) | 38g. Private ownership of industry should be expanded |
| 26a. The state should guarantee a job for everyone who wants to work. | 16c. It should be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one | |
| 26o. Income differentials should be smaller. | 39h. Greater efforts should be made to reduce inequalities of income between people | |
| HUNGARIAN | 33b. What do you think about the right to write first names and surnames in one's mother tongue? | 39k. Ethnic minorities should have the right to write their names in their mother tongue. |
| 33a. What do you think about the use of bilingual signs in mixed areas? | 39j. The use of bilingual (i.e. both Slovak and Hungarian) signs in mixed areas was an excessive and unjustified demand of minority representatives. (Reversed) | |
| 29iv./38c. In a democratic system the majority has the right to make decisions even at the expense of the minority. v. In a democratic system the minorities must be guaranteed at least the same rights as the majority. (Reversed) | ||
| INTEGRATION | 9e. To what extent do you trust: NATO | 33. Slovakia should join NATO as soon as possible v. Slovakia should stay outside NATO |
| 9f. To what extent do you trust: the EU | 32. Slovakia should join The EU as soon as possible v. Slovakia should stay outside The EU | |
| SPLIT | 5. What arrangement between the Slovak and the Czech Republics would you personally prefer in the future: two independent states | 34. What arrangement between the Slovak and the Czech Republics would you prefer: two independent states |
| 4. If a referendum had been held before the division of the CSFR, would you have voted: for the division of the CSFR | 16q. It would be better if the Czech and Slovak republics were not separated. (Reversed) | |
| REL | 37vi. To adopt more stringent criteria for abortion v. To lift any restrictions for abortion. | 16n. A woman should be allowed to have an abortion in the early weeks of pregnancy if she decides so. (Reversed) |
| 9j. To what extent do you trust: the Church | 16p. The Church has too much influence in our country. (Reversed) | |
| AUTH | 29ii./38a. The most important thing is unity and togetherness of people. v. The most important thing is plurality of opinion and democracy. | |
| 29iii./38b. What is important in politics is patience at negotiations. v. What is important is decisiveness and the firm hand of a strong personality. (Reversed) | ||
| 26c./39b In the interest of the people a politician can sometimes act contrary to the law. | ||
| Factor | Survey | |
| FOCUS | CEU | |
| AUTH | .96 | .96 |
| HUNGARIAN | .78 | .83 |
| ECON | .66 | .32 |
| INTEGRATION | .64 | .43 |
| SPLIT | .54 | .81 |
| REL | .46 | .35 |
| Code | Question | Correlation between mean response of party supporters and position on main competitive dimension from the SAV/AVCR 1995 survey. | Difference in correlation | |
| Slovakia | Czech Republic | |||
| 72b | The democratically elected state bodies should use their power more firmly. | .97 | .17 | .80 |
| 72c | An important part of democracy is protection of rights and freedoms of those political minorities who were not successful in elections. | .83 | .17 | .67 |
| 72h | It is good for the country if there exists a parliamentary opposition. | .83 | .24 | .60 |
| 72f | It is necessary to watch the press, radio, and television so that they do not jeopardize the policy of a democratic government. | .87 | .28 | .59 |
| 72d | Our country needs a strong personality who will direct it out of the current situation. | .90 | .62 | .29 |
| 72e | The parliamentary opposition, though never ending objection, only hinders the government in positive work. | .95 | .93 | .02 |
| 72a | Today's level of democracy corresponds with the country's needs and it is not necessary to change anything. | .86 | .92 | -.06 |
| 72g | It is right to forbid certain positions to people with a Communist past | .29 | .78 | -.49 |
| Factor | Average range of mean position within groups on main competitive dimension | ||||||
| Slovakia | Czech Republic | ||||||
| HZDS, SNS,
ZRS (from 1994) |
Other parties | Difference (Other -Coalition) | ODS, ODA,
KDU-CSL |
Other parties | Difference
(Other - Coalition) |
||
| ECON | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.03 | |
| NAT | 0.14 | 0.10 | -0.04 | 0.13 | 0.21 | 0.08 | |
| REL | 0.01 | 0.38 | 0.37 | 0.23 | 0.06 | -0.17 | |
| TRANS | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.12 | -0.01 | |
