

Liberalism and Cultural Rights in Central and Eastern Europe:

Toward a Pluralist Balance

Zsuzsa Csergo*

Department of Political Science

George Washington University

Washington, DC 20052

csergo@gwu.edu

and

Kevin Deegan-Krause

Department of Political Science

Wayne State University

Detroit, MI 48202

kdk@wayne.edu

Abstract:

The experience of postcommunist Europe casts doubt on the widespread belief among Western theorists and policy-makers that group rights leads to violence while liberal individualism brings peace. Comparing cultural policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania demonstrates that the strongest supporters of individualism were those who grasped its (counter-intuitive) advantages for majority groups who wanted to constrict minority cultural opportunities. Most leaders in multiethnic democracies instead gravitated toward group-rights approaches. Despite Western warnings, these approaches proved surprisingly effective at reducing tension if they included the pluralist recognition of claims by *multiple* cultural groups. The timing and extent of pluralist group-rights approaches depended on the size and structure of cultural groups articulating cultural claims and on the choices of minority and majority group leaders.

The newly democratizing states in Central and Eastern Europe offer unexpectedly good news about the possibility of a workable balance between the rights of individuals and the rights of groups. After WWII ended Central Europe's fascist regimes, a consensus emerged among Western scholars and policy makers that claims to group rights resulted in repression and violence, and peaceful ethnic coexistence depended on *individualist* approaches to civil rights. National and ethnic loyalty, it was argued, were dangerous forces that required subordination to liberal individualist norms and non-ethnic forms of social organization.¹ The end of communist rule in the same region shows potential to disrupt this consensus. Despite Western appeals for liberal individualism, political leaders in many postcommunist countries have introduced group-rights policies without unleashing a wave of ethnic violence. Meanwhile, the leaders who most threatened ethnic peace were often those who were loudest in proclaiming Western-style liberal individualist principles.

The experience of postcommunist Europe offers persuasive evidence that multiethnic democracies gravitate toward group-based policies to resolve competing cultural claims even in the face of the West's continued emphasis on liberal-individualist principles. The emergence of such policies depends on a variety of factors, including not only the demographic composition of a country's population but also the way majority and minority political actors define themselves in relation to the state and the political and socio-economic resources they are able to mobilize domestically and internationally, including the availability of a kin state in the neighborhood and of international norms that support a group's claims.

Once adopted, the success of a policy in reducing ethnic tension depends less on the individual- or group-nature of the rights claim than on the degree to which either kind of claim recognizes a degree of cultural pluralism. Emerging group-rights approaches coincide with

stable majority-minority cooperation, while individual-rights approaches frequently attract leaders who used them as a normative justification for majority-group dominance.

Individual or Group? One Culture or Many?

To explore the mismatch between the normative individualism that Western institutions endorse and the predominance of collectivism in the on-the-ground choices of domestic politicians, it is necessary to understand these positions not as monolithic wholes but as realms of disagreement in their own right. Among *both* the individual-rights and the group-rights advocates, the most important conflicts concern the recognition of plurality. The key cultural policy question is no longer whether the democratic state should take a position of strict cultural neutrality. The key issue is whether the democratic state can safely encourage and provide means for the reproduction of multiple cultures: whether more than one language should be recognized in the domains of government, whether ethnic and national minority groups could maintain separate state-sponsored organizations, whether groups could control educational institutions or cultural institutions (such as in the domain of media and entertainment) for socializing members of the minority in their culture.

Pluralism in Liberal Debate

For theorists, the central question of the debate has been whether democratic governance can uphold universalist principles of individual rights, liberties, and equality rooted in Enlightenment thought and simultaneously enable or even encourage the reproduction of particular cultures.² The normative logic of liberal individualism has been to call for a common, unifying *state-culture* while at the same time encouraging the “de-ethnicization” of politics.

Individualist scholars insist forcefully that only in a “difference-blind” democracy based on individual rights can citizens enjoy full equality. Brian Barry argues that, according to liberal principles, “[c]ultures are simply not the kind of entity to which rights can properly be ascribed”³ and that there is nothing “natural” or “primordial” about collectivist identity-politics.⁴ Others, including Evan Charney and Stephen Deets, also warn of the concrete dangers that can result from the privileging of national identity.⁵

Within the apparent consensus on the centrality of individual rights, however, differences emerged in the 1990s regarding the proper consideration due to ethnic groups. An alternative to the longstanding postwar consensus on individual rights appeared among theorists who advocated political recognition of cultures.⁶ Theorists on the pluralist side of the spectrum hold that liberal-democratic institutions (the rule of law, accountability, and so on) should guarantee citizens rights and liberties. They also emphasize the liberal idea of choice. Unlike individualists, however, pluralists claim that individual choice makes sense only in communities. They stress the importance of “membership in a secure national community for persons’ sense of identity and self-worth.”⁷

What differentiates liberal pluralists from the individualist position is not the importance of fundamental liberal principles but rather the consequences of particularist cultural reproduction. Where liberal individualists see dangers in the recognition of particular cultures, pluralists consider the efforts of cultures to reproduce themselves as a “natural attribute of a political society.”⁸ For Young, on the pluralist side, “cultural diversity requires acknowledgement rather than judgment.... [T]he value attached to ethnic affiliation by many human communities is a natural condition and not a social pathology.” Young argues that the “appropriate prescription” is “[p]reventative therapy in the form of effective policies of

accommodation rather than curative medicine by the extirpation of identity.”⁹ Liberal pluralists therefore endorse policies that support minority cultures for the sake of the individuals in those cultures. Kymlicka argues that all liberal states practice nation-building that advantages majority cultures and contends that the claims of majority and minority may be equally legitimate.¹⁰

Pluralist positions appear not only in political theory but in the practices of many states, including European Union members. EU members themselves make significant concessions to minority claims for cultural reproduction. Finland, for example, recognizes Swedish as an official language even though Swedish-speakers constitute only six percent of the population. Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain have adopted policies that grant politically-organized cultural groups various rights.¹¹ Even though specific policies vary across the European Union, the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria that articulated the conditions under which new members would be admitted specified respect for and protection of minority cultures as one of the most important criteria. Nevertheless, in setting standards for “Eastern enlargement,” the Western officials endorsed liberal individualism as the primary rights paradigm.¹² European documents articulated the same principle. The Council of Europe’s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, commonly considered the most important European legally binding international tool for minority protection, consistently refers to “persons” and “individuals” rather than groups that would benefit from such protection.”¹³

Pluralism in Collectivist Debate

In the parliaments of Central and Eastern European countries, however, political leaders have found it necessary to balance not so much the claims of individuals against cultural groups, but the claims of competing groups. The main question in such settings is whether more than

one group can qualify for cultural rights, and if so, how those rights should be distributed. The differences that emerged in these debates can be summarized in two new categories of analysis: national pluralism and national exclusivism.

National pluralists endorse a group's right to cultural reproduction and recognize that in an ethnically plural society multiple groups may claim such rights. At the same time, national pluralists often disagree vehemently about the extent to which groups deserve rights or even about which groups qualify as rights' holders. National pluralism in majority groups offers explicit recognition of and support for minority groups (as groups rather than as individuals), but not necessarily at a level equal to those of the majority. As the titular "owner" of the state, the majority group may claim state resources for its own cultural reproduction. These majorities provide support for minority education and culture, but the majority sets the terms. Among minority groups, national pluralism more often entails demands for the same cultural conditions that majority populations enjoy merely as a result of their majority status, particularly the ubiquity of language and culture. In practice, minority national pluralists seek group rights that will allow group members to think as little about their minority status as members of majority groups think about their majority status.

National exclusivists insist upon group rights but for their group alone. The most extreme representatives express a willingness to remove minorities from political power or from physical proximity to the majority. More moderate national exclusivists accept the presence of minority populations and even their political participation but accord them only *individual* rights and reserve the collective right of cultural reproduction for members of the majority.

One way to understand the range of individual-rights and collective-rights positions can be a schematic, two-dimensional array based on the locus of cultural rights and the degree to

which cultural policy recognizes a plurality of cultures. Figure 1. shows a schematized array of alternatives.

Figure 1. about here

Cultural Rights in Central and Eastern Europe

In order to understand the appeal of these positions and their consequences, we apply the four-fold typology to four democracies in postcommunist Europe: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. These four countries in the heart of Europe maximize opportunities for comparison: they occupy a broad swath of territory from Germany to the Black Sea and exhibit a broad range of conditions as well as responses to cultural rights claims. Even as international institutions sought a broadly applicable rights regime, the political leaders in these societies developed diverse positions on questions of group rights and pluralism. That diversity shows connection to underlying conditions of ethnic demography, including not simply ethnic composition but also the *kinds* of internal and external minorities that exist within or outside a state: the degree of their political organization, and the kinds of cultural rights demands they formulate. The case analyses that follow highlight the conditions under which particular approaches emerged and evolved.

Limited Pluralism, Individual Rights: The Czech Republic

Of the four countries examined here, only the Czech Republic neither serves as a kin-state to minorities in other countries nor has a significant *national* minority on its own territory.

On the 2001 census, more than 94% of respondents identified themselves as “Czech” or “Moravian.”¹⁴ Roma comprised the largest and most distinct minority cultural group in the Czech Republic with a share of the population estimated between 2% and 3%.¹⁵ The Czech Republic’s Roma, however, did not pursue sustained claims for cultural reproduction, and disputes over cultural rights remained relatively infrequent. Czech political leaders thus faced few challenges to pursuing a single, dominant culture without reference to group rights. A closer look, however, suggests that Czech liberal individualism has sometimes exhibited close connection to the group-based search for homogeneity that national exclusivists pursue.

One segment of the Czech political elite took no pains to hide its exclusivism. The Czech Republican Party (SPR-RSČ) based its political support on some of the region’s most extreme anti-foreigner and anti-minority (especially anti-Roma) sentiment. The party’s leader, Miroslav Sládek, stood at limits of the exclusivist-nationalist category, arguing that Roma not did not deserve group *rights* but should face group *sanctions*.¹⁶ At its height in 1996, the party received just over 8% of the vote, but its popularity faded thereafter, dropping below 4% in the 1998 elections and to 1% in 2002. Several small parties and associations have attempted to take up the Republicans’ message but with little political success.

On the opposite end of the political spectrum Václav Havel played a crucial role in securing the country’s international reputation for individual liberalism. As Czech President from 1993 to 2003, Havel consistently advocated a brand of liberal individualism that verged on the de-nationalized vision of human relationships described as “cosmopolitanism.” Despite his longevity in office, however, Havel’s overall political influence remained largely symbolic, and he played little direct role in shaping the Czech Republic’s policy toward minority cultural groups.

Among the party leaders with direct influence over policy, official positions fell mostly within the liberal individualist category, but with much less cosmopolitan flavor.¹⁷ Particularly notable are the positions of the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and its then-coalition-partner the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). Both parties defined themselves explicitly as “liberal,” and ODS leader Vaclav Klaus’s frequently insisted that the “foundation of the state is the free citizen.”¹⁸ The leaders of both parties approached questions about the Roma minority with emphasis on individual rights. Pavol Bratinka, a leader the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), similarly argued that “the explicit and specific problems of the Roma community should not be ignored. Nevertheless, we must build on the principle that all citizens are equal before the law. No group can get any advantages and no measures can be applied according to an ethnic key... [e]ven if it sometimes seems to be the easiest way.”¹⁹

The liberal individualism of ODS and ODA lacked consistent application, however. Czech citizenship law offers a particularly notable example of legal criteria that appeared to avoid “ethnic keys” yet obviously affected some groups more than others. The Czech Republic’s law governing the transfer of citizenship from Czechoslovakia included clauses that withheld Czech citizenship to those with a criminal record and without a record of residence in the Czech Republic. Klaus acknowledged that these conditions were more likely to exclude Roma than other groups, but he argued that “the government cannot change the accepted law for the sake of one group of inhabitants.”²⁰ The citizenship law’s uniquely negative impact on Roma became even more apparent in the wake of subsequent legislation allowing the Foreign Ministry to waive citizenship requirements for a community of Czechs emigrating from Ukraine. This decision caused Human Rights Watch to conclude that “it was easier for an ethnic Czech in Ukraine who

had committed a murder to gain Czech citizenship than a law-abiding Rom who was born and lived his entire life in the Czech Republic.”²¹ Whether Klaus and his political associates genuinely accepted a liberal-individualist notion of politics is debatable,²² but it is significant that policies justified through individual-rights rhetoric resulted in some collective disadvantage for Roma. The individualist position was especially weak among officials at regional and local levels, particularly in communities with large numbers of Roma.

Most of the prominent Roma-related political conflicts—from the segregation of swimming pools to subsidies for Roma willing to emigrate, to the construction of walls separating Roma and Czech settlements—began with municipal officials, and tended to create conflicts within parties between the local and national levels. The relatively small size of the Roma population, its institutional fragmentation²³ and geographical dispersion meant that Roma-related issues received little attention at national levels and permitted discontinuity between individualist rhetoric among top officials and a more exclusivist view at lower levels.

Pluralist Consensus, Mixed Rights: Hungary

In Hungary, as in the Czech Republic, there was no sizeable internal minority that could enforce claims to cultural rights. Hungarians reached a different consensus, however, because of considerations about Hungarian cultural minorities in neighboring countries. Roma comprise a large minority of Hungary’s population—2% according to the 2001 census, 5% to 6% according to more detailed estimates²⁴— but (as in other Central and Eastern European countries) internal divisions, a scarcity of political resources, and the “absence of a coherent ethnic identity” have limited and fragmented the cultural claims of Roma.²⁵ By contrast, Hungarians living outside of Hungary’s borders have articulated explicit demands for cultural rights in the countries in which

they live and sought to enlist Hungary as a guarantor of those rights. Within Hungary, furthermore, family relations and cultural exchange across the borders contributed to widely-shared popular interest in the protection of Hungarian minorities abroad. As a result, Hungary's parties reached widespread agreement on a pluralist stance.

One notable exception to this consensus is the national-exclusivist Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), which maintained a high profile in the country's politics despite relatively weak popular support. MIÉP has consistently employed irredentist slogans and consciously echoed French nationalist Jean-Marie Le Pen. Two other small parties, the Independent Smallholders' Party and the Christian Democratic People's Party, have echoed some of MIÉP's exclusivism, though their positions have been less consistently extreme. The position has found only limited electoral appeal, however. MIÉP did not manage to achieve parliamentary representation until 1998 and again fell below the 5% parliamentary threshold in 2002. The Christian Democrats became a marginal political force after parliamentary defeat in 1998, and, after growth in the mid-1990's, the Smallholders' support collapsed before the 2002 elections (for reasons largely unrelated to cultural policy).

All other major political forces in Hungary have adopted pluralist positions on the national question, but they differ in the degree to which they support the recognition of group rights. The country's two largest parties—the Alliance of Young Democrats and the Hungarian Socialist Party—stand near the center while two smaller parties—the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats—stand slightly further out on opposing sides. Of the pluralist parties the Hungarian Democratic Forum has been the most inclined toward recognition of collective rights. Under Prime Minister József Antall, Democratic Forum was the strongest

party in a national-conservative governing alliance between 1990 and 1994, and its institutional initiatives remained important parts of Hungary's minority policy even after the party's support ebbed. The Minority Self-Government Act in 1993, for instance, recognized 13 national and ethnic minorities (including the Roma) and enabled them to form their own elected bodies to work in partnership with local and national levels of government. The act became the basis for the creation in 1995 of the National Minority Self-Government system.²⁶ The Antall government also began the process of institutionalizing relations with Hungarians abroad and signing "Friendship Treaties" with neighboring countries that incorporated sizable Hungarian populations.

On the other side of the individual-collective debate, the Alliance of Free Democrats has consistently supported pluralism within a liberal framework. Although unable to repeat early political successes, the party has continued to play a significant role in Hungarian politics with a stable electoral base of 5% to 10%. Free Democrats formally identify themselves as a liberal democratic party with an emphasis on the primacy of individual freedom and human rights. Remarkably among political parties in the region (including those that define themselves in liberal terms), the party's ideological doctrine has emphasized not only universal human rights, but also the need to defend the rights of *all* disadvantaged groups. Included are not only ethnic minorities but also sexual minorities, women, children, and the handicapped.²⁷ The Free Democrats' approach to Hungarian minorities outside of Hungary is consistent with a liberal-pluralist stance: The party advocated ethnic Hungarians' right to cultural reproduction yet opposed efforts to provide them benefits solely on grounds of ethnicity.

On questions of cultural rights, Hungary's two largest parties have occupied an even narrower range between individual and collective rights within the general framework of

pluralism. After the 1994 elections, the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) actively supported a national pluralist position on cultural rights, combining individual freedoms with advocacy for the institutional recognition of minorities' collective rights.²⁸ Under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, this party has moved from a liberal-democratic ideology to a conservative nationalism that places increased emphasis on Hungarian national interests.²⁹ While in government between 1998 and 2002, the FIDESZ program cited liberal principles in its definition of *citizenship*, while in practice defining *nationhood* in cultural terms. The party combined individual freedoms with advocacy for the institutional recognition of collective rights both in relation to ethnic minorities in Hungary (by supporting minority self-governments) and in relation to Hungarians living abroad.³⁰ Since 2001, the party has placed increasing emphasis on relations with Hungarians abroad. Central to its strategy were the "Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries" (or "Status Law") adopted in 2001³¹ and the party's 2004 (failed) campaign for legislation to grant Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad.

The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), FIDESZ's main parliamentary opponent and the strongest party in Hungary's post-2002 coalition government, is a successor of the reform communist wing of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party that has redefined itself as a social-democratic party. Although a staunch opponent of FIDESZ's policies, MSZP has supported the same approach of combining liberal guarantees of individual rights with the formal recognition of group rights. MSZP recognizes collective rights for national minorities and supports institutional structures that guarantee group cultural reproduction. In relation to Hungarian minorities abroad, the party advocates policies that help strengthen the socio-economic status of these minorities in their countries in ways that would allow them to maintain themselves as

separate cultures.³² At the same time, the MSZP leadership has been strongly critical of FIDESZ's approach to nation-building. In the 2004, MSZP campaigned against offering citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad. The MSZP leadership has also pursued a more consensual approach to Hungary's relations with its neighbors. Thus, the primary difference between MSZP and FIDESZ has been in the manner in which the two parties have articulated their positions to their domestic and international audiences.

Contested Pluralism, Collective Rights: Romania and Slovakia

In Romania and Slovakia, the presence of large and politically active Hungarian cultural minorities helped to produce a broader spectrum of positions on cultural policy than in the previous two cases. These positions (including those that formally advanced liberal individualism) focused on groups rather than individuals but differed substantially in the balance of rights allotted to majority and minority groups.

Similar patterns in the two countries have much to do with similarities in ethnic composition. Roma and Hungarians are by far the most significant minority cultural groups in both countries: Hungarians comprise nearly 10% of the population in Slovakia and nearly 7% in Romania. Although the Roma population is as large or larger—estimates suggest 9% to 10% in Slovakia and 8% to 12% in Romania³³—the debate about cultural rights for Roma faced the same limitations as the Czech Republic and Hungary: weak common Roma identity, poor organization, and few resources. Furthermore, unlike in Hungary, the problem of co-ethnics living abroad has played only a limited role. Few Slovaks living in the Czech Republic expect Slovakia to act as a kin-state, and few Romanians in Moldova look to Romania. Nor have concerns about these populations (or the much smaller number of Slovaks and Romanians in

other countries) resonated with domestic political audiences. Questions of cultural rights for Hungarian minorities and Hungary's role as a kin-state thus dominate the political agenda in both countries.

The national circumstances of the two cases differed only in one important regard: Slovakia has only recently achieved independence. Until 1993 the primary questions of cultural rights for Slovaks involved their relationship with the majority Czech population of Czechoslovakia. Independence eliminated some of these questions but intensified others. Independent Slovakia faced questions not only about the role of minorities, particularly Hungarians, but also a more significant debate about the role of the majority in its effort to build a "national" state.³⁴ The effects of this difference, however, manifest themselves only in a few relatively isolated areas discussed below. In most respects, the two countries demonstrate an extremely similar array of collective-rights positions.

National Pluralism in the Minority Population

The Hungarian ethnic parties in Slovakia and Romania have firmly supported pluralism as the basis for cultural rights, usually within the broader context of support for collective rights. Hungarian political leaders in both countries defined their visions for cultural rights in terms of *equality* between the Hungarian cultural group and that of the majority population. In Romania, the overwhelming political party of choice for most Hungarians has been the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ). Although made up of several factions institutionalized as "platforms," this party has consistently articulated the notion that national minorities should have the same rights to cultural reproduction as the majority population: the unrestricted right to language use in institutions of education, culture, and self-government, and

the unrestricted right to maintain Hungarian cultural traditions and their relationships with kin abroad. All RMDSZ platforms have accepted the notion of collective rights in addition to individual rights, even though they differ internally on how they derive their claims to rights. At one end of the spectrum, conservative-Christian leaders have argued that Hungarian cultural rights were natural entitlements. At the other end, those in the liberal faction claim that autonomous individuals should be allowed to join communities and exercise rights through those communities.³⁵ From 1993, overall RMDSZ strategy has remained in the control of moderates under the leadership of Béla Markó, who has advocated a gradualist strategy based on negotiation with minority-friendly majority political forces and a collectivist approach to cultural rights that at the same time emphasizes liberal principles.³⁶ Under Markó's leadership, RMDSZ has pushed for the institutional recognition that Romania is a state of multiple national and ethnic groups.

In Slovakia, Hungarian political leadership spans a nearly identical spectrum. A liberal wing—Slovakia's Hungarian Civic Party—argued for linguistic and cultural rights on the basis of individual choice and personal fulfillment, while its more collectivist rival—Együttélés (Coexistence)—has demanded national pluralism. As in Romania, the political power of Hungarians in Slovakia has most often remained in the hands of moderates, here represented by the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement.³⁷ The policy proposals of the Hungarian parties in both countries sought to guarantee for Hungarians many of the same *de facto* collective rights enjoyed by the majority populations. In Slovakia, the Hungarian parties' demands in their strongest form represented a level of collective benefits as equal as possible to the level that majority population enjoyed merely by virtue of their status as the majority population. Együttélés's detailed 1994 proposal for territorial arrangement, for example, not only would have

separated the country into majority Slovak regions and a majority Hungarian region but also would have maintained parity in the percentage of each population that would be forced to live as a minority within regions dominated by the other ethnic group.³⁸ Hungarian political representatives used a variety of arguments to assert the essential equivalence of Slovak and Hungarian claims. In particular, they sought to portray the Hungarian minority as a co-equal “titular” (technically “state forming”) element in Slovakia.³⁹ It is noteworthy, however, that Slovakia’s Hungarian parties have rarely extended this status to other ethnic groups.

National Exclusivism and Pseudo-Liberalism in the Majority Population

During the first part of the 1990s, the politically most significant parties within the majority population of both countries adopted national exclusivist approach to cultural rights. These parties, however, often made their claims in the language of liberal individualism. Until the late 1990’s, Romania’s largest party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD),⁴⁰ insisted on an almost unlimited right of cultural reproduction for ethnic Romanians at the expense of all other groups. In these claims the party found support from the smaller but even more vocal Party of Romanian National Unity and Greater Romanian Party. During the same period in Slovakia, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS) used a slim parliamentary majority to pursue similar policies on behalf of ethnic Slovaks.

In Romania, the Party of Romanian National Unity and the Greater Romania Party unambiguously claimed collective rights exclusively for the majority, without justifying their demands on the basis of individual rights. By the 2000 parliamentary elections, Greater Romania had become the main exclusivist nationalist party in the country, and its leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, took second place in presidential voting with nearly a third of the total

vote.⁴¹ In parliament throughout the 1990's and in coalition government in 1995, this party showed a great degree of ideological continuity with the centralizing and national homogenizing tendencies of the Ceaușescu regime. The party's anti-minority policy proposals included a ban on the use of minority languages in local administration, courts and education, and a prohibition on ethnic parties.⁴²

Romania's Social Democratic Party (PSD), an offspring of the National Salvation Front established in 1989 by second and third-tier Communist party apparatchiks, has remained the single most important party in Romania since its inception in 1989. Its leader, Ion Iliescu, was appointed as president in 1990 and won two of the three subsequent presidential elections. In the period between 1990 and 1996, the Iliescu-led party pursued a national-exclusivist line, building a collective and majority-centered vision of Romania directly into the new constitution which begins by noting that the Romanian state rests on the unity of the Romanian "popor," which in the current Romanian understanding means people in the ethnic sense (like the German "Volk").⁴³ The educational and cultural policies adopted during this period aimed to increase institutional spaces for the majority language and limit those for minority languages. The Iliescu government in this period explicitly rejected the notion of group rights for the minority and opposed institutional decentralization that would have empowered the Hungarian minority.

In Slovakia, majority exclusivist parties took a similar approach, but in many ways surpassed their Romanian counterparts in their unwillingness to compromise with the Hungarian minority, particularly on questions of language rights.⁴⁴ The Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) repeatedly emphasized the role of Slovaks as Slovakia's 'titular' or 'state-forming' (*štátotvorný*) nation' and actively sought to ensure collective benefits for the Slovak majority. SNS called for schools as "nation-serving

institutions” and legislation to make Slovak the exclusive language in the official domain and public education.⁴⁵ HZDS programs endorsed similar policies in more muted tones,⁴⁶ and the public statements of some high-level HZDS officials (including some by party chair and prime minister Vladimír Mečiar) frequently rivaled in vehemence the comments of SNS leaders.⁴⁷

The representatives of these majority parties in both countries made use of liberal individualist arguments in justifying their nationalist exclusivist course. SNS in Slovakia, for example, rejected “collective rights for national minorities as a disintegrative tendency which at present has no support in international law.”⁴⁸ Both HZDS and SNS proposed the resolution of nationality disputes according to the principle of individual rights of citizens. The frequent use by these parties of the “civic” principle in this context reveals the unusual affinity between liberal individualism and national exclusivism in ethnically divided societies. In this strategy, the civic principle was reduced to a sum of individual preferences that, in practice, created advantages for the majority population. The abstract principles of individualism reserved collective rights to the majority ethnic groups, Slovaks and Romanians. Meanwhile, those majority political actors who remained consistent to individual liberalism in rhetoric and policy preferences either drifted to the political margins or migrated to national pluralist parties discussed below, which supported a degree of equality—albeit equality among groups rather than individuals.

National Pluralism in the Majority Population

By the late 1990s, national exclusivism no longer dominated minority policy in either Romania or Slovakia. Iliescu lost the Romanian presidency in the 1996; when he returned to

power in 2000, he did so with more moderate approach to minority policy. Slovakia's HZDS and SNS lost control of government after the 1998 elections. In both cases the new governments included Hungarians. These changes in leadership, however, did not mean the victory of liberal individualism over collectivist approaches to cultural policy. Rather, the majority-minority agreements that helped bring about moderation in both countries relied on a pluralist balance that informally accommodated group rights for both majority and minority groups.

Although the new Romanian government led by the Romanian Democratic Convention formally rejected the idea of collective cultural rights, the 1996 elections marked the beginning of an increasingly pluralist period in Romania. Government parties continued to advance policies in favor of majority cultural reproduction but were also willing to allow for policies that accommodated similar rights for minorities. The largest governing party, the Christian Democratic National Peasant Party, supported efforts to increase Romanian control in the counties where Hungarians compose regional majorities and advocated Romanian state support for the cultural reproduction of kin abroad, especially to strengthen Romanian cultural dominance in Moldova (where Russian and other minorities pushed for linguistic pluralism).⁴⁹ The National Liberal Party, which emphasized liberal-individualist values, also identified the promotion of Romanian culture as a priority.⁵⁰ Yet both parties also supported proposals that offered *de facto* group rights for Hungarians including the restitution of minority church property and guarantees of minority language use in local government, education, and the courts.

Following Iliescu's return to power after the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections, the government continued an accommodative approach to minority relations that involved a complicated mixture of liberal-individualist rhetoric, majority collectivist goals, and expressions of cooperation that were more characteristic of national pluralists. At one level, the

party continued to employ language of individual rights that is characteristic of liberals.⁵¹ As before, the rhetorical commitment to “individual rights” did not prevent the party from rewarding the titular majority culture with what were in practice a broad range of collective rights to cultural reproduction. PSD continued to resist amendments to the constitution that would replace references to “the Romanian people” as the source of national sovereignty with the phrase “the citizens of Romania.”⁵² The party also continued to champion the “promotion of the Romanian values in the world cultural space, an action that will become a national interest objective for all the institutions of the Romanian state.”⁵³ Yet PSD’s practical steps after 2000 suggest a marked change toward pluralism or increased willingness to award collective benefits to other cultural groups, while never explicitly using the phrase “collective rights.” After the 2000 election, Iliescu and his Prime Minister Adrian Năstase entered into cooperation agreements with the opposition Hungarian party and worked with this party to implement a considerably more minority-friendly institutional framework in Romania. Even though PSD deputies often expressed agreement in parliamentary debates with their exclusivist nationalist colleagues from the Greater Romania Party, they rejected Greater Romania’s proposals to limit Hungarian language use.⁵⁴ In 2003, PSD helped to push through a constitutional amendment that guaranteed minority language use in courts.

In Slovakia, support for pluralist approaches to cultural rights among majority parties remained hidden during the first part of the 1990s. The exclusivist HZDS-SNS government was quick to accuse rivals of being “anti-Slovak Slovaks,” and Slovak opposition parties used oblique approaches to signal moderate positions on minority issues. The Christian Democratic Movement opted for a strategy of silence, making only vague references to minorities in its

programs and frequently refusing to take explicit positions on Hungarian-related issues in parliament.⁵⁵ The Democratic Union initially offered a mild form of exclusivist nationalism, rejecting collective rights and autonomy, while advancing the “titular” rights of Slovaks in ethnically mixed areas. But this party also shifted quickly to less specific statements about majority entitlements.⁵⁶ The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) sought to dispel any perception of favoritism toward Hungarian parties through meticulous balance between conflicting positions, weighing “the rights of individuals” and “the rights of minorities” against “the right of a nation to self-determination.”⁵⁷

After the 1998 elections, the Slovak moderate parties that formed a governing coalition together with the Hungarian Coalition Party became increasingly more pluralist in their cultural policies, even though they did not formally recognize group rights. The Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDL) that the Christian Democrats and the Democratic Union formed in 1998 combined the reticence and vagueness of its component parties,⁵⁸ but the minority policies that this coalition helped design manifested national pluralism. SDL also made a conscious effort to translate the individual-group balance into actual policy proposals, advocating both a broader mastery of the Slovak language and culture among minority populations and a series of policies to accommodate minority demands in the sphere of language use and education.

Rather than a “de-ethnicization” of politics, as the liberal individualist position would predict, these parties achieved majority-minority cooperation through consistent efforts to adopt policies that in effect extended group rights to both majority and minority cultural groups. Like their Romanian counterparts, majority parties in Slovakia refused to “de-ethnicize” the constitution by changing the reference from “the Slovak people” to “citizens of Slovakia.” Nevertheless, these parties in practice included the Hungarian minority in the political

community by maintaining governing coalitions with them even at times when such a coalition was not an electoral necessity. With their low-key national pluralism, these parties have played a critical role in reducing national tensions in both countries.

Cultural Rights and Policies in Public Opinion

Although political leaders and parties were the primary participants of the debate over cultural policy, the electorate also contributed to these debates at least indirectly. Whereas partisanship had little relationship to cultural-rights attitudes in Hungary and the Czech Republic, far stronger relationships appeared in Romania and Slovakia. As expected, the largest differences presented themselves between parties of the Hungarian minority and parties of the majority population. Yet notable differences emerged also within the majority between the national exclusivist and national pluralist parties.

Survey questions offer only indirect measures of views on individual and group rights and the acceptable degree of pluralism. The responses, however, confirm the pattern found among party leaders. In particular, the existence of co-nationals abroad meant that supporters of Hungarian parties overwhelmingly favored the notion that the democratic state should allow multiple groups to reproduce their cultures. Among respondents to a 1995 survey, Hungarians were considerably more likely than Czechs to agree that “Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions” (77% of Hungarians as opposed to 44% of Czechs) and that “It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions (61% of Hungarians as opposed to 50% of Czechs).⁵⁹ In Slovakia, more than 90% of the supporters of Hungarian minority parties expressed a preference for “maintaining minority tradition” rather than “adapting” to the broader society, compared to only 58% within the ethnic

Slovak population. Hungarians in Romania expressed similarly high likelihood of support for statements about the rights of minorities to their own schools, churches, cultural organizations, press and parties according to a 1997 survey.⁶⁰

On the whole, the majority populations in the two countries with strong internal minorities, Romania and Slovakia, expressed lower support for the reproduction of multiple cultures. Members of the majority have by no means been unanimous on these questions, however. In Slovakia, 1995 survey questions about minority tradition and adaptation show that supporters of Slovakia's national-pluralist Christian Democrats and Democratic Union stood closer to the Hungarians' than they did to supporters of Slovakia's national exclusivist parties, HZDS and SNS. In fact, virtually every nation-related question asked in surveys in Slovakia during the 1990's produced a gap of similar magnitude.⁶¹ The 1997 Romania survey also shows a sizeable difference between parties. On questions of minority rights, supporters of the Greater Romania party differed markedly from supporters of parties comprising the Democratic Convention, though the relative positions of party supporters on related questions were less consistent than in Slovakia. In accord with the changing programmatic position of Iliescu during this period, supporters of his party occupied a position between the national pluralists of the Democratic Convention and the national exclusivists of Greater Romania. Iliescu's supporters proved to be particularly conciliatory on questions of language use.

Accounting for Variation

The four countries studied here demonstrate three distinct patterns of the combination between collective rights and recognition of cultural pluralism: a relatively narrow liberal-individualist range in the Czech Republic (with an associated national-exclusivist wing); a

slightly wider range among liberal and national pluralists in Hungary; and a much wider range of disagreement between national exclusivists and national pluralists in Slovakia and Romania.

Figure 2. compiles the analysis of the previous sections to provide a schematic (and approximate) representation of party positions on questions of collective rights and pluralism.

Figure 3. offers a quantitative approach to the same question, though the extreme limitations of comparable survey data limit the reach of such analysis to a single snapshot of mass attitudes about pluralism in three of the four countries. Nevertheless, the same patterns emerge.

Hungarians (both in Hungary and in Slovakia) were more likely to support recognition of pluralism than were Czechs who, without significant internal or external minorities, were more likely to demand assimilation. Slovakia exhibited a wider range of partisan opinion, even excluding the highly pluralist position taken by supporters of Slovakia's Hungarian parties.⁶²

Figures 2. and 3. about here

What accounts for these differences? The presence or absence of internal and external minorities plays a key role. Figure 4, which sorts countries according to population status, corresponds closely to Figure 2, which sorts parties according to policy position. The overlap is not perfect, however, and the relationship between demography and policy positions require attention to other factors, particularly the way in which majority and minority groups define themselves in relation to the state, the nature of groups' cultural demands, and the political and socio-economic resources groups are able to mobilize domestically and internationally.

Figure 4. about here

Relationships between ethnic composition and cultural policy are more direct in some circumstances than others. The Czech Republic's majority population had little cause to think about group rights. On one hand, Czechs in neighboring countries did not organize as minority groups or make appeals to their kin state; on the other hand, minority groups within in the Czech Republic—most notably Roma--did not challenge the hegemony of Czech culture with coherent cultural claims. With few claims to group rights and little demand for pluralist policy, the liberal individualist approach became dominant. At the same time, in the absence of meaningful political debate on the question, in instances of conflict between Czechs and Roma at the local level liberal individualism often gave way to national exclusivist policy in favor of the Czech majority.

Hungary's similar domestic demographics might well have caused it to follow the same course if it were not for Hungarians abroad. The size of that population, along with historical perceptions of neighboring states' communist-era anti-Hungarian policies and fears of postcommunist cultural homogenization in those same countries led all major Hungarian political leaders to adopt pluralist positions that could appeal to voters at home by seeming to protect Hungarians abroad. Hungarian leaders disagreed about the need for group rights, but agreed in their support of cultural pluralism in Hungary as a source of leverage for Hungarians in neighboring states. This position was particularly potent because of its relatively low cost: in the absence of a politically-mobilized domestic minority group, Hungarian leaders could support the pluralist demands of their co-ethnics abroad and even make pluralist concessions at home without endangering the dominance of Hungarian culture.

In Romania and Slovakia, the presence of politically-organized minorities produced a wider range of positions on cultural rights and pluralism. Hungarians minorities, supported by their kin state, created strong political organizations that could advance demands for autonomous institutions that would guarantee their continued cultural reproduction and minority self-government in the territories where they lived. Pluralism and collective rights thus became salient as claims to “titular” rights clashed with demands for minority rights. In Slovakia, where political elites faced the additional challenge of establishing a new national state, the largest political party of the majority population opted for a policy of national exclusivism. In Romania, dominant elites likewise adopted national exclusivism as part of their efforts to consolidate a national state in the midst of by three other former federal states that had collapsed along sub-state national lines. Yet national exclusivism was not the only response that emerged in these circumstances. A strong national pluralism emerged not only among Hungarians but gradually also within the majority population.

The rise of national pluralism within the majority population suggests that demography is not destiny and that political leaders may choose options other than majority-minority conflict. Divisions within the majority political spectrum on cultural rights questions forced majorities and minorities into conversation. In the second half of the 1990’s, voters in both Romania and Slovakia replaced national exclusivist governments with elected national pluralist governments. These accepted the participation of Hungarian minority parties and negotiated a mutually-tolerable degree of cultural pluralism within a tacit framework of group rights. In Romania, furthermore, the changes extended not only to the replacement of a national exclusivist

government by a national pluralist one but even to the moderation of the country's largest party from national exclusivism to a degree of national pluralism.

International incentives, especially the prospect of EU accession, played a role in shaping these changes, but the influence was indirect and unpredictable. Despite consistent Western encouragement of liberal individualism, most of the region's political actors opted for a group rights approach. The disjunction offers an important lesson about the ways in which domestic actors used international resources according to their own definitions of national interest. Domestic actors found ways to use international resources that were quite different from those intended by the international actors themselves. National minorities emphasized Western messages of "minority protection" and referred selectively to instances of national pluralism in Western democracies (Swedes in Finland, South Tyrol in Italy and Catalonia in Spain) as legitimation for their claims. National-exclusivist elites also proved adept at using the theoretical language of liberal individualism in ways that privileged their own groups and excluded minorities. The main EU contribution was to push pro-EU parties into serious negotiations with minority parties. The resulting dialog did not conform to EU recommendations but reduced tension nevertheless.

Assessing Outcomes

The indirect role of Western influence on rights policy in Central and Eastern Europe reflects a deeper disjunction between theoretical approaches and political reality on the ground. In most countries in the region, political leaders from majority and minority populations have pursued overwhelmingly collectivist positions. Pure individual-rights approaches remained confined to politically inconsequential intellectuals committed to the concept of a civic nation

and to a few cosmopolitan-minded liberals who ignored nationality in favor of the “global city”. Even in the Czech Republic, where leaders actively endorsed individual rights, the absence of organized claims by minority cultural groups meant that individualism remained largely untested and vulnerable to the exclusivist decisions at local levels. For those who endorse liberal-individualism as a necessary condition for resolving majority-minority conflicts over cultural rights, the predominance of collective-rights policies might be regarded as a mark of failure, but the failure is only theoretical. In fact group-rights approaches provided messy but effective solutions, while the elegance of liberal individualism attracted those with the least interest in accommodation.

Leaders of majority-group parties in Romania and Slovakia quickly realized that in an ethnically-polarized environment, the rejection of rights for minority groups may translate automatically into *de facto* group rights for the majority. It is ironic—but not surprising—that the leaders most prone to aggressive limitations on minority groups were most likely to adopt liberal individualist rhetoric. During the mid-1990’s, Romania’s Iliescu and Slovakia’s Mečiar adopted Western language of individual rights not only because they sought to curry favor with Western diplomats but also because the new language dovetailed conveniently with their own interests. These examples indicate that, without proper care, the insistence on individual rights can benefit precisely those parties that are most dangerous to ethnic reconciliation in the region.

It is significant that, since the second half of the 1990s, the driving forces in Central and Eastern Europe have emphasized neither liberal individualism nor national exclusivism but rather various forms of pluralism that acknowledge some need for balance between individual and collectivity as well as the need for some balance among collective groups. Although the

distribution of rights has remained asymmetrical, it has not been one-sided, and the politically resourceful minorities in particular have obtained many of the cultural rights they demanded.

Politicians in many postcommunist countries thus bypassed the Western debate about the “right” to cultural reproduction. While in principle ignoring (or even denying) the question of group rights, these leaders have taken steps to recognize groups in practice. The political efforts of liberals who believe in cultural pluralism for the benefit of the individual ultimately differ little from the efforts of collectivists who accept a degree of pluralism and practical accommodation among groups. The postcommunist debate about the right to cultural reproduction has thus focused not on the question whether cultural rights are legitimate, but on the more practical questions of “how much?” and “to whom?” It is not the spread of an individual-rights mindset that has reduced ethnic tensions in Slovakia and Romania but rather the emergence of pluralist mindsets—both liberal and national.

The parties instrumental in this process do not conform to Western prescriptions. Their commitment to individual rights is limited at best, and they often seek to evade any categorization at all. They may even be accused of some of the same pseudo-liberalism of their national exclusivist counterparts since they tacitly accept the idea of collective rights even as they reject it in their public statements. Unlike the exclusivists, however, the pseudo-liberal pluralists recognize at least some of the demands of minority groups while at the same time reserving a privileged position for the majority group.

This national pluralism offers an escape route from the confrontational and unstable path that national exclusivists have pursued and that liberal individualists have inadvertently encouraged. While unsatisfactory to many liberals because of its reification of collectivities, such a resolution may not only ease tensions but may also serve as a halfway house on the way

to a more individualist pluralism. In setting standards that will contribute to peace and stability in the region the West should focus less on discouraging group rights and more on encouraging pluralism among groups.

Figure 1. Typology of approaches to cultural rights and cultural policy.

		Locus of rights	
		Individual	Collective
Cultural policy	Promotion of one dominant culture	Liberal individualists	National exclusivists
	Promotion of multiple cultures	Liberal pluralists	National pluralists

Figure 2. Typology of positions of political parties in postcommunist Europe on cultural rights and cultural policy
 (Numbers in parentheses show average range of electoral support)





Figure 3. Positions of party electorates in postcommunist Europe on cultural policy, 1995

(Circle size proportionate to party vote in subsequent election)



Source: ISSP 1995

Figure 4. Distribution of internal and external minorities in postcommunist European countries

		Politically active internal minority	
		No	Yes
Politically active external minority	No	<div style="border: 1px dashed gray; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> Czech Republic </div>	<div style="border: 1px dotted gray; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> Romania Slovakia </div>
	Yes	<div style="border: 1px dashed gray; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> Hungary </div>	

Notes

* The authors thank Zoltan Barany, Valerie Bunce, Bill Crowther, Elizabeth Franker, Will Kymlicka, Cristina Petrescu, Dragos Petrescu, Brad Roth, George Schopflin, Lee Sigelman, Sherill Stroschein, Sharon Wolchik and Stefan Wolff.

¹ See Michael Ignatieff, "Nationalism and the Narcissism of Minor Difference," in Ronald Beiner, ed., *Theorizing Nationalism* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999); Mark Beissinger, "How Nationalisms Spread: Eastern Europe Adrift the Tides and Cycles of Nationalist Contention," *Social Research*, 63, no. 1 (1996); Jack L. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000); and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Fantasies of Salvation : Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). Exceptions to such assumptions about nationalism are relatively rare. See Daina Stukuls, "Imagining the Nation: Campaign Posters of the First Postcommunist Elections in Latvia," *East European Politics and Societies* 11, no. 1 (1997); and Rawi Abdelal, *National Purpose in the World Economy : Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective, Cornell Studies in Political Economy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

² Crawford Young, "Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: An Overview," in Crawford Young, ed., *Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: A Comparative Inquiry* (London: Macmillan Press and St. Martin's Press, 1999).

³ Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 67.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵ Evan Charney, "Identity and Liberal Nationalism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 2 (2003) and Stephen Deets, "Liberal Pluralism: Does the West Have Any to Export?," *JEMIE: Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, no. 4 (2002).

⁶ Charney uses the term "Liberal nationalists" to refer to approximately the same category.

⁷ Ibid. See also Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann, "Multiculturalism : Examining the Politics of Recognition," (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship : A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, *Oxford Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

⁸ Young, p. 5

⁹ Young, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰ Will Kymlicka, "Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: East and West," *JEMIE: Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, no. 4 (2002). For individualist critiques of this position, see Charney and essays in *JEMIE: Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, no. 4 (2002)

¹¹ Will Kymlicka, "Introduction," *Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? : Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe*, in Will Kymlicka and Magdalena Opalski, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹² Sabrina Ramet, *Whose Democracy?: Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997).

¹³ "Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities CETS No.: 157," Council of Europe <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=157&CM=8&DF=02/07/04&CL=ENG>.

¹⁴ Moravian identity proved to have limited potential for mobilizing cultural demands. After 1992 electoral support for Moravian parties never exceeded 2%.

¹⁵ Jean-Pierre Liegeois and Nicolae Gheorghe, "Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority," *Minority Rights Group International Report 95/4*, <http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/Pdf/Romareport.pdf>, p. 7

¹⁶ Kitty McKinsey, "Central/Eastern Europe: Roma and Non-Roma View Each Other with Hostility," *RFE/RL*, June 23, 1997, <http://www.rferl.org/features/1997/06/F/RU/970623151122.html>. Cited in Nadya Nedelsky, "The Bonds and Boundaries of Nationhood: Political-Cultural Roots of Czech and Slovak Definitions of the Nation and Their Implications for Post-Communist Governance" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, 2001).

¹⁷ The Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Communists acknowledged the distinctiveness of Roma culture and offered support, but rejected any privileges for Roma as a group. The government's 2002 policy statement rejects "xenophobia" but acknowledges the distinctiveness of Roma culture only within the context of efforts at

“integration.” See “Programové prohlášení vlády České republiky,”

http://www.vlada.cz/1250/vlada/vlada_progprohl.htm. After 2002, the Social Democrats and Freedom Union also acknowledged special conditions facing Germans and Silesians. See Peter Josika, “EU elections: euro and minority-sceptics win landslide victory in the Czech Republic,” *Eurolang*, Prague, June 24, 2004, <http://www.eurolang.net/news.asp?id=4637>.

¹⁸ Václav Klaus, “Ideový návrh Ústavy České republiky,” *Svobodné slovo*, July 31 1992. Cited in Nedelsky.

¹⁹ Miroslav Korecký, “Ethnic Key Is Not Acceptable,” trans. FBIS, *Lidove noviny*, October 2, 1996.

²⁰ Viktor Krejčí, “Neviditelné v pozadí skinů?” *Telegraf*, February 9, 1993. Cited in Nedelsky. See also Martin Komárek, “One Law, Two Perspectives,” trans. FBIS, *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, August 28, 1997.

²¹ “Czech Republic: Roma in the Czech Republic, Foreigners in Their Own Land,” *Human Rights Watch*, 8, no. 11 (1996). Cited in Nedelsky.

²² [Authors’ work]

²³ Zoltan D. Barany, “Ethnic Mobilization Without Prerequisites: The East European Gypsies,” *World Politics*, 54, no. 3 (2002).

²⁴ “Hungary in Figures,” Hungarian Central Statistics Office, http://www.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/index_eng.html; and Liegeois and Gheorghe, p. 7.

²⁵ Barany, p. 307.

²⁶ Today, roughly half of the minority self-governments are Roma. Dena Ringold, Mitchell A. Orenstein, and Erika Wilkens, *Roma in an Expanding Europe: Breaking the Poverty Cycle* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003).

²⁷ “Magyar liberalizmus az ezredfordulón,” January 1, 2003, http://www.szdsz.hu/index.phtml?op=hirek_reszletes&id=16.

²⁸ The party’s official full name has changed several times; this paper uses the commonly acronym FIDESZ. See Barnabas Racz, “Left Politics in Post-Communist Hungary,” in Charles Bukowski and Barnabas Racz, eds., *The Return of the Left in Post-Communist States* (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 1999).

²⁹ “Europa a jövőnk, Magyarország a hazánk” [“Europe is our future, Hungary our homeland”] at http://www.fidesz.hu/download/EU_vitairat.pdf

³⁰ “Gyökerek és szárnyak,” *Magyar Nemzet*, May 24, 2003, <http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?CikkID=11132>.

³¹ This law was commonly known as “the Status Law.” See <http://www.htmh.hu./torveny.htm> and Zoltán Kántor, *A Státustörvény: Előzmények és követelménye* (Budapest: Teleki László Foundation, 2002).

³² “Medgyessy Péter a Napkeltében,” *Napkelte*, July 4, 2003. <http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/archivum.php?hir=622>.

³³ Liegeois and Gheorghe, p. 7.

³⁴ Sharon L. Wolchik, “The Politics of Transition and the Break-up of Czechoslovakia,” in Jiří Musil, ed., *The End of Czechoslovakia* (Budapest: Central European Press, 1995).

³⁵ See László Tokés, “Jussunkat Követeljük. Ne Cerem Ce Ni-Se Cuvine. Wir Wollen, Was Uns Gehört. We Demand Our Rights. Nous Prétendons Nos Droits,” (Cluj, Romania: RMDSZ, 1995) and “A Szabadelvű Kör Dokumentumai,” *Hitel - Erdélyi Szemle* (March-April 1994), p. 94; Gábor Kolumbán, “Autonómia törekvések és konszociáció, a szövetségi demokrácia esélyei Romániában,” *Hitel - Erdélyi Szemle* (March-April 1994), pp. 3-9; and László Pillich, “Pótcselekvéseink kora lejárt,” *ibidem*, pp. 10-13.

³⁶ [Authors’ work]; and Zoltán Kántor, “Nationalizing Minorities and Homeland Politics: The Case of the Hungarians in Romaina,” in Balázs Trencsényi, et al., eds., *Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies* (Budapest: Regio Books Iasi: Editura Polirom, 2001).

³⁷ “Volebný program Maďarského Kresťanskodemokratického hnutia pre parlamentné voľby v r. 1992,” *Maďarske kresťanskodemokratické hnutie*, 1992.

³⁸ [Authors’ work].

³⁹ “Program, Maďarské Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie,” *Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Mozgalom*, 1994.

⁴⁰ This party underwent a number of name changes since the beginning of the 1990s ; PSD is its current name.

⁴¹ “Doctrina Partidului România Mare,” *Partidul România Mare*, <http://www.romare.ro/prm.html>.

⁴² Michahel Shafir, “The Political Party as National Holding Company: The Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania,” in Jonathan P. Stein, ed., *The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).

⁴³ See Articles 1 and 4 in the Romanian Constitution (<http://domino.kappa.ro/guvern/constitutia-e.html>).

Constitutional amendments in 2003 left this definition unchanged.

⁴⁴ [Authors’ work]

-
- ⁴⁵ "Program Slovenskej národnej strany," Slovenska národna strana, 1995.
- ⁴⁶ "Slovensko-Do Toho! Volebný Program," Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko, 1994.
- ⁴⁷ [Authors' work]
- ⁴⁸ Program Slovenskej Národnej Strany.
- ⁴⁹ "Cauza Națională," Partidul Național Țăranesc Creștin Democrat, <http://documents.pntcd.ro>.
- ⁵⁰ Teodor Meleșcanu, "Problema națională în contextul integrării" February 22, 2002, <http://pnl.ro/index.php?id=dp814&offset=1>; and Theodor Stolojan, "Programul politic," August 15, 2002, http://www.pnl.ro/index.php?id=program_stolo&offset=3.
- ⁵¹ "Party Program," Party of Social Democracy, <http://www.psd.ro/engleza/index.html>.
- ⁵² Adrian Năstase and Béla Markó on February 19, 2003, <http://www.psd.ro>.
- ⁵³ "RMDSZ Tájékoztató," Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, <http://www.hhrf.org/rmdsz/tajek/index.htm>.
- ⁵⁴ "Romania: Ruling Party Will Not Support Elimination of Ethnic Parties," *BBC Monitoring Service*, August 21, 2001.
- ⁵⁵ [Authors' work].
- ⁵⁶ Zita Sujová, Martin Kovačič, and Ivan Sámel, "Parlament schváli zákon o štátnom jazyku SR," *Národná Obroda*, 16 November 1995. See [Authors' work].
- ⁵⁷ "O čo sa usiluje SDL," in *Dokumenty Tretieho Zjazdu Strany Demokratickej Lavice* (1995).
- ⁵⁸ "Občan na prvom mieste," Demokraticke unie, 25 July 1998, <http://www.du.sk/prg-skolstvo.htm>.
- ⁵⁹ "National Identity" [Computer File], International Social Survey Programme, 1995.
- ⁶⁰ "Barometrul de Opinie Publică 1995-1997" [Computer File], Open Society Foundation Romania.
- ⁶¹ [Authors' work].
- ⁶² Central and Eastern Europeans were more likely to recognize cultural pluralism and support maintenance of minority traditions than were respondents in advanced, industrialized democracies. See "National Identity."