

Any Way You Slice It:  
The Politics of Partial Cleavages in Slovakia and the Czech Republic

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When Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan created the comparative study of cleavages in 1967, they never intended for their framework to serve as the last word on the question.. In more than three decades since their work, frozen cleavages in many countries have thawed and never quite resolidified, calling into question the usefulness of cleavage as a tool for analysis. Among the most damaging of the changes has been the emergence of new democracies where, despite more than a decade of political development, cleavages of the expected type simply have not emerged. Furthermore, the new divisions have emerged not so much from below in the form of structural differences--as theorized by Lipset and Rokkan--but rather from above, at the hands of political leaders.

This article begins with the notion that in the absence of deep overlapping socio-economic and political divisions in new democracies, it is necessary to begin with at a smaller scale, with the underlying divisions that may eventually come together to make up to create a full cleavage. An application of this revised method to the new democracies of Slovakia and the Czech Republic in the first decade after their transition shows that the role of socio-economic questions in party competition depends little on the underlying class structure or the array of attitudes on economic questions. By contrast, underlying ethnic divisions in Slovakia proved to have not only a direct relationship to attitudes and party competition, but an indirect relationship as well, producing a division *within* the ethnic Slovak community at both mass and elite levels. The comparison also casts new light on the differences between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The process of cleavage formation in the two countries proves far more similar than previously thought, and the clear difference in outcomes shows the clear imprint of particular decisions by particular political party leaders.

## What Are Cleavages?

Although their work began the serious study of cleavages, Lipset and Rokkan avoid an explicit discussion of the meaning of the term, defining it instead contextually in their questions about particular types of conflict: "cut across each other and produced overlaps between allies and enemies, and which reinforced each other and tended to polarize the national citizenry? . . . Why did some early conflicts establish party oppositions and others not?"(Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 1) Several years later in 1970, Rae and Taylor provided a more explicit definition, identifying three specific types of divisions as cleavages: "(1) ascriptive or 'trait' cleavages such as race or caste; (2) ascriptive or "opinion" cleavages such as ideology or, less grandly, preference; and (3) behavioral or "act" cleavages such as those elicited through voting and organizational membership (Rae and Taylor 1970, 1). In 1990, Bartolini and Mair listed a similar set of characteristics in their analysis of the effects of cleavage on electoral stability:

the concept of cleavage can be seen to incorporate three levels: an *empirical* element, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in social-structural terms; a *normative* element, that is the set of values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element, and which reflect the self-consciousness of the social group(s) involved; and an *organizational/behavioral* element, that is the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage"(Bartolini and Mair 1990, 215)

Bartolini and Mair thus acknowledge their similarity to Rae and Taylor while making the clear distinction that their definition of cleavage involves not any one of these differences alone but rather *all* of them. They emphasize that "cleavages cannot be reduced simply to the outgrowths of social stratification; rather, social distinctions become cleavages when they are organized as such. . . . A cleavage has therefore to be considered primarily as *a form of closure of social relationships*"(Bartolini and Mair 1990, 216). This definition possesses certain intuitive advantage. To claim that the essence of cleavage lies in the overlap of several different kinds of

divisions is to do away with a theoretical weakness of Rae and Taylor, whose methods differentiate among cleavages on the basis of the profile of adherents but ultimately reduce to the number and size of groups, which may offer little relevant information, or to the intensity of feeling, which may be ephemeral and difficult to measure. Bartolini and Mair capture the deeper insight that while differences are everywhere, they only become politically meaningful they overlap with other differences, such as when support for redistribution of income becomes closely related to rejection of religious education in schools, or when support for either of these issues becomes closely related to a particular political institution on the one hand or a particular social group on the other. The more of these differences that share the same pattern, the more each side encounters and engages only its own members, shares only certain opinions and the more important the cleavage becomes for society as a whole, transcending mere ‘difference.’

It is not necessary to throw out Rae and Taylor altogether, however. As Bartolini and Mair acknowledge, their distinctions between “trait”, “opinion” and “act” differences remain useful. These sets of characteristics each capture a different aspect of the human person and the aspects are not in most cases intrinsically linked. Bartolini and Mair’s decision to require all three of these aspects in their definition of a cleavage reflects their appreciation for the importance of overlap, but the decision also fences off an important middle ground. Although closure of social relationships in the form of a cleavage powerfully affects politics, it is also a rare occurrence and at by definition can only explain the big conflicts within a society. As the following sections demonstrate, a sensitivity to incomplete closer of social relationships, overlap at only two of the three levels cited by Bartolini and Mair.

One problem with these intermediate types of cleavage is the absence of appropriate terminology. Bartolini and Mair’s definitions invalidate the use of “cleavage” by those who use

the term cleavage to refer only to the overlap between attitudinal and behavioral divisions (Römmele 1999). One solution is to refer to the triple overlap of ascriptive, attitudinal and behavioral differences (or in Bartolini and Mair's terms, empirical, value and organizational differences) as "full cleavages" and accept others as 'diminished subtypes' (Collier and Levitsky 1997). In this context an overlap of "opinion" and "act" differences would become, for example, a 'cleavage minus ascription' or a 'attitudinal-behavioral cleavage' in much the same way that O'Donnell uses "delegative democracy" to refer to democracies without horizontal accountability or Zakaria uses "illiberal democracy" to refer to a democracies without rule of law.

Figure 1. displays the possible relationships in graphic form. Where only one type of difference emerges—demographic, for example—it is sufficient simply to use the term 'demographic difference,' and to address the other aspects of the difference with descriptors like those Rae and Taylor's intensity and fragmentation. In instances where two types of difference align together, it is necessary to use more descriptive names. Overlap between certain attitudes and certain patterns of voting and membership becomes an "opinion-act" or "attitudinal-behavioral" cleavage. This same logic, produces the other sub-categories of "ascriptive-attitudinal" cleavages and "ascriptive-behavioral" cleavages. If clearly identified, these 'diminished-subtype cleavages' or 'partial cleavages' serve as important categories of analysis in their own right.

Each of these partial cleavages displays distinct characteristics and has its own distinct effects on the social and political outcomes of countries in which they are present:

**C** An ascriptive-attitudinal cleavage reflects a relationship between particular material conditions or identities and specific sets of beliefs such as redistributionist sentiments of working classes, may create a wide and enduring split in society. Yet without a

behavioral component that produces labor unions or labor parties, the split may yield little conflict and even less change. These correspond quite closely to Mainwaring's description of "salient social cleavages without clear party expressions" (Mainwaring 1999, 46)

C An attitudinal-behavioral cleavage—a strong relationship between particular beliefs and particular party choices—may have immediate effect but may not endure from one election to the next because they lack roots in society. In fact observers often refer to such cleavages as "political cleavages" to distinguish them from "social cleavages" that involve ties to particular social groups.

C An ascriptive-behavioral cleavage—one which lacks an attitudinal component—is the least familiar of the three but is nevertheless a possibility, particularly when social groups have not consciously articulated the nature of an underlying group identity. If the members of a group can agree on questions of identity and formulate corresponding demands, this cleavage can develop into a full cleavage. Before such a shift occurs, such a cleavage is vulnerable to political entrepreneurs who may try to seek support by emphasizing opinions that cut across group lines.

The three-fold overlap of a full cleavage, in the sense used by Bartolini and Mair, possesses significantly greater potential for impact than the individual differences or two-fold diminished subtypes introduced above. Full cleavages endure because of their roots in society, have direct impact on political outcomes through political institutions, and allow claims to legitimacy through their association with more abstract ideas. But such a powerful and coherent set of overlapping differences is rare, and a focus only on full cleavages will miss important aspects of the relationship between social groups and politics.

## **How Do Cleavages Form?**

Looking only at full cleavages also obscures where such cleavages came from in the first place and what newly overlapping differences might someday replace them. It is highly unlikely that ascriptive, attitudinal and behavioral differences would overlap suddenly and simultaneously, allowing a full cleavage to spring fully formed from an expectant society. The partial cleavages discussed above represent part of the full life-cycle of cleavages, both their birth and their death (though obviously not all partial cleavages become full).

Specifying the full range of possible overlapping differences is an essential step in the processes of revisiting the question of the origins of cleavages. In fact most work on cleavages has been influenced by the notion implicit in Lipset and Rokkan that differences at the ascriptive level—location and livelihood in particular—produce attitudinal differences and that these together yield behavioral differences which find their ultimate political expression in the establishment of political parties. Lipset and Rokkan do not exclude other possible developmental paths, but few scholars have devoted much attention to the other possibilities. Some, including Sartori (Sartori 1969) and Przeworski and Sprague (Przeworski and Sprague 1986) have implicitly questioned the Lipset and Rokkan model by emphasizing the role of class parties in producing class consciousness (and not the reverse), while others such as Inglehart (Inglehart 1977) and Kreisi (Kreisi 2000) claim to have identified newly-emerging cleavages which lack clear ascriptive characteristics. Furthermore, the ascription-to-attitude-to-behavior model cannot be easily applied to most of the democracies that have arisen since Lipset and Rokkan devised their model.

Mainwaring (1999) notes that the model functions poorly in “third-wave” democracies and calls for more attention to a “top-down” approach that can understand how “Third-wave

party systems are especially subject to elite shaping from above”(55). Against the socially-derived cleavage model, Mainwaring and others (Chhibber and Torcal 1997) offer a politically-derived cleavage model<sup>1</sup> in which political leaders and their institutions shape or even create attitudinal differences. Although ascriptive differences are by definition less variable than attitudes, even these may be affected by the decisions of political elites. Although in most cases elites cannot create ascriptive differences, they may be able to uncover buried ascriptive fault-lines and use them for political advantage. For example, party leaders might deliberately introduce questions of pension reform into discussions of overall spending cuts in order to reorient the conflict along generational rather than class lines.

There is clearly no one source—social or political—for all cleavages and in all probability no individual cleavage has an exclusively social or exclusively political origin. The challenge in approaching such mixtures is to determine the relative strengths of the social and political component and the role that each played in shaping the final outcome. For such a task, it is essential to pay attention to the components of cleavage: the ‘differences’ and ‘partial cleavages’ discussed above.

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<sup>1</sup>The commonly used phrases “social cleavage” and “political cleavage” present terminological difficulties because the pair are used in two different and not entirely consistent ways. In some contexts, the adjectives are descriptive and are used to distinguish cleavages with an ascriptive basis (“social”) from those without (“political”). In other cases, however, “social” and “political” refer to a causal relationship, whether a cleavage emerged from society or from political elites. While it is unlikely that a cleavage without an ascriptive basis (a “political” cleavage) is unlikely to have emerged from society, it is possible to imagine a socially-derived cleavage whose ascriptive basis has disappeared over time. Furthermore research documents concrete examples of cases in which political elites have attempted to create new divisions and in the process have deliberately provoked discord between ascriptive groups as a way of establishing a firm and enduring basis in society. In light of the many possibilities for confusion, this paper will use “ascriptive” and “behavioral” to substitute for the descriptive meanings of “social” and “political” and will use “socially-derived” and “politically-derived” to refer to the rival causal models.

## Measuring Cleavage Components

One advantage of the framework described above is the relative ease with which it can be used with existing sources of quantitative data to yield meaningful information about cleavages and their components. Ascription, attitude and behavior are all subject to extensive scrutiny by social scientists and extensive data is available in each category even in new democracies. Censuses measure many key ascriptive characteristics; electoral results measure at least one aspect of behavior and, if disaggregated to municipal levels may allow correlation with census-based demographic information. By combining census and electoral data it is possible to gain an understanding of the relationship between the ascriptive characteristics of particular communities and the collective behavior of those communities on successive election days. From this information it is possible to use correlation and regression to draw generalizations that, for example, a positive and statistically significant relationship exists between the level of unemployment in a community and the share of votes for a particular political party or bloc of political parties. Such calculations, however, do not indicate that it is the unemployed and their families who vote for the party in question and not others who, perhaps, seek an emphasis on law and order to prevent the unemployed from disrupting society.

Opinion surveys lack the comprehensiveness of censuses or electoral results but offer the only meaningful source of attitudinal variables. Although they depend on samples that are relatively small in comparison to the population as a whole, surveys are also the only source that can provide information on *each* of the three key characteristics for particular individuals. Correlation and regression analysis using this data can provide direct evidence of a relationship between the ascriptive characteristics of individuals and their political behavior (including, in some cases, not only voting but memberships and relative preferences among political parties).

Survey data also allows a study of the relationship between both ascriptive and behavioral characteristics and individual attitudes. Depending on the survey, attitude-related questions include thoughts on basic principles of economic policy, nationality, the role of religion, preferences for particular political systems and related fields.

Although one of the ultimate goals of such research is to look at the relative degree of overlap of ascriptive, attitudinal and behavioral characteristics, the results from the aforementioned tests can only provide meaningful answers within a comparative context. Correlation and regression results are limited by the nature of questions asked, the number and range of possible responses and other factors. If, for example, the correlation between party choice and redistributionist attitudes is higher than the correlation between those same attitudes and social class, it does not necessarily mean that political factors predominate over social ones in the shaping of those attitudes. Nor does scholarship offer any guidelines for “normal” in such circumstances. For this reason, the framework introduced here can only be done in a comparative context, with comparisons from one country or region to another, or from one period of time to another. Thus while the data does not permit conclusions of the relative importance of ascription, attitude and behavior, it does allow conclusions about the relative weights of those characteristics in two countries and about changes over time in any particular country. As the following sections show, such comparisons can be extremely revealing.

### **Test Cases: Slovakia and the Czech Republic**

The former Czechoslovakia offers a particularly convenient laboratory for exploring the question of how cleavages form because they appear to exhibit different cleavages despite great similarities in culture, society and institutional design. Within Czechoslovakia, Slovaks and

Czechs followed similar (though by no means identical) historical paths and under a common (though not always fully symmetrical) set of political institutions, and although the countries separated at the end of 1992, neither made major alterations to the institutional structure it inherited. Furthermore, attempts at redressing socio-economic inequalities within Czechoslovakia had also produced, by the 1980's, a high degree of parity between the two. Despite different economic and political paths during the mid-1990's, the socio-economic similarities have remained and, if anything, grown stronger.

At the same time, political competition in the two countries after 1989 has followed divergent paths. The Czech Republic, until relatively recently, offered a near-textbook example of left-right, socio-economic division (Evans and Whitefield 1994; Kitschelt 1999; Whitefield and Evans 1999). Slovakia, by contrast, presented a more complicated picture which could not be explained by left and right (Evans and Whitefield 1994). While some observers saw in Slovakia the absence of a clear pattern (Huber and Inglehart 1995), others identified a cleavage that was unusual by the standards of western Europe, a split between supporters of strong leadership and defensive nationalism a supporters of democracy and greater national accommodation. This little-studied combination, furthermore, performs better than any other explanation in accounting for Slovakia's oscillation between democracy and near authoritarianism (Krause 2000), further underlining the importance of studying cleavages in new democracies.

Aside from their intriguing relationship between demographics and cleavages, Slovakia and the Czech Republic also possess the advantage of extensive and publically-available public opinion data. Furthermore, because of strong ties between the social science communities in the two countries, a large number of surveys were conducted simultaneously in both countries with

nearly identical questionnaires. With few exceptions, these surveys include a reasonably wide array of demographic data, and electoral preference. Some go beyond these minimums to provide extensive class and income information, attitudes toward a range of political parties, and attitudinal questions on economic policy, nationality, international integration, religion, social policy and preference of regime-type. Full details on these data sources appear in Appendix A.

### **Level One: Differences**

An understanding of Slovak and Czech cleavages and their origins must begin with an analysis of their component parts, simple differences in the ascriptive, attitudinal and behavioral characteristics of both societies. By ignoring, for the moment, the relationship between these three sets of characteristics, it is possible to gain a more precise understanding of the differences that contributed to Slovak and Czech cleavages and the sequence in which those cleavages emerged.

#### *Ascription*

In most respects, Slovakia and the Czech Republic present remarkably similar ascriptive structures. On most of the commonly-cited, measurable ascriptive differences, two countries exhibit similar patterns:

- Gender: As might be expected, no meaningful difference exists between the two countries in terms of gender distribution.
- Age: The average age in Slovakia is slightly lower—by 2.5 years—than the average age in the Czech Republic. The two countries respective age distributions, however, are almost identically structured with the elderly forming a slightly smaller share of Slovakia's

population than the Czech Republic's and those of school age and below forming a slightly greater share in Slovakia than the Czech Republic.

- Education. As with age, the Slovak and Czech populations bear close resemblance in their educational attainments. According to surveys conducted in 1993 and 1995, Slovaks were more likely to have ended their schooling during or immediately after private school (30% against 25% in the Czech Republic), but those Slovaks who went on to secondary school were more likely to complete it successfully and advance to post-secondary schooling. As a result, the total number of Slovaks and Czechs with secondary school degrees and university degrees is almost identical (Institute of Sociology 1993).
- Urbanization: Slovaks were marginally less likely than Czechs to live in large cities or in very small villages, and more likely to live in small towns. By various calculations, approximately 22% of Czechs live in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants against only 13% of Slovaks. At the other end of the spectrum, about 9% of Czechs live in villages with fewer than 500 inhabitants, against only 5% of Slovaks. In between these extremes, Slovaks are more likely to live in villages and small towns in the 500-5,000 inhabitant range (38% against the Czech 25%) and about equally likely to live in medium and large towns in the 5,000 to 100,000 inhabitant range (about 45% in both countries) (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1995; Czech Statistical Office 2001).
- Class: Although Slovakia and the Czech Republic differ to a moderate degree in per capita GDP—a difference ranging between 5% to 20% depending on the method of calculation—evidence shows the class structure of the two countries to be nearly identical. Whether computed according survey evidence regarding monthly dollar income, subjective social status, or feelings of wealth and poverty, the structure of Slovak and

Czech societies do not differ in statistically significant ways (Machonin, Tucek et al. 1996). The two countries also report extremely similar—and by world standards, extremely low—Gini coefficients of income and wealth inequality (2000). Although both societies show movement toward inequality, both preserve a distribution that is heavily skewed toward the middle and lower-middle classes, with few extremely rich and relatively poor extremely few (Machonin, Tucek et al. 1996, 318).

In only two areas do the populations of Slovakia and the Czech Republic exhibit different structures of ascriptive characteristics that are different in kind rather than in degree:

- Religion: 1991 Census figures show a significant difference in the share of Slovaks and Czechs who either claimed no religious affiliation or refused to answer the question: 27% in Slovakia against more than double that share--56%--in the Czech Republic. Within these very differently-sized populations of believers, there were other differences. Although most believers in both countries identify themselves as Roman Catholics (83% in Slovakia and 89% in the Czech Republic), the adherence of the remaining believers differed. The second and third most significant denominations in the Czech Republic were two indigenous Czech Christian churches with just over 8% of all Czech believers. In Slovakia, the most significant denominations other than Roman Catholicism were Lutheranism with 6% and Greek Catholicism with 3% (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1995; Czech Statistical Office 2001).
- Ethnicity. Slovakia's population includes a significant and distinct ethnic Hungarian minority without any counterpart in the Czech Republic. According to Slovakia's 1991 census, Hungarians constitutes 10.5% of the population. Hungarians are by a considerable margin the largest minority in Slovakia, speak a language outside the Slavic

language family and live primarily in a dense band along Slovakia's border with Hungary. Outside of this important ethnic group, Slovakia's population also includes a significantly larger share of Romanies—as much as four times that of the Czech Republic by some estimates (Zel'ova', Bac~ova' et al. 1994, 32)—though the actual size of the populations remains in dispute and may range anywhere between 3% and 10% in Slovakia and between 1% and 3% in the Czech Republic. Unlike the Czech Republic, Slovakia's population in 1991 also contained a sizeable number of Rusyns or Ruthenians, who speak a Slavic language related to Slovak, Polish and Ukrainian, but the Rusyn population likely did not exceed 2% in 1991. (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1995; Czech Statistical Office 2001)

According to the socially-derived model of cleavages, this information should go quite far in predicting other attitudinal and behavioral differences in Slovakia's politics and therefore in predicting the respective cleavage structures of the two countries. But even with the socially-derived cleavage model, the question remains open whether the main cleavages derive from realms where the two countries have similar structures—such as social class—or realms where the two countries differ—such as religion or ethnicity.

### *Attitudes*

Although Slovak and Czech attitudes differ to a statistically significant degree in some specific areas, the overall differences are considerably smaller than suggested by those who posit significant structural or cultural differences between Slovaks and Czechs (Carpenter 1997; Elster, Offe et al. 1998; Kitschelt 1999). Furthermore, although the overall levels of support for certain attitudes did differ between Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the distribution of opinions on

particular questions differed very little between the two countries. Nor did major differences emerge in the relationship among responses to various attitude-related questions.

The necessary preface to any discussion of public opinion is a review of the available data. The use of public opinion instruments poses challenges to any researcher because although survey methods have improved significantly over time, small differences in survey networks can produce significant differences in results. Furthermore—and this is true of all survey research—small differences in the wording of questions can yield also yield significant differences in results. For this reason, to rely on a single survey (Miller, White et al. 1998) or even a single set of surveys conducted by the same firm is to risk skewed results.<sup>2</sup> Fortunately, the availability of multiple sources of data usually eliminates the need to take such risks. The five sets of surveys detailed in Appendix A contain hundreds of different attitudinal questions, but the list can be condensed considerably by setting aside questions that did not appear on a regular basis or have analogs in other surveys. Table 1. lists the seven sets of related questions fit both of these restrictions. These provide the basis for most subsequent analyses.

Table 2. shows the degree of difference between Slovak and Czech mean responses on these questions, where such information is available for respondents in both countries. As the table indicates, differences do appear on many questions, though these vary from survey to survey depending on the method and the specific question. Differences on economic questions produce a consistent 5-10 percentage point difference with Czechs supporting free markets to a greater degree than Slovaks by consistent but relatively small margins. On questions of

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<sup>2</sup>This risk is relatively small for relatively simple questions of mean and standard deviation (support for particular parties or particular attitudes), but for questions of interrelationship among variables results from individual surveys can differ dramatically from one to the next, even when questions are identical.

international integration, the differences again average about 5 percentage points, and although it was more often than not the Czechs who were willing to accept international influence, it was in some surveys the respondents from Slovakia who showed greater favor toward outsiders, particularly the European Union in the 1997 and 1998 CEEB surveys. Responses on questions of minority relations are more difficult to assess. When phrased in the abstract as in the 1994 FOCUS survey, Czechs and Slovaks exhibit nearly identical mean responses, but respondents from Slovakia were far more likely to see minority groups as threatening. According to the CEU surveys, Czechs were more likely to oppose the split of Czechoslovakia by 10 percentage points, but the AVCR survey shows no significant difference between the two populations on a differently-worded version of the same question.

Table 3. shows the difference in standard deviation between Slovak and Czech mean responses on these questions, where such information is available for respondents in both countries. In practical terms, most of the results listed in Table 3 constitute almost unnoticeable differences in the overall structure of opinion and represent slight shifts in the distribution curve rather than differences in the shape of the curve.<sup>3</sup> Despite differences in overall economic opinions, the populations of Slovakia and the Czech Republic differ little in the structure of those opinions. Nor do they differ considerably on questions of integration or even on the split of Czechoslovakia. Differences are only significant on questions of regime type (and there only on one of the three surveys) and on questions of majority-minority relations, where the difference in

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<sup>3</sup>In an evenly distributed a population of one hundred, a 0.01 change in standard deviation results when two or three respondents change their responses by one point out of four on one question; a 0.25 difference in standard deviation results from comparisons of an evenly distributed population shifts to one with unanimity of opinion; a 0.35 change in standard deviation results from comparing a society split evenly between moderate options (twos and threes on a four point scale) to a society dominated by extremism (an even split between ones and fours on a four point scale with no twos or threes).

attitude structure differs more than on any other question used here.

A final relevant consideration is the relationship among particular attitudes. Factor analysis looks at correlations among responses on multiple variables to find patterns of responses. Of the sets of surveys detailed in Appendix A, only CEU and FOCUS ask multiple questions in each of a number of areas, and only CEU questionnaires included a large and consistent battery of question in regular intervals. Factor analysis of the full set of CEU attitudinal questions yields similar results for both countries except for one distinct difference (Markowski 1997; Krause 2000). In seven nearly-identical surveys over four years, responses in both Slovakia and the Czech Republic produce nearly identical clusters around three separate themes: the freedom of markets, the role of religion, and the costs of transformation (including restitution of property, crime, and joblessness). In one area, however, the clustering of opinions differs quite significantly. Responses from Slovakia can be distinguished from Czechs by the consistency to which they answered questions about the value of nationalism, the preference for an patriotic politician over an expert and the split of Czechoslovakia. In the Czech Republic, by contrast, patterns of response on questions of nationalism and patriotic politicians did not resemble those of other questions or even of each other. Furthermore in the Czech Republic the responses on the split of Czechoslovakia had little to do with nationalism or patriotism and were far more consistent with responses concerning the costs of transformation. Those Czechs who liked the low crime and full employment of the Communist era also tended to like Czechoslovakia. No such pattern emerged in Slovakia (Krause 2000).

### *Behavior*

Ignoring ascription or attitudes, at least for the moment, political behavior alone offers

little potential for differentiating Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Both countries experienced moderately high voter turnout in national parliamentary elections and moderately low party membership, and both party systems presented voters with a similarly large range of parties that could plausibly claim a chance at winning parliamentary representation.

The two party systems offered not only a similar number of choices, but also a similarly sized and shaped array of choices. CEU surveys conducted regularly between 1992 and 1996 include questions asking respondents about the degree to which each party represents their interests. A variety of advanced correlation techniques allow the translation of responses to such questions into a one-, two- or multiple dimension map of party space as defined feelings of sympathy and antipathy. Early analysis of the data in one-dimensional arrays using factor analysis shows clear similarity between the Slovak and Czech cases (Krause, 2000). Both yield an essentially bi-polar distribution which cluster the country's largest party and two coalition partners on one side and a variety of smaller opposition parties on the other. In both countries one medium-sized party hovers closer to the middle than others, though the position of this party (the Christian Democratic Union, KDU-CSL) in the Czech Republic is far more stable than that of its counterpart (the Party of the Democratic Left, SDL) in Slovakia which shifts position dramatically over time.

Reduction of the party space to one dimension allows for useful comparisons between party position and other one-dimensional relationships, such as the position of party supporters on particular issues, but such reduction may also conceal other divisions within party space. Figures 2. and 3. depict the mean position of Slovak and Czech parties within a two-dimensional space over all seven CEU surveys. Actual positions vary slightly from these positions over time, but especially after 1993 the relative positions are extremely stable through 1996 (and later

studies by other firms confirm the absence of significant change through the end of the 1990's). As these figures show, the similarities between Slovak and Czech political behavior extend into the second dimension. Both figures show a large party accompanied by two smaller parties; in both countries these sets of parties hover near the rightmost limit of the primary (X) axis but toward the center of the secondary (Y) axis. In both countries, this group of parties formed the core of the governing coalition for much of the 1990's. Against these parties in both countries stand a wide range of parties closer to the leftmost limit of the primary axis and distributed widely along the secondary axis. In the Czech Republic, this opposition array stretches in an arc from a the upper center to the lower left, ranging in that order from the Social Democratic Party to the Communist Party and to the Republican Party. In this configuration, the Social Democratic Party is actually closer to the coalition parties than to some other parties in the opposition. An almost identical situation holds in Slovakia, where the opposition parties stand at considerable distance from one another in a crescent facing the dominant coalition. The practical significance of this unusual configuration is the presence of more than one key behavioral split in each country. One major difference separates coalition from opposition, while another separates opposition parties from one another. Both countries contain cross-cutting differences, but only one cuts all the way across, while the second keeps the resulting opposition internally divided. This difference has significant affect on the interpretation of ascriptive-behavioral and attitudinal-behavioral cleavages discussed below/

### *The Role of Difference*

Looking first at individual differences in ascription, attitude and behavior reveals more similarities between Slovaks and Czechs than conventional wisdom would suggest. Shorn of

their attitudinal and ascriptive connotations, the structures of Slovak and Czech political behavior appear almost identical, even to the secondary dimension of difference that appears to affect only those parties in opposition. Furthermore, although Slovaks and Czechs differ to a noticeable degree on certain political attitudes, the overall distribution of attitudes within the two societies follows remarkably similar patterns, except perhaps on questions of minority rights. Likewise, the two societies share similar underlying ascriptive patterns with the twin exceptions of Slovakia's Hungarian minority and its significantly greater share of religious adherents. The essence of cleavages lies in the overlapping of more than one such difference, however, and different patterns of overlap result in cleavage patterns that differ far more than any particular ascriptive, attitudinal or behavioral pattern.

### **Level Two: Partial Cleavages**

Since cleavages depend on the overlap between two or more types of difference, the significance and origins of cleavages can be determined by looking at the major types of difference in relationship to one another over time, looking at each pair within the triad. For Slovakia and the Czech Republic, this exercise reveals the strong role of behavioral elements.

#### *Attitudinal-Behavioral Cleavages*

Although the 'unlabeled' map of Slovak and Czech parties shows close similarity, further analysis shows that the positions of the parties in each country are associated with very different sets of attitudes. These two different patterns existed from the beginnings of independent Slovakia and the Czech Republic and changed only marginally over time.

The party space calculations derived from the CEU survey questions can be used to

assign a spatial position to individual survey respondents which can then be correlated with the respective positions of those same respondents on questions related to attitude. In one-dimensional party-space, the results of the correlation confirm the findings of earlier, simpler explorations (Krause 2000): the one dimensional party-space positions of respondents correlate far more closely to questions of free markets and inequality in the Czech Republic than they do in Slovakia, while question of the split of Czechoslovakia show high correlations in both countries. The full battery of questions used in the CEU surveys helps to clarify the differences even further. Rather than present results on all twelve questions from the CEU survey, it is possible to use five sets of attitude clusters derived from the factor analysis of attitudes discussed above: free markets, religion, costs of transformation, nationalism (which includes patriotism) and the split of Czechoslovakia (which factors with transformation in the Czech Republic and with nationalism in Slovakia). Table 4. presents the correlations over time. In the Czech Republic it is the differences over economy- and transformation-related questions that most closely resemble the differences in party choice, and the relationship grows stronger over time. No single set of issues in Slovakia evokes the same degree of correlation. Religion correlates closely in the 1992 years but the relationship quickly subsides, to be replaced by sharply increasing correlations between party choice and questions of nationalism. For the main (X) axis in two dimensional party space, the results are nearly identical. The secondary (Y) dimension exhibits a significantly different set of relationships. In Slovakia, the position of respondents on this second dimension relates extremely closely to questions concerning the role of religion and the need for decommunization. In the Czech Republic, respondents' positions on the secondary dimension do not correlate as closely with any of the questions asked in the survey, showing only moderate

correlations with questions of religion and the split of Czechoslovakia.<sup>4</sup>

Unfortunately, the CEU surveys do not ask key questions about international integration, ethnic minorities or regime type, and those surveys that do ask such questions do not ask questions that allow the construction of party space. It is necessary in these cases to rely on simple questions of party preference. Since both Slovakia and the Czech Republic experienced relatively stable coalition and opposition blocs during the period in question, it is possible to reduce the array of choices to a simple binary: parties in the governing coalition v. parties in the parliamentary opposition. On the basis of such simple distinctions, it is possible to incorporate results from surveys of the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB) and the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (AVCR) and the Slovak agency FOCUS. In areas where these surveys ask questions related to those of the CEU surveys, the results show distinct similarity over time. Both CEU and AVCR surveys show the high politicization of attitudes toward the split of Czechoslovakia, with the supporters of governing coalitions in both countries considerably more likely than others to favor the split. On questions related to the economy, surveys from all four sources show nearly a nearly identical pattern: high and slowly increasing levels of correlation in the Czech Republic and near-zero levels of correlation in Slovakia that increase to the level of statistical significance only in the late 1990's.

Questions of international integration show significantly more change over time.

Calculations based on CEEB, FOCUS and AVCR surveys from 1992 through 1998 show a consistently strong relationship between how Czech respondents felt about the European Union

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<sup>4</sup>Although adherents of the Republican and Communist parties dislike one another, they share a mutual distaste for the Roman Catholic Church and a preference for a unified Czechoslovakia. Direct experience suggests that the supporters of these two parties might also be more inclined toward authoritarian politics than supporters of other opposition parties, but the one relevant survey question asked by CEU in 1994 offers no support for this claim.

and foreign investors and their choice of political parties. In Slovakia, by contrast, the same surveys show a steady rise from near-zero levels of correlation on these questions in the early 1990's to statistically significant levels by the late 1990's. On the issue of the European union, CEEB surveys show a moderate increase and levels of correlation that even by 1998 remain well below those of the Czech Republic. Results from FOCUS surveys suggest a rather more substantial increase in Slovakia over time toward a degree of correlation between attitude and coalition choice that rivals other highly politicized issues such as the split of Czechoslovakia. A nearly identical pattern emerges from FOCUS questions on the freedom allowed to foreign investors. By 1998 this issue, too, resembles the issue of the EU in its high politicization. Relationships between attitudes on ethnic minorities and political choice are more difficult to compare across the Slovak-Czech border because of the absent of surveys in the Czech Republic that ask both attitudinal and behavioral questions, but the FOCUS surveys of Slovakia also show a steady rise in the correlation between coalition vote and questions about majority and minority rights, loyalty of minority groups and the desirability of Hungarian neighbors between 1992 and 1999.

The least clearly defined of the relationships that can be measured with available surveys is the question of regime type. Questions on AVCR and FOCUS surveys ask respondents to evaluate the desirability of strong hand leadership. AVCR surveys show a pattern that resembles Slovak and Czech responses on questions of international integration: a strong relationship in the Czech Republic and a weaker but increasing relationship in Slovakia. FOCUS surveys show the same trend in Slovakia but the single FOCUS survey conducted in the Czech Republic shows the relationship between firm-hand leadership and political choice to be insignificant, as does another study of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic that is not related to those used

here.

Taken together, these results draw a clear distinction between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Although the two countries differ little in either the patterns of party competition or the attitudinal distribution, the overlay of the two differs substantially. In the Czech Republic it is economic and social attitudes that correspond to party choice. Attitudes about the nation and religion are either subsumed into socio-economic questions (as with questions about the split of Czechoslovakia) or remain unrelated to party choice. In Slovakia, the positions are reversed. Socio-economic attitudes show little relation to party choice, even among the widely spread group of parties in opposition between 1992 and 1998. A combination of religious and national attitudes showed a far closer relationship to party choice during these years. Religious attitudes, which remained closely tied to anti-Communist attitudes, gradually lost their prominence and came only to divide opposition parties. By contrast, differences on national attitudes—a closely inter-related complex of questions regarding Slovakia's independence, minority rights and foreign involvement—shifted along with party choice until by the end of the 1990's the two almost perfectly overlapped.

This difference raises as many questions as answers. If cleavages are socially-derived, this difference must at some level correspond to an ascriptive difference whose borders at least roughly overlap those of the attitudinal-behavioral cleavage. The search for such an overlap is the subject of the next two sections.

### *Ascriptive-Attitudinal Cleavages*

In light of the moderate differences between Slovakia and the Czech Republic in terms of demographics and attitude and the clear differences in attitudinal-behavioral cleavages, the extent

of ascriptive-attitudinal differences between the two populations is surprisingly small. With few exceptions, the relationship between an individual's ascriptive categories and their attitudes is approximately the same degree in both countries.

Although no single survey asks all possible questions, the five sets of surveys when taken together allow for a nearly complete set of ascriptive-attitudinal relationships. Some of the easiest to measure demographic categories produce no meaningful relationships at all.

Particularly striking is the attitude between the attitudes studied here and respondents' gender.

Although gender information is available for each of the fifty thousand respondents on the seventy-three surveys used here, gender rarely shows a statistically significant relationship with any of the attitudinal questions used here and when it does it is invariably a statistical anomaly, not confirmed in other surveys in the same series or by other sets of surveys.

Religious belief shows a correlation with the attitudinal questions discussed above that is almost as small. In neither country is denomination or the frequency of church attendance consistently linked to the split of Czechoslovakia, trust in the European Union, acceptance of foreign investment, or even free markets, even though church attendance is positively linked with decommunization which in turn is positively linked to linked to foreign investors and markets and related attitudes. Aside from decommunization, frequency of church attendance also correlates significantly only with questions directly related to religion, such as state support for churches, restitution of property, and abortion, and in both countries the level of correlation is approximately the same.

Urbanization—as measured by the size of a respondent's community—yields stronger correlations with some attitudinal questions, but the results are uneven and, again, usually similar in both countries. Where a respondent lived had little to do in either country with support for

foreign investment (correlations averaged .03 to .08 depending on the survey), support for an independent Czechoslovakia (.02 to .07), trust in the European Union (.01 to .08), though in Slovakia the latter two showed a greater trend toward consistent and statistically significant, albeit moderate, correlation between residence in rural areas and rejection of outside influences. Economic questions produced a wider range of relationships depending on the survey and the time period, but at on no survey did correlations move consistently out of the moderate range (.10 to .15). Respondents in Slovakia exhibited a slightly greater relationship between rural residence and preference for state ownership and lower income differences, but only the CEU surveys did this difference prove substantial. Regime preference yielded similarly uneven results. Surveys from both countries yielded a positive relationship between the rural population and support for “firm hand” government, though early 1990's AVCR surveys and mid-1990's NDB surveys show the correlation to be higher in Slovakia.

Age and education show a consistent relationship to most attitudinal questions, but in these comparisons there is remarkably little difference between Slovaks and Czechs. After early and erratic swings of opinion between 1990 and 1992, economic questions related to free markets and income differences begin produce consistently strong correlations on nearly all surveys in both countries (.10 to .25). Correlations on questions of the European Union and foreign investment are similar (.10 to .25). The only exceptions to the consistent and significant level of correlation with age and education involve regime type and the breakup of Czechoslovakia. In both cases a consistently significant correlation can be found *only* in the Czech Republic.

Socio-economic position of respondents also showed a clear relationship to many of the attitudes measured here. Surveys conducted in both countries after 1992 consistently show that those with lower incomes and lower social status are more likely to reject markets and to seek

lower income inequality. Some sets surveys show this correlation stabilizing after 1993 at .10 to .20 while others show a consistent increase through the full range of surveys with peaks above .25 in the late 1990's. Questions about the European Union produce similar patterns of growth over time with the relationship only emerging after 1993 or 1994 and reaching correlations of .15 by the late 1990's. For questions of regime type and Czechoslovakia's dissolution, there is considerably less data. AVCR and NDB surveys show a moderately positive correlation (.05 to .15) in both countries between low income and support for a firm hand, while FOCUS surveys in Slovakia show an erratic relationship with no clear trend and a range of .00 to .10). On the question of Czechoslovakia, only CEU surveys between 1992 and 1996 allow for a comparison. Echoing the results for age and education, social status shows no correlation with preference for split in Slovakia. Only in the Czech Republic did socio-economic position relate to feelings about the split: wealthier Czechs were glad to see separation; poorer Czechs held higher regard for Czechoslovakia.

Finally, there is the question of ethnicity and attitude. The near homogeneity of the Czech Republic means that Czechs overwhelm all others in correlation calculations. The difficulty is compounded by the inability of many survey firms to include a useful representative sample of Romany (either because the firms do not survey in Romany communities or because Romany do not identify themselves as such on surveys). For this reason, it is possible to look only at data for Slovakia. Table 5 shows a significant difference between Slovaks and Hungarians on the mean scores and standard deviations derived from the 1995 FOCUS survey question about relationships between majorities and minorities. As Figure 4 indicates, these differences reflect an overwhelmingly different distribution of attitudes among Slovaks and Hungarian. The correlation between ethnicity and attitude on this question consistently hovers at

or above .30. Hungarians also notably from Slovaks differ on other questions that they perceive to be related to minority rights, and they are overwhelmingly more likely than Slovaks to support any conditions that might serve to counterbalance the position of Slovaks in Slovakia, including a unified Czechoslovakia, membership in the European Union. To a more limited degree, Hungarians also show more support for foreign investment and for a market economy and, after 1993 for negotiation instead of firm hand rule.

Ethnicity provides the largest source of difference in ascriptive-attitudinal cleavages between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In fact, aside from this differences, there are no other significant and enduring differences that could help explain the significant difference in attitudinal-behavioral differences discussed above. Ascriptive categories are related to opinion in essentially the same way in both countries.<sup>5</sup>

For close observers of the two countries, these results will be surprising. One common icon of Slovakia's political development during the 1990's is the ironically named "grandma democrat" ("babka demokratka"), the elderly, head-scarf-wearing peasant woman with sympathy for strong leaders and nostalgia for an independent Slovak state. These surveys suggest although the rural population may be slightly more likely to favor a firm hand, the overall differences between young and old, educated and uneducated on these attitudinal questions remained minimal in Slovakia throughout the 1990's. Having unearthed only fragments of ascriptive-attitudinal difference that might explain the differences in Slovak and Czech attitudinal-behavioral cleavages, it is necessary to turn to the direct link between ascription and behavior.

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<sup>5</sup>The main exception to this—the Czech Republic's uniquely positive relationship between support for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia with youth, education and income can be understood as a manifestation of aforementioned Czech proclivity to see the split as primarily a socio-economic question rather than a national one.

### *Ascriptive-Behavioral Cleavages*

The marked differences between relationship between individuals' traits and their votes in Slovakia and the Czech Republic corresponds to the differences in attitudinal-behavioral cleavages mentioned above. Just as Czech parties differed from their Slovak counterparts in their attitudinal profiles, so they also differed—at least for a significant time period—in their demographic profiles.

The most striking difference, of course, involves ethnicity. Unlike any other ethnic group in either of the two countries, Slovakia's Hungarians voted almost exclusively for Hungarian political parties (Krivý 1999). At first glance this would appear to solve the puzzle of the different attitudinal-behavioral cleavage since Hungarians have strong opinions about national questions and vote for Hungarian national parties and might thereby account for a national cleavage with no counterpart in the Czech Republic. Unfortunately, this neat solution has very limited explanatory power. Hungarians represent just over one-tenth of the citizens of Slovakia, but the attitudinal-behavioral cleavage on national questions extends across the full range of Slovakia's population. In fact, the difference between political parties on issues of national minorities, the split of Czechoslovakia, the European Union and foreign investment remains the dominant attitudinal-cleavage even when Hungarian respondents are excluded from the calculations. The ascriptive characteristic of ethnicity explains the differences of between supporters of Slovak and Hungarian parties but it cannot directly explain why the same issues set supporters of certain Slovak parties against those of other Slovak parties. The national cleavage not only separates the minority from the majority but also divides the majority itself.

Turning to other ascriptive characteristics helps to clarify the question. Gender, as above, shows no clear relationship to overall voting patterns (except for the slight over-representation of

women among voters of Christian democratic parties and the slight over-representation of men among parties with strongly anti-foreigner orientation). The relationship between religious belief and voting is more pronounced, but only in limited ways. Krivy's comparisons of voting results in Slovakia with census data about religious confession by municipality shows that certain individual parties have pronounced religious roots: the Christian Democratic Party and, to an increasing degree the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) attracted voters in Roman Catholic municipalities, while the Party of the Democratic Left (SDP) and the Workers Association of Slovakia (ZRS) did particularly well in areas dominated by agnostics and atheists. Among coalitions of parties, however, the relationship was slower to emerge, largely because parties with Roman Catholic roots often allied themselves with parties with atheist and agnostic roots. By the 1998 election, however, a clear relationship had emerged between strongly Roman Catholic municipalities and votes for the HZDS-led coalition. Most individual-level survey data show a similar pattern: CEU and FOCUS surveys show an insignificant correlation between church attendance and voting in 1992 that increases over time until by 1995 it has reached .10 level of correlation, after which it remains stable. Individual level data for the Czech Republic (in the absence of voting-census comparisons for the Czech Republic, these are the only grounds for comparison) show level of correlation between party voting and church attendance that is consistently higher than in Slovakia, especially in 1992 and 1993.

This pattern—low levels of correlation in Slovakia that over time approach already high levels in the Czech Republic—appears not only in questions of religion but in the other major ascriptive categories as well:

- The correlation between municipality size and coalition voting begins at relatively low levels in Slovakia and increases over time. Krivy shows a steady increase from near-zero

correlation in the 1992 election to successively more significant relationships in the 1994 and 1998 elections. CEU and FOCUS surveys of Slovakia show a similar pattern at the individual level, with correlations peaking in the mid-1990's at the .10 to .15 level.

Comparison with CEU surveys of the Czech Republic shows consistent correlations at this same level beginning in 1992.

- The correlation between age and education and coalition voting exhibits a nearly identical but even stronger pattern. Krivy's comparisons show a gradually increasing degree of correlation between support for parties of the HZDS-led coalition and municipalities with lower overall levels of correlation (Krivy). Individual level data shows the same development with remarkable consistency from survey to survey. All four surveys that contain party preference data—AVCR, CEEB, CEU and FOCUS—show a correlation between education and coalition preference that remains near zero until after 1993 when it rises gradually to the .10 to .15 range by 1998. For age, the findings are nearly identical. These contrast sharply with findings in the Czech Republic. There the correlation between education and coalition voting jumped from near-zero in 1990 to .10 by 1991 and increased gradually over time to the .15 to .20 range. On age, the Czech Republic shows a similar pattern, with a slightly longer lag and slightly lower degree of correlation (.10 to .15).
- The correlation between income and status and coalition voting exhibits a similar pattern, though here the correlation in the Czech Republic shows no signs of stabilization. In AVCR surveys, but continued to increase over the full course of the surveys, peaking in the .20 to .30 range in the final surveys of the 1990's. Corresponding surveys conducted in Slovakia show a similar pattern through the late 1993 (the latest survey available) but

with a level of correlation that is lower than in the Czech Republic by a consistent .10.

Other surveys show less clear patterns, though FOCUS surveys conducted through 1999 show the relationship between income and coalition vote stabilizing in the .05 to .10 range.

During the 1990's the party systems of both countries became increasingly divided between parties supported by the wealthy, urban, educated and young and those supported by the poor, rural, uneducated and elderly. In the Czech Republic, however, this difference emerged almost immediately. In Slovakia it took far longer and never reached the same level. This slowly shrinking gap between the two countries requires a re-assessment of conventional views of the two countries' politics, particularly the image held by many of Slovakia's intellectuals of a political system divided between those who were like themselves and those who were more like their village ancestors (Simecka 1998). This image certainly corresponded to that presented by leaders of the HZDS-led coalition that governed Slovakia between 1994 and 1998, but the emergence of the split was gradual and never fully corresponded to the image. Ironically, it was the Czech Republic that actually fit the pattern but without a single, charismatic face to represent the old and rural and disadvantaged (and to infuriate the intellectuals) the Czech Republic never developed the corresponding image.

### **Level Three: Full Cleavages**

The findings of the above three sections yield immediate conclusions about the status of cleavages in these two countries: one full cleavage in each of the two countries and the possible emergence of a second cleavage in Slovakia.

In Slovakia, the ethnic cleavage is clear. One population differs from another in terms of

ascription (Hungarian v. Slovak), attitude (unanimous tolerance of minorities and foreign involvement v. tendencies toward majoritarianism and xenophobia) and behavior (voting for Hungarian parties v. voting for Slovak parties). This cleavage emerged early and remained remarkably stable. Yet for all its sharp definition, this cleavage played a relatively marginal and indirect role in Slovakia's politics. The main political controversies in Slovakia emerged not between Hungarians and Slovaks but rather within the realm of the majority Slovak population and its preferred political parties.

In the Czech Republic evidence suggests the existence of a socio-economic cleavage. Survey evidence indicates the rudiments of an ascriptive basis as early 1991 or 1992. By that time there was already a pattern of Czechs supporting economic redistribution and redistributionist parties that was consistent with their poor chances for success in the emerging market economy as a result of advanced age or poor education or poor location. Until 1998, this cleavage shaped not only voting but coalition formation and provided the framework for nearly all political conflicts. Although less defined than the Slovak-Hungarian cleavage in Slovakia, the Czech Republic's socio-economic cleavage stood at the center of all major conflicts between political parties, shaping coalition formation and political outcomes.

## **Conclusions**

The strength of this socio-economic cleavage in the Czech Republic prompts the question of why no similar division emerged in Slovakia. The old, uneducated, rural poor held much the same set of attitudes as their Czech counterparts toward free markets and economic redistribution, but unlike the Czechs they but did not choose their political parties on the basis of those attitudes or even on the basis of their ascriptive characteristics. Not until the mid-1990's

did Slovaks with poor chances for economic success start to choose one side of the political spectrum over the other, and even then they did not do so with socio-economic concerns foremost in mind. Why not? Why did socio-economic cleavage remain latent in Slovakia until the late 1990's when it began to emerge in ascriptive—though still not clearly in attitudinal—form?

One preliminary answer relates to the presence of the Hungarian-Slovak cleavage and the pre-existing Czech-Slovak cleavage within Czechoslovakia, both of which forced Slovaks to take sides on ethnic questions. The creation of institutional structures and behavioral patterns around those divisions shaped (though they did not determine in an ascriptive sense) the divisions that came later. Furthermore, it was struggle over responses to these cleavages that attracted the attention of Slovakia's most charismatic political leader, Vladimir Meciar. By focusing on the plight of Slovaks against other national groups, Meciar for a time forestalled the immediate political division of society into winners and losers in the socio-economic sense (and it is striking how little attitudes toward the split of Czechoslovakia have to do with *any* of the ascriptive or other attitudinal characteristics of Slovaks). Only later, once the first national problem was resolved and once the charismatic leader began to unsettle younger and more educated voters (and attract older and less educated ones) did the winners-losers cleavage begin to emerge, at first perhaps by accident, as his rhetoric scared off those who could profit from international integration, and later by intention, as he sought to establish a base of support among supporters who would not take issue with his unwillingness to play by the institutional rules of the game. Meciar's vilification of the west and Hungary took on an undertone of domestic losers against winners by the mid 1990's, and by the late 1990's Slovakia's political divisions had acquired a still-weak but visible foundation in the conflict between ascriptive winners and ascriptive losers. Unlike their counterparts in the Czech Republic, however, these winners and losers identified

themselves in terms of their orientation toward the nation and toward foreigners more than toward economic strategies. By the end of the 1990's, both countries were moving toward the same cleavage, one that would pit the winners of globalization process against the losers. The main difference between Slovakia and the Czech Republic is that Slovaks approached this international-economic cleavage from its international side while Czechs approached it from the economic side.

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vied.

## Appendix A: Survey Data Sources

### **Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Sociological Institute**

Jiří Veveřník, Jan Tuček

1990, 1990, 1991, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998

### **Central and Eastern Eurobarometer**

Karlheinz Reif, George Cunningham

1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998

Ascriptive (full), Attitudinal (economy, integration), Behavioral (except 199x, 199x)

### **Central European University**

Gabor Toka

1992, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1994, 1995, 1996

Ascriptive (full), Attitudinal (full), Behavioral (including degree of preference for all parties)

### **FOCUS**

Zora Butorova, Olga Gyarfašova, Ivan Dianiška

1992, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999

Ascriptive (full), Attitudinal (full), Behavioral (including degree of preference for all parties)

### **New Democracies Barometer**

Richard Rose

1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998

Ascriptive (except ethnicity), Attitudinal (economy, regime-preference, ethnic identity)

Table 1. Categorization of questions on surveys of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 1992-1999.

Topic	Survey				
	AVCR	CEEB	CEU	FOCUS	NDB
Free market	Private enterprise should be given complete freedom	The creation of a free market economy, that is one largely free from state control, is right for our country's future	The government should support private enterprise	I prefer an economy that is free market, social market, socialist	[Non] Preference for the socialist economy our country had before 1989
Income differences	Differences in income should increase		Reducing income differences is [not] harmful for the economy	Income differences should be smaller	
Foreign investment	Foreign firms should have a completely open field for their activities			Foreign firms should have a completely open field for their activities	
EU Membership	Should this country attempt to join the European Union	Impressions of the aims and activities of the European Community/Union generally positive		I trust the European Union	
Minority rights	Do you think that nationalities and other minorities should submit to the interests and demands of the majority			In a democracy the majority has the right to decide at the expense of the minority v. In democracy it is necessary to fully respect the rights of minorities	Do you fear the threat of national minorities
Czech/Slovak split	In a referendum on Czechoslovakia, I would vote/ would have voted against a split		I oppose the split of Czechoslovakia	I was against the split	
Regime preference	It would be better for our country if instead of discussion about various methods of solving the current situation, there governed a firm hand and someone clearly said what to do.			I prefer the firm hand of a strong leader to patient negotiation	Strong leaders are better than parliamentary rule

Table 2. Differences in mean scores of respondents in Slovakia and the Czech Republic on attitudinal questions from multiple surveys over time.

Topic	Survey				
	AVCR	CEEB	CEU	FOCUS	NDB
Free market	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.16
Income differences	0.10	-	0.02	0.15	-
Foreign investment	0.05	-	-	0.04	-
EU Membership	-	0.04	-	0.08	-
Minority rights	-	-	-	0.01	0.25
Czech/Slovak split	-	-	-	-	-
Regime preference	0.01	-	0.09	-	-

Table 3. Differences in mean scores of respondents in Slovakia and the Czech Republic on attitudinal questions from multiple surveys over time.

Topic	Survey				
	AVCR	CEEB	CEU	FOCUS	NDB
Free market	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.02
Income differences	0.03	-	0.01	0.04	-
Foreign investment	0.01	-	-	0.03	-
EU Membership	-	0.01	-	0.00	-
Minority rights	-	-	-	0.05	0.07
Czech/Slovak split	-	-	-	-	-
Regime preference	0.02	-	0.02	-	-

Table 4. Correlations between attitudinal scales in Slovakia and the Czech Republic over time.

Country	Factor	Year			
		1992	1993	1994	1996
Slovakia	Economy	.16	.02	.27	.09
	Transformation	-.14	-.08 †	-.28	-.29
	Religion	-.32	-.30	-.19	-.23
	Nation	.18	.35	.49	.43
	Czechoslovakia	.23	.36	.41	.41
Czech Republic	Economy	.47	.56	.54	.58
	Transformation	-.54	-.56	-.64	-.62
	Religion	.02 †	-.24	.02 †	.05 †
	Nation	.15	.20	.18	.26
	Czechoslovakia	-.44	-.40	-.50	-.45

†All correlations significant at the level of  $p > .001$  *except* for those designated by asterisks

Table 5. Mean and standard deviation of Slovak respondents on (A) In democracy, minority rights should be completely respected v. (B) In democracy a majority has the right to decide at the expense of the minority

Ethnicity	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Slovak	2.6390	831	1.3952
Hungarian	1.3482	112	.8565
Total	2.4857	943	1.4058

Figure 1. Model of full and partial cleavages




Figure 2. Mean locations of political parties in the Czech Republic according to factor analysis, 1992-1996




Figure 3. Mean locations of political parties in the Czech Republic according to factor analysis, 1992-1996





Figure 4. Distribution of responses of Slovaks and Hungarians on minority rights in Slovakia, 1995



(A) In democracy, minority rights should be completely respected v.

(B) In democracy the majority can decide at the expense of the minority

