

END NOTES

1. Elsewhere, Linz and Stepan go further to say that "no regime should be called a democracy unless its rulers govern democratically. If freely elected executives (no matter what the magnitude of their majority) infringe the constitution, violate the rights of individuals and minorities, impinge upon the legitimate functions of the legislature, and thus fail to rule within the bounds of a state of law, their regimes are not democracies"(Linz & Stepan, 1996b, 14). The definition of democracy implicit in this statement differs significantly from procedural minimum definitions in its attention to rights and institutional interaction. Other definitions implicit elsewhere in this and other works (Linz & Stepan, 1996a) suggest that Linz and Stepan do not always hold democracy to such high standards.
2. The use of clearly normative terms such as "better" accurately reflect the approaches of many of these authors. Their research stands alongside a normative commitment to the promotion and improvement of democratic forms of government that is stated explicitly in the works of most of these authors.
3. According to Diamond's definition, in a liberal democracy, "the rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, torture, and undue interference in their personal lives"(Diamond, 1996, 24). By this phrasing, the "rule of law" not only protects citizens from *illegal* abuse but also implicitly forbids the specified forms of abuse from being considered legal. In effect, Diamond is speaking here about rule of a particular kind of law, in this case non-invasive or non-torturous law.
4. Spatial metaphors, although vivid, often acquire a variety of inconsistent meanings and it is important to be clear about which one is in use. Zakaria in an article on a similar subject uses "horizontal" to refer to relationships between institutions at the same level of government and "vertical" to refer to relationships between central and local or regional institutions. Elster, Offe and Press ...
5. Schedler gives nuance to this definition by noting that horizontal accountability cannot require equality in all respects. A constitutional court, for example, need not possess all the powers of the legislature whose decision it overturns. At the same time, horizontal accountability cannot allow *mere* equality in that sphere where accountability is to occur. The aforementioned court actually must be *superior* to the legislature in the specific act of overruling a decision.
6. In cases where redress is impossible--especially in one-time events such as elections and executions--monitoring institutions require the means to prevent anticipated violations before they occur.
7. O'Donnell's lack of attention to this concern may result from his emphasis on Latin American presidential regimes in which the sharp distinction between executive and legislature combined with the frequent weakness of presidential parties in parliament can lead to stalemate and rule by decree (Kenney, 1998). In parliamentary regimes with less sharp divides between legislature and executive and stronger party systems, the problem of legal usurpation becomes a more serious concern. O'Donnell is not alone in his focus on the executive. Diamond's broad definition of "liberal democracy" calls for "executive power" to be "constrained constitutionally and held accountable by other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament, ombudsman and auditor general)" without calling for corresponding limits on the power of legislatures to affect other institutions (Diamond, 1996, 23).

8. In neither case did HZDS representatives take advantage of these offers.

9. According to a 1994 survey of deputies in Slovakia's parliament, 77% of respondents identified their own preference or the preference of their party group as the chief determinant in their committee appointment. Nor did this percentage differ significantly from party to party or from majority coalition to opposition (University of Leiden, 1994). Furthermore, unlike the 1992 Czech parliament, which excluded minority parties from most committee leadership positions, Slovakia's 1992 parliament retained a roughly proportional distribution of committee chairs, vice-chairs and verifiers.

10. A number of indicators suggest that this reshuffling of committee seats and leadership positions occurred with the direct intent of limiting opposition representation. Considerations such as the occupational or personal expertise of deputies played little role in the decision. The Constitutional-Legal committee contained no greater share of lawyers in 1994 than it had 1992 or in 1990 even though the overall share of deputies with a law degree increased slightly during the same period; The share of medical doctors on the committee concerned with health care in 1994 declined from 1990 and 1992 levels, even though the overall share of doctors in Parliament had increased. Newly-elected opposition deputy Juraj Švec, the rector of Slovakia's largest university, found himself assigned to the Environment committee despite his extensive experience in education and his repeated request to be placed on the Education, Science and Culture committee.

11. Assertions that assignment to the Environment committee was used by the majority as an intentional slight against other members of parliament are strengthened by a closer look at the committee's membership. Assignments to the committee included the three most prominent members of the Democratic Union (DU), a party that in early 1994 separated from one of the parties of the majority coalition--the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)--and forced a vote of no confidence that ousted HZDS's prime minister. Danica Siváková, director of the Slovak parliament's Office of Information and Analysis, offers the same interpretation (Sivakova, 1998)

12. A 1993 survey of Slovakia's parliamentary deputies included questions which allow a rough measure of the relative prestige of committees in the eyes of deputies themselves. This ranking correlates almost perfectly with the degree of over-representation of coalition parties. Of particular note is the degree to which this ranking corresponds to the over-representation of the leading coalition party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). The party was most over-represented on the highest-prestige committee, and most under-represented on the lowest-prestige committee. Furthermore, the extremely low prestige of the Environment committee during the 1992 Parliament helps to explain its selection as the "wastebasket" for otherwise unwanted opposition deputies in the 1994 Parliament. The same pattern appears in the leadership structures of the committees. Opposition parties also did not even receive a single verifier position in any of the four committees with highest prestige.

Comparing committee prestige with coalition over-representation also suggests certain other conclusions about the coalition's strategy in making committee assignments. In only one committee is coalition strength significantly greater than the prestige ranking would predict: Mandates and Immunities, and State Administration. This committee while not prestigious, offered a compensatory attraction since it held responsibility for determining who would and would not be permitted to be a member of Parliament. It is this committee that later proved most useful to the majority coalition in its attempts to minimize the effect of defections of coalition members.

13. An editorial by majority coalition deputy Roman Hofbauer argued that "only a liar can speak at present about political pressure on the media in Slovakia, as the execution of control of the electronic media is performed by an extra-executive institute of the Slovak Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting,"(Hofbauer, 1997a) while a statement by Deputy Prime Minister Katerina Tothová stated that "The Slovak Republic Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting is not subordinated to the government, but it is a body elected by the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR]"(1996i).

14. In 1995, Vladimír Mečiar, prime minister and chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the largest party in the majority coalition, stated that the members of the two councils "are independent" and that "Not one is a member of the parties that constitute the governing coalition"(Zabojnik, 1995), and in 1996 he reiterated that the councils "are filled with independent people without political jerseys"(Minarik, Sliskova, & Skoda, 1996).

15. Prime Minister Mečiar's statements about the non-partisanship of the councils appointed on during Parliament's overnight session of early November 1994 compete with his own acknowledgment that the appointees receive criticism because they belong to the "national-democratic stream" of Slovakia's politics (Zabojnik, 1995), and it is clear that others thought of the appointees in partisan terms. According to SNS deputy Marian Anđel the opposition would make "amazing progress" if in the future it managed to obtain even "two out of the nine members of the Slovak Television Council and one representative on the Slovak Radio Council"(1996b).

16. In the summer of 1996, opposition deputies took advantage of conflict within the majority coalition, to add a single representative from the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL). In September 1996, opposition and coalition deputies agreed on a new and comprehensive set of standing orders that replaced OKO with a new committee to be "composed proportionally of members of all parliamentary parties"(Samel, 1996b, 2). Yet when Parliament moved to set up the committee in February 1997, the majority set the number of members at eight and elected five majority representatives. Majority representatives justified the resulting disproportional five-to-three ratio by explaining that "it was necessary to calculate [the independent deputies in parliament as part of] the coalition"(1997d). Coalition deputies rejected an opposition compromise proposal of a nine-seat committee with a five-to-four ratio which would preserve a coalition majority while more closely representing the ratio of coalition and opposition. Under parliament's rule for establishing proportionality, an eight-member committee in which independents are included with the majority provides the highest degree of disproportionality in favor of the majority of any committee with more than three members. Even the proposed five-to-three ratio ultimately did not emerge, since coalition deputies approved only one opposition representative and refused to accept the nominees proposed by KDĽ, the Democratic Union (DU) or the Hungarian coalition parties. Coalition deputies placed the responsibility for the rejections on the opposition parties themselves for nominating unsuitable deputies with ties to foreign intelligence agencies (Minarik et al., 1996) and threatened that "if the opposition insists on its current candidates to [these committees], HZDS will present materials which testify to their former contacts with foreign intelligence services"(Krnó, 1997b, 4).

17. The court at the same time rejected arguments that this same clause also covered the position of SIS director (1996a).

18. The Slovak National Party (SNS) proposed broadening the FNM to include opposition members and placing the FNM under the oversight of the Supreme Inspection

Office (1996d). The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), made rival overtures during this period, seeking support from the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) with the promise that the FNM's privatization activities would halt until the FNM had been restructured [Jancura, 1996 #551]. HZDS representatives also promised SDL a seat on FNM's executive council, an offer that SDL chair claimed to have rejected on the grounds that a single representative could do more harm than good: since "We [SDL] would vote against [the supporters of HZDS chairman] Mečiar, others would skim the cream [of privatization] and we would look like idiots (Krno, 1997a, 2). Mečiar's response focused on concerns of logistics rather than equity: "I do not think that political representation based on the proportional principle is possible there because there are seventeen political parties in Parliament, which is more than the number of functions in the FNM [Presidium and Executive Committee]. Politicization would destroy the Fund. Each party would have a different interest and these interests cannot be brought into harmony" (Minarik et al., 1996). Once the coalition crisis had been resolved, Mečiar returned to his insistence on a coalition monopoly, noting that although he might accept opposition representatives on the board overseeing the intelligence service, he would not consider a wide restructuring of FNM-related organizations, a statement that one prominent commentator interpreted to mean that "control of the FNM" was "more important than control of SIS"[Jancura, 1997 #552].

19. In 1994 Mečiar and Moravčík accused one another of conducting--or preparing to conduct--the largest ever purge of Slovakia's public administration (1996h; Vincourekova, 1994). More precise evidence is impossible to obtain at most levels, but a look at the more easily visible district level shows that Moravčík replaced only twenty-six of the thirty eight district governors appointed by the previous Mečiar government and limited the dismissals explicitly to those who had signed a statement criticizing Slovakia's president, Michal Kováč (Fisher, 1994b, 12) whereas the Mečiar government that followed dismissed all thirty-eight.

20. Accounts of Húška's actual statement differ slightly. The daily *Sme* offers a slightly different but no less significant account of Húška's statement: "When asked whether the HZDS demands that new representatives of the state administration join the movement, Húška replied: 'We are doing it and will keep on doing it'"(1996h).

21. In October 1995 the Slovak National Party explored an alternative mechanism and announced its decision "to bring charges of treason against President Michal Kováč" because of allegedly anti-Slovak statements which Kováč made in Germany. Such a step would entail arraignment by Slovakia's Parliament and adjudication by the country's Constitutional Court. In light of weaknesses in the charge and the independence of the court at the time, it is not surprising that SNS did not in the end file charges (Fisher, 1995d).

22.. As one HZDS representatives noted, the vote was "only of a declarative nature"(Urbanova, 1995).

23. Although ultimately unsuccessful, efforts to remove Kováč's from the presidency continued until the last months of his term. In June 1997, Prime Minister Mečiar announced that Kováč's term as president ended on 15 February 1998, the fifth anniversary of his election as president, rather than on 2 March 1998, the fifth anniversary of his inauguration (1997g). Mečiar justified this calculation on the grounds that Kováč had begun receiving a salary and had acted in an official capacity in the two weeks before the formality of his inauguration (1997c). Kováč in response denied receiving any salary until nearly a month after the inauguration and emphasized that he did not take the formal

oath of his office until 2 March 1993. The Constitutional Court ultimately sided with Kováč (1997c). The political motivations of Mečiar's efforts are suggested by his apparent change of opinion on the question of Kováč's final day in office. According a RFE/RL report of 17 January 1997, "Mečiar said the next parliamentary election should be held in June 1998, three months after the end of Kováč's term"(Siskova, 1996), implying that he believed Kováč's term to end in March.

24. Slovakia's Constitutional Court struck down this transfer in May of the following year (Kresak, 1997).

25. In 1996 the coalition-appointed Prosecutor General, Michal Valo, refused to carry out pardons granted by President Kováč in the Technopol fraud case—a case that involved Kováč's son—on the grounds that it exceeded the president's authority. Valo's refusal ended only when the Constitutional Court refused to consider Valo's petition for further clarification of the limitations regarding the power of presidential pardon and declared Valo's refusal to issue the pardons as "without any legal justification"(Sme, 1998c, 1).

26. When in May 1995 Kováč recorded a protest against accusations by Mečiar, STV broadcast the recording not during the evening news but shortly before midnight with no prior announcement. In late June, STV refused to broadcast a presidential address shortly before the visit of Pope John Paul II (Fisher, 1995c), a step that received publicly endorsement from majority coalition officials (1995b). These circumstances repeated in the following year when on 3 May 1996 STV preceded Kováč's speech at the reopening of a national monument with a critical introductory text: "Slovak Television (STV) has requested a speech without internal political invective considering the nature of the occasion. [STV] expresses its sorrow over the fact that its request did not find sympathetic ears"(1996o). Several days later, on 8 May 1996 STV refused to air a presidential speech commemorating the anniversary of the defeat of fascism, arguing that it had only recently broadcast a presidential speech and had "not recently requested" another. The STV statement further argued that "in accordance with its mandate, it is obliged to give the president air time only in extraordinary circumstances"(1996h). In April of 1997 Kováč issued a written statement in which he stated that despite numerous requests "to respond to at least some of the programs with the prime minister" concerning an upcoming referendum, he had "not been given an opportunity to do so"(Hrabko, 1997). In the following month, Kováč chose to publicize his views on the referendum through a public letter sent to the mayor of every municipality in Slovakia, noting that he had resorted to this method in part because STV had rejected his requests for "even a few one-minute appearances"(1997g).

27. On 31 August 1995, as the result of an anonymous telephone tip, Austrian police found Michal Kováč, Jr., son of President Michal Kováč in his car near the Austrian border town of Hainburg. Kováč Jr. claimed that he had been abducted near his home in Slovakia, assaulted and transported illegally across the Slovak-Austrian border. Police action in the Kováč Jr. abduction began immediately upon the discovery of the crime. On 7 September the chief investigator in the case, Jozef Šimunič, publicly issued an official request to have certain members of the Slovakia's intelligence service (SIS) relieved of their oath of secrecy so that they might provide evidence in the case [Mravec, 1995 #417]. On the following day, Šimunič was removed from the investigation and replaced by Peter Vačok. Vačok, too, raised questions of SIS involvement (Hinkova, 1995) and cited the testimony of an anonymous witness who claimed to have participated in the shadowing and abduction of Kováč Jr. and further claimed that the operation had been personally directed by SIS director Ivan Lexa. Prosecutors, however, rejected Vačok's decision to file charges (Toth, 1996a) and within several weeks Vačok himself was

removed from the case and replaced by Jozef Číž (1995b). In April of 1996 Číž announced that anonymous witnesses could corroborate the hypothesis that Kováč had faked his own abduction (Stahlova, 1996). Six weeks later, however, Číž announced his decision to suspend the investigation on the grounds that it had "failed to find facts that would justify the launching of criminal proceedings against any particular person"(1996). After some additional investigation, police formally suspended the investigation on 30 August 1996, exactly one year after the abduction had occurred (Jurina, 1996a).

During much of this time, Michal Kováč Jr. remained in Austria while an Austrian court considered a request by Germany for his extradition in connection with an investigation of fraud involving the Technopol corporation. Since Austrian law did not permit extradition of those who had not entered Austria willingly, the court sought to determine the nature of the abduction and took testimony from Kováč Jr., from Kováč Sr. and from alleged witness Oskar Fegyveres. On 20 February 1996, the court ruled against Germany's extradition request on the basis of "reasonable suspicion that Michal Kováč Jr. was deprived his liberty and conveyed to the Republic of Austria by violent means, and with the full knowledge of the Slovak authorities, and this through its subordinated organization/institution, or, as the case may be, by persons working for them. . . ." (1996e). Subsequent investigations by opponents of the majority coalition--conducted informally while the coalition was still in power--reached the same conclusions as the Austrian court (Mitro, 1999; Sa`mel, 1996c).

Given the sizeable differences between the coalition and opposition accounts and the polarizing aspects of the case, it is unlikely that the abduction and surrounding events will be the subject of thorough and impartial investigation in Slovakia in the near future, but the available circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the involvement of Slovakia's majority coalition.

The first consideration is the degree to which the two main hypotheses about the incident--self-abduction and abduction involving the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS)--pass the amateur detective's tests of motive, means, and opportunity. The self-abduction hypothesis fails dramatically on the question of motive. Although allegations that Kováč Jr. was involved in fraud involving the Technopol corporation make it plausible that he would consider deceiving police and the media, it is difficult to understand what Kováč Jr. could hope to gain from arranging his own abduction to Austria. SIS Director Lexa referred to the abduction as "just a cloak designed to conceal the Technopol case"(Sa`mel, 1996d), but in planning a self-abduction, Kováč Jr. could not have easily ignored the possibility that such an action might--as it ultimately did--actually greatly heighten the visibility of a case that had previously remained obscure. Furthermore, in conducting a cross-border self-abduction Kováč Jr. would also consciously place himself in immediate danger of extradition to Germany. It is similarly difficult to argue that the abduction served as part of a larger opposition-planned effort to provide a "pretext for attacks on the police and the government coalition"(1995a). With Kováč Jr.'s legal difficulties, it would be difficult to find a less credible candidate to use in a faked abduction.

The motives for an abduction involving SIS cannot be as easily dismissed. For the same reason that he would provide a poor candidate for self-abduction, Kováč Jr. would provide an excellent potential target for abduction by opponents of the president. His abduction across the Austrian border would call broad public attention to his involvement in Technopol and could lead to his extradition to face trial in Germany. At the same time, Kováč Jr.'s criminal involvement would taint his denials and help to deflect attention away from the actual kidnapers. Kidnapping Kováč Jr. could be expected to achieve several concrete results: hurting the image of Kováč Sr. by calling attention to improprieties committed by his son and namesake, impeding the Kováč Sr.'s performance of his official duties by involving him in complicated international diplomacy concerning his own son, and sending an implicit message about the capabilities and intentions of political opponents of the president.

The timing of the abduction also coincides well with developments within the majority coalition and SIS. Between March and May 1995, HZDS-led coalition took legislative steps to remove virtually all removable presidential prerogatives, to halve the presidential staff, and to issue a vote of no confidence in the president. These steps failed to produce the president's resignation or his removal, but they did result in the appointment of majority coalition representative Ivan Lexa as director of SIS. The combination of Lexa's consolidation of control within SIS and summer stalemate between Kováč is consistent with a SIS-led effort to shift the balance of institutional power. The majority coalition acquired means for carrying out an abduction at about the same time that they faced increased incentives for dramatic action

As a second consideration, it must be noted that the process and outcome of the investigation conforms more closely to an abduction involving SIS than it does to self-abduction. Excluding sheer criminal genius or outright police incompetence, an operation as significant as the alleged abduction should leave certain clues which could lead at least to the identification of potential suspects if not to their capture. Furthermore, if Kováč Jr. were responsible for his own abduction, the majority coalition and its appointed investigators would have extremely strong incentive to find convincing evidence as this would vindicate the majority coalition and harm the political position of the president. If, by contrast, if the abduction of Kováč involved SIS, investigators could not resolve the case successfully without damaging those who had appointed them to their position. The suspension of the case without a solution is consistent with two presuppositions of the case against the majority coalition: that despite strong incentives to do so, investigators could not find sufficient proof against Kováč Jr. to bring an indictment; and that investigators faced strong incentives to overlook SIS participation. In fact suspension of the investigation is the only possible outcome for the case that fits both of these conditions.

Third, there is the verdict of the Austrian Provincial Court that Kováč's was abducted against his will with the knowledge and participation of Slovak authorities. Although this verdict cannot be regarded as final proof of Kováč's innocence or the guilt of SIS (1997e), it also cannot be dismissed easily as the product of false testimony (1996c) or political bias (Hofbauer, 1996a). Although German requests for extradition could have been rejected without identifying Kováč' Jr.'s kidnapers, the Austrian court felt certain enough of its evidence to state that Slovak officials knew about and participated in the abduction.

28. The official statement on the kidnaping by the Slovak government is notable for its implicit characterization of itself as the victim of an affair for which the Kováč family is apparently responsible. In the first sentence of the statement, the government "expresses its human understanding for the situation of Slovak President Michal Kováč, who, as a father, has found himself in a very difficult position, because, in circumstances not yet clarified, his son arrived in a foreign country, where he is being held as a suspect of serious fraud in connection with an international investigation." Through its choice of words, the thereby statement emphasizes that Kováč Sr. is a main figure in the affair, that the difficulty is personal and familial rather than official, that the account of Kováč Jr.'s abduction is unproven, and that Kováč Jr. is himself "a suspect of serious fraud" in another case. Having thus made implicit criticisms of Kováč Jr. and implying the involvement of Kováč Sr., the statement adopts a defensive tone which twice emphasizes the rule of law in Slovakia and concludes by denouncing "speculation, double meanings, distorted information, etc." and by threatening to "deploy all legal means in order to challenge absurd and illegitimate hints constructed in this context in order to discredit the Slovak Government"(1995).

29. In subsequent remarks on a television discussion program Prime Minister Mečiar explained his government's failure to request Kováč Jr.'s return as a sign of respect for the independence of Austrian courts. The Austrian court, however, regarded the Slovak government's inaction as unusual and described it as "Contrary to international custom"(1996e).

30. Slovak election law required new parties such as DU to submit at least 10,000 signatures to one of four regional election commissions. On 4 August 1994, the HZDS and SNS delegates to the Bratislava commission where DU had submitted its petition list reported that "20 to 33 percent of the more than 14,000 signatures on the Democratic Union's petition sheets were invalid"(1994a). (It is notable that SNS challenged "20 to 33 percent" of DU's 14,929 signatures, since even complete success in striking all of the 33 percent would still have left DU with 10,002 valid signatures, a number sufficient, if barely, to meet legal requirements.) Delegates from other parties rejected the allegation, and a majority of commission members voted DU had met the legal requirements for participating in the 1994 parliamentary election. On 10 August the national-level Slovak Election Commission also reviewed the DU petition sheets. It found irregularities, that disqualified "more than 2,400" of the signatures, but concluded that the remaining valid signatures constituted "enough for participation in the election"(Olach, 1994).

31. Before the verdict a majority coalition official had cited Slovakia's Constitutional Court as "the only body authorized at this time to make an objective decision" regarding the DU petition (Kleiman, 1994). After the decision, another majority coalition official explained to the contrary that "Leaving things up to the Constitutional Court is slow and ineffective"(1994d) Before the verdict a majority coalition official had cited Slovakia's Constitutional Court as "the only body authorized at this time to make an objective decision" regarding the DU petition (Kleiman, 1994). After the decision, another majority coalition official explained to the contrary that "Leaving things up to the Constitutional Court is slow and ineffective"(1994d)

32. As in the case of DU, the regional and national election commissions noted problems with the ZRS petition but ultimately voted to accept it (1994). In May of 1995, however, two former employees of ZRS charged that members of the ZRS council had falsified approximately 2,000 of the signatures on its petition sheets using a roster of the unemployed acquired from a government regional office in southern Slovakia (Slovakia Document Store, 1995). These allegations received support from parliamentary deputy Miroslav Kočnar, who had until recently been a Vice Chairman of ZRS and one of its deputies in parliament.

33. Gaulieder justified his resignation on the basis of "a deep gap between words and actions" within the party and asked a series of questions including "Why and to whom did we sell shares of strategic enterprises? Why aren't we able to solve serious crimes? . . . Why do we seek internal enemies, betrayers abroad and within the church and the academic community?"(1996c).

34. In particular, Gaulieder called attention to differences between the letter's signature and the handwriting on the envelope.

35. According to majority coalition deputy Dušan Macuška "František Gaulieder was evidently lying. He wanted to prove to the [Mandates and Immunity Committee] facts that are in complete contradiction to written documents, documents that have even been verified by a notary public"(Raslavsky, 1996). In an attempt to call attention to the majority coalition's unorthodox behavior in this case, other political figures in Slovakia

attempted to provide evidence of a double standard by claiming to have received letters of resignation from prominent majority coalition deputies including Macuška and the chairman of Parliament, Ivan Gašparovič. Like Gaulieder, these deputies denied that they had signed the respective letters and denied that they wished to resign. Unlike Gaulieder's denial, the denials made by Macuška and Gašparovič found immediate acceptance with the Mandates and Immunity committee, which refused to consider the matter any further (1997f).

36. On 6 December 1996 a bomb exploded in front of František Gaulieder's house causing considerable damage but did not injure Gaulieder or any members of his family. Gaulieder and opposition politicians condemned the bombing and suggested that it had been politically motivated (TASR, 1996b; TASR, 1996k). In an official statement HZDS also condemned the bombing and offered a rival hypothesis for the action's motivation: "It evokes in us a suspicion that somebody has not hesitated in using this barbaric act to cast a bad light on somebody else"(TASR, 1996d). A police investigation continued for several weeks but identified no suspects and was suspended in February of 1997. The lack of evidence about the explosion allows few meaningful judgements about this aspect of the Gaulieder case. Plausible motives can be constructed for representatives of the coalition, for representatives of the opposition, and for Gaulieder himself. In the latter case, however, it is necessary to accept the implausible (but by no means impossible) supposition that he would willingly risk the physical and emotional health of his wife and children by detonating the bomb while the family was at home.

37. Amendments submitted by the majority coalition and passed by parliament in 1995 required that a parliamentary vacancy be filled by a substitute from among those listed on the same electoral list--the same party and the same electoral region--as the previous office holder. The law left the choice of substitute to the political party, but it also specified specific conditions under which the principle of party choice would not apply (č. 80/1990 Zb. § 48 ods. 2). According to this exception, in cases where other eligible candidates had received a certain level of preference votes, the vacancy was to be filled by the eligible candidate receiving the greatest number of preference votes. In the case of the vacant seat, three candidates received the requisite number of preference votes, but SNS nominee Ladislav Hruška was not among them.

38. According to Ján Garai of the majority coalition's Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), "The wording of the law is clearly formulated. No one can take the right of a political party to claim the mandate of one of its deceased deputies and nominate to the vacancy an alternate from its own ranks"(1997h); in response to a reporter's objection that "the electoral law also speaks about the rights of a citizen who receives the most preferences," Garai reemphasized his argument that selection of alternates "is a party matter"(1997h).

39. The justices argued that the circumstances of the case did not allow such a step. Justices explained that in the court could not overturn Gaulieder's expulsion because it parliament had not voted on "a resolution concerning deputy Gaulieder" but rather on "note that the deputy departed from his position and that his mandate expired.." Justices explained that they could overturn a resolution but not such a "note" (Dulin, 1997a).

40. DU Chairman Jozef Moravčík claimed that excluding his party would have radically altered the constitutional balance of power in such a way as to permanently affect other institutions: "we would appeal to the Constitutional Court. We are afraid, however, that, after our exclusion, the coalition would shorten the term of office of this institution, as well as of the president"(Sliskova, 1995). Although Moravčík's cannot be expected to

show great objectivity in assessing steps taken against his own party, his scenario corresponds well to the majority coalition's other efforts to undercut rival centers of power.

41. The promise of financial inducements is one of the few elements that appears in the accounts of both Gaulieder and Mečiar.

42.. When discussing Gaulieder's actions, HZDS representatives repeatedly addressed--albeit in scornful tones--the possibility that other deputies might follow Gaulieder out of HZDS and force the majority coalition back into opposition [Smolec, 1996 #479; Slobodník, 1996 #510].

43. As the following sections indicate, however, controversy surrounding the court's ruling on questions surrounding the referendum offered something of a precedent.

44. Šimunič gave an exclusive interview to the opposition daily *Sme* in which he criticized majority coalition Prime Minister Mečiar for complicating the investigation by releasing "erroneous information" and speaking about evidence to which Šimunič had not yet had access (Mravec, 1995).

45. On 7 September, Šimunič publicly issued an official request to have certain members of the Slovak Intelligence Service, (SIS), relieved of their oath of secrecy so that they might provide evidence in the case [Mravec, 1995 #417]. In an interview with the pro-government daily, *Slovenská republika*, Vačok noted that the members investigation team had "have collected enough evidence to be able to say that--and I stress this--not SIS but equipment that belongs to SIS, and certain people who, as everything suggests, are working there took a certain part in the perpetration of this criminal act"(Hinkova, 1995).

46. Faced with the need to explain why he failed to produce a single indictment concerning an incident that took place in mid-morning on a public road and involved, by investigators accounts, a minimum of eight people (1995), Číž cited "conflicting testimonies or testimonies by certain persons that cannot be objectively assessed without their being present," "contradictions between the testimonies of certain witnesses and persons whose place of stay is not known," and "the disinterest of persons enjoying immunity to reveal some facts regarding the case that they allegedly know but which they do not want to reveal"(Toth, 1996b). By phrasing his argument in this way, Číž implies that his failure to solve the case can be attributed to a combination of irresponsible witnesses and pardons issued by President Kováč. Yet of the case's key witnesses, only Oskar Fegyveres was known to be not "present" or in an unknown "place of stay." Likewise, the list of those enjoying "immunity" included only one witness in the Kováč Jr. abduction: Oskar Fegyveres. Číž thus appears to base the failure of the entire investigation on the absence of a single witness.

47. Further questions about the independence of the Kováč Jr. investigation and related cases involve by a speech by Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar to a party rally held in central Slovakia:

The investigators who gave certain promises that they would know how to solve things otherwise are being removed from the case. . . . Such people, must not conduct the investigation! New people are taking up the positions, one of whom is, I think, from Banská Bystrica, one from Zvolen, and one from Liptovský Mikuláš [towns in central Slovakia]. Central Slovaks are going to take hold of things, and I hope they will put things in order, and if there was an abduction, they will announce it, and if

not they will at least say what happened"(1995d).
The reference to "Central Slovakia" and to particular towns in the region may be understood in context not only as a nod to Mečiar's central Slovak audience but to his own origins in Central Slovakia and the strong support for the majority coalition in that region. The statement therefore suggests a demand for coalition-friendly investigators. The statement also suggests that Mečiar had information about changes in the investigation team nearly a week before the changes were announced.

48. In an interview with the pro-government daily, *Slovenská republika*, Hudek explained why he did not dispute the authenticity of the tape until several days later: "Everyone who knows me knows that I always have things verified and do not react too hastily. The contents of the tape therefore shook and upset me at first. I never claimed that the whole tape contained the exact recording of my conversation. But I recognized my voice and diction on the tape, as well as the voice on the other end, and I partly remembered fragments of the conversation. I was unable, however, to recall the sequence of questions and answers, the causal relationship between them, and their time"(1996g). This denial is in some ways as damaging to Hudek's case as the tape itself since he acknowledges being unable, without further confirmation, to deny that he had promised to give a police investigator "a good kick in the balls" and that he had "issued instructions on how [the firing] should look"(1996d).

49. The report also failed to "prove unambiguously that the taped voices were those of Hudek and Lexa"(1996g), even though Hudek had already admitted to recognizing his own voice in the recording (1996g).

50. The pattern of police investigation in political cases had become so clear by the time of the Gaulieder bombing that commentator Juraj Handzo could predict the exact course of events within two days of the event "It is to be expected that the ruling coalition will indignantly reject [the suspicion of its involvement in the explosion] and will claim that Gaulieder placed the explosive in front of his house himself or that the opposition staged the explosion. We will never find out the truth, because the police investigation will certainly end up being shelved"(Handzo, 1996).

51. In late 1998, Mečiar's successor as Prime Minister and Acting President, Mikuláš Dzurinda, issued an unprecedented order rescind certain amnesties granted by Mečiar including those related to the Kováč Jr. abduction (TASR, 1998g). This decision immediately became the subject of Constitutional Court appeals by representatives of HZDS. As of this writing the court has not issued a final verdict in the matter.

52. The two-round system proposed in the referendum question further increased the difficulty of Mečiar's decision. As the single most popular politician in Slovakia, Mečiar would be almost assured of winning a plurality in the first round but since opinion surveys suggested that he would find it difficult to win a majority in the second round.

53. The referendum commission maintained that the Ministry of the Interior had an overriding legal obligation to carry out the decisions of the commission in matters concerning the referendum. Majority coalition Prime Minister Mečiar responded that "the commission is merely a supervisory body ensuring that laws are observed," while "the government is a state body set up along state lines and as such it is not under the jurisdiction of any electoral commission. The government has to obey the laws alone. Only the National Council [Parliament] of the Slovak Republic has the right to supervise the government"[Dobos, 1997 #530]. The Minister of the Interior, Gustav Krajčí sided with Mečiar. Asked whether he was bound primarily by the resolutions of the

Government or by those of the Central Referendum Commission, Krajčí responded that "For me it is the resolutions of the government which are binding above all"(1997a). Krajčí reemphasized this position in a later interview: "The Central Referendum Commission's resolutions are not decisive for me. As a government member, I am bound by government resolutions"[Pankovicinova, 1997 #529].

54. According to the court, "the supplement to the decision of the president of the Slovak Republic on calling the referendum about the question listed in Part I, Letter b), runs counter, in Point four of the decision, to Article 2, Paragraph 3, of Law No. 564/1992 of the Code on the Manner of Executing the Referendum in the wording of subsequent amendments (1997a).

55. Čič also offered his interpretation of the practical implications of the second section of the ruling, noting that "the referendum can take place with all four questions but, should the reply to the question about the direct election of the head of state by citizens be valid, Parliament will not be bound by the draft constitutional law that is printed on the reverse side of the ballot papers"(1997b). Arguments similar to these appear in the Court's written explanation of its decision, but this section of the verdict did not appear until after the referendum had already taken place.

56. So contested did the situation surrounding the referendum become that the government and the Central Referendum Commission issued mutually exclusive conclusions about the status on the referendum. On 25 May Mečiar announced that "Not even ten percent of the population participated, so [the referendum] is not valid"(Lesko, 1997). By contrast, the Central Referendum Commission declared on the following day that the referendum had been "marred," and that because the three question ballots had not been approved by the commission the number of valid votes cast was actually "zero"(Kassova, 1997).

57. Krajčí denied both of the charges. On the question of forgery Krajčí offered the dubious argument that the invalidity of the fourth question made its omission irrelevant: "It is the same ballot that was stamped by the central commission, only that there is nothing there which is in conflict with the law. That means that it doesn't have the supplement and the question. Question number four was removed from the ballot, but it is the same ballot"(Toth & Kotian, 1997). On the question of his failure to distribute the commission-stamped four-question ballots, Krajčí and his supporters argued that distributing a ballot containing the fourth question was proscribed by the verdict's second section.

Krajčí's explanations find little support in the actual verdict or in Slovak law. The verdict does not contain any specific prescriptions, stating only that the supplement of the fourth question runs counter to another law on the wording of referendums. This phrasing undercuts HZDS deputy Ján Cuper's frequently repeated argument that Krajčí "would have been acting unconstitutionally"(Malecova, 1997) if he distributed a four-question ballot, since the court speaks only of a contradiction between two non-constitutional laws. Arguments that distribution of the four question ballot would have violated statutory law likewise find little basis in the verdict or the legal code. Slovakia's law governing referendums reserves all questions of referendum content to the referendum commission and employs the Ministry of the Interior only as printing press and courier. Since the court ruling--even according to the most extreme interpretation would declare the fourth question as simply invalid and not illegal or otherwise contraband, it does not provide firm grounds that would justify its modification or non-distribution.

Nor can the circumstances justify Krajčí's decision on the extra-legal basis of

limited information or good intentions. The lack of information argument rests on the fact that at the time of his decision Krajči had access only to the Constitutional Court's brief verdict and not to its more explicit explanation (Sumichrast, 1997). Krajči did, however, have access to informal explanatory statements by court justices. Although these statements lacked binding force and might be perceived to represent the "personal opinions" of the judges (Michalic, 1997), the clarity and vehemence of those statements suggests that Krajči undertook his efforts out of willful disregard for available information rather than out of ignorance. Likewise, Krajči's argument that he acted "so that the citizen was not misled by question number four" (Michalic, 1997) fails to take into account the confusion that might ensue from omitting question number four, especially considering that citizens had been told to expect a four question ballot and that the chairman of Slovakia's highest court had made prominent public statements permitting the use of the fourth question.

58. Barila claimed that he received pressure from his superiors with regard to the Krajči case: "Before my decision, that is, before the proposed decision, it is true that superiors consulted with me. The Prosecutor General consulted with me. I met with the regional prosecutor and the district prosecutor. Even before the final decision it was suggested, or I was directly told, to change my decision, so that [the investigation] would be suspended" (Silacky, 1997). Barila's superiors, for their part, admit consulting with him on the case but deny exerting any pressure (Silacky, 1997).

59. The new law included provisions for:

- significantly raising the threshold of votes for coalitions of parties to gain entry into parliament. Whereas in the past the threshold had been 7% for coalitions of two or three parties and 10% for coalitions of four or more parties, the new law raised the threshold to 5% per party within the coalition.
- reducing the number of electoral commission members appointed by coalitions from one per party within the coalition to one per coalition.
- replacing Slovakia's four electoral districts with one nationwide district.
- strengthening prohibitions against private radio and television coverage of election campaigning
- prohibiting the publication of public opinion polls during the final two weeks of the election campaign
- eliminating the public posting of electoral rolls
- shifting a variety of administrative tasks from electoral commissions to the Ministry of the Interior and the Slovak Statistical Office.

60. Accusations against BIS and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) were not without political motives of their own (Leschtina, 1996; Novacek, 1995).

61. Rumors abound regarding considerably larger sums placed in accounts in Switzerland and elsewhere, but by the end of 1998 these had not yet been confirmed (Slonkova, 1998).

62. In a speech in which he acknowledged the potential need for a referendum on the Czech Republic's entry into the European Union, ODS chairman Václav Klaus described a referendum as "something that, in my opinion, should be held once in a generation" (Pravo, 1996, 2)

63. One commentator attributes this preference to ODS leader Václav Klaus's fear of "the concentration of power in the hands of [local governors]" (Machacek, 1993).

64. Of the thirty-one ODS deputies who later left the party to establish the Freedom Union (US), twenty-five (80%) supported the regional reform; of the thirty-eight ODS deputies who remained in the party, only eighteen (47%) supported the reform.

65. Shortly after his election to the post of prime minister ČSSD Chair Miloš Zeman discussed offered the following remarks on the question of electoral reform: "I can imagine a majority electoral system and there would be nothing unconstitutional about it if the two strongest political parties, which together have 137 mandates [out of 200] in the Chamber of Deputies, agreed to jointly submit a certain constitutional bill"(Hospodarske noviny, 1998).

66. A follow-up survey conducted in the Czech Republic in 1996 just before Havel's illness showed a certain recovery in his perceived influence, nudging ahead of the media and the international organizations but still ranking well behind the other four (and just ahead of local government) (Krause, 1996b; University of Leiden, 1994).

67. The Slovak word "*zodpovednosť*," from the root "*odpoved*" or "answer," is translated most often as "responsibility" but can also be translated as "accountability," depending on the circumstances. There is no word which may be uniquely translated as "accountability." The same argument, incidentally, may be applied to the Czech language and the Czech word "*odpovědnost*."

68. In the conclusion of its report OKO adopts rhetoric reminiscent of the country's previous, communist regime. OKO "confirms all facts mentioned by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar regarding the activities of the SIS" and "condemns the groundless endeavor by Michal Kováč, president of the Slovak Republic, to criminalize Vladimír Mečiar, prime minister of the Slovak Republic"(Urban, 1995)

69. HZDS deputy Dušan Macuška, head of the parliamentary commission investigating the events of March 1994, explained that the constitutionality of a vote on no-confidence "depends on which methods led to that final result"(Sujova, 1995).

70. Three particular pardons angered the coalition most:

- On 1 December 1995 Kováč granted immunity from prosecution to Oskar Fegyveres, who had confessed involvement in the plot to kidnap Kováč's son, Michal Kováč, Jr., justifying it as necessary to obtain Fegyveres's testimony and solve the case.
- On 17 July 1996 Kováč granted immunity to two Slovak citizens who, along with Kováč, Jr., were under police investigation for fraud involving Slovakia's Technopol corporation, justifying it as necessary to allow the two to travel and to testify in a concurrent investigation of the Technopol trial underway in Germany.
- On 12 December 1997, Kováč broadened the immunity to include all those investigated in the Technopol case, including his own son, explaining that "in the five years since investigations began, the authorities have failed to gather evidence that would make it possible to bring the case to trial"(RFE/RL Newslines, 1997)

71. As late as 1997, representative of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) in the city of Banská Bystrica, the third largest city in Slovakia, found it necessary to solicit donations from individual donors abroad to help the local party organization raise money for the purchase of a single second-hand personal computer for the party's office.

72. These results are based on a compilation of statistics reported in the first fourteen issues of *Parliamentní Zpravodaj* spanning the period between the 25th session of the

Czech Parliament that took place in December 1994 and the 43rd session that took place in April 1996. Due to printing errors, the calculations do not include several votes on major legislative packages taken during the 34th session of parliament that took place in September of 1995. These statistics record only the number of deputies present and the number voting in favor and do not permit distinctions between "no" votes, "abstention," and "present but not voting." Accordingly, the cohesion figures used here record all three of these options as "no." A close look at the limited number of votes for which this more extensive breakdown is available suggests that these distinctions are important only in a very limited number of cases. The level of cohesion on any given vote is measured as the larger of two figures: the share of party deputies voting in favor of a measure, or the share of present deputies who did not vote in favor of the measure.

73. This calculation in may overstate the case to some extent, since the calculation of unanimity includes those cases where no party members were present for a vote. This phenomenon, however, remained largely confined to the Czech Republic's Republican Party which maintained an extremely low level of attendance during the period in question. Excluding this party from the calculations does not significantly change the overall results, however, dropping the share of unanimous votes only from 0.64 to 0.61.

74. The Department of Information and Analysis of the Slovak Parliament did maintain a database of roll call votes, but leaders of the majority coalition repeatedly rejected the requests of the director of that department for permission to open the database to scholars.

75. For the other coalition, a caretaker government charged with holding power until pre-term elections, political leaders deliberately sought a non-partisan figure to hold the premiership.

76. It should be noted that Jozef Moravčík, who headed the government between March of 1994 and December of 1994, did not become the chair of his party until *after* his selection as premier.

77. From 1990 until 1997 the Hungarian coalition is counted here as two parties on the basis of the existence of separate parliamentary party groups for the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM) and Coexistence (ESWS). Given the close cooperation and near unanimity of these parties, however, it would also be consistent with Sartori's principles to count them as a single party.

78. The number of parties for this period includes only one of the two splinter parties of the Left Bloc, though it would also be consistent with Sartori's principles to count both parties.

79. This method is not wholly free of the need for judgements, however, since it can be applied both to the share of party seats in parliament and the share of support from the mass public. In accord with this chapter's focus on parties in parliament, it uses the parliamentary data, but the results from the two different sources differ little, especially in the period between mid-1992 and mid-1996 in Slovakia during which both sources of data in both countries show steady but slow increase. The public opinion data also yields similar overall measures of party size, with the Slovak system consistently remaining 0.75 to 1.25 higher than its Czech counterpart, with both countries consistently exceeding the Mainwaring and Scully baseline for extreme pluralism. The choice made here to use party groups instead of mass-opinion reflects the parliamentary perspective of this chapter and the notion that the number of party groups within a legislative body may play an important role.

80. Polarization is measured by a variation of the measure devised by Huber:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N f_i |x_i - \bar{x}|$$

where f_i is the percentage of survey respondents announcing their intention to vote for party i , x_i is the mean left-right score of supporters of party i on the factor in question, and \bar{x} is the left-right score of the population mean (Knutson, 1998). For the sake of comparison, f_i is adjusted here to reflect the percentage of major party supporters rather than the percentage of all survey respondents.

81. Outside of the Slovak and Czech communist parties, only two major parties in each country could claim to have existed before 1989. In the Czech Republic, the Christian Democratic Union-Czech Peoples Party (KDU-ČSL) inherited the organizational apparatus and membership base of the Czech People's Party (ČSL), a party originally founded in 1918 through the merger of several smaller Roman Catholic parties and later forcibly incorporated into the Communist-era political party system and transformed into a compliant satellite party until the return to democracy in 1989 when it reclaimed its Christian Democratic roots and merged with the Christian Democratic Union (KDU). In Slovakia, similar circumstances affected the Democratic Party (DS), which was founded in 1944 as part of efforts to liberate Slovakia from Nazi occupation and part of which later functioned as a satellite party during the Communist era as the Party of Slovak Revival (SSO). In 1989 the party changed its name back to the Democratic Party.

Two other parties claimed the mantle of previously existing parties, but without the same degree of organizational continuity. The Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), established in 1989, characterized itself as heir of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party that was founded in 1878 and disappeared as the result of a forced merger with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) in 1948. Likewise, the Slovak National Party (SNS) identified itself with the Slovak National Party founded in 1871 and dissolved by the Hungarian government in 1914, though no formal connection existed beyond the party name.

82. These levels are considerably higher than Hungary's average of 23% and Poland's average 15% in the same survey [Check NBD] but rather lower than countries in Southern Europe and comparable to countries such as Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Brazil that fall in the bottom half of Latin American surveys.

83. The split of the KSCM parliamentary party group in 1993 raises certain difficulties in calculating loyalty. Figure 6.8 displays all options. The 'KSCM and LB' option treats the two splinters as a single party, while the 'KSCM alone' and 'LB alone' looks only at the individual parties. In practice, the split only creates a difference on the two CEU surveys conducted in 1994. By 1995 most supporters of the original coalition had opted for KSCM.XXX

84. These measurements understate overall membership to the extent that they do not address the membership of small parties, though those parties would likely add little to the total. They also contain the potential for overstatement to the extent that parties may have some incentive to inflate their importance by artificially raising membership numbers.

85. Mesenikov's figure of 35,000 members for the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM) is likely an overstatement since it is thought to include those

sympathetic to the party as well as dues-paying members. The same may be true of Mesenikov's figure of 20,000 members for ZRS.

86. During most of the 1990's, HZDS explicitly refused to comment on its membership, but the party newspaper *Slovensko do toho!* did print five reports from district party organizations that included comments on membership. From these it is possible to make an estimation of total membership by weighting these membership numbers according to 1) the population of the district as a proportion of Slovakia's total population, or 2) the number of votes received by HZDS in the district in the previous election as a proportion of the total number of votes received by HZDS. These methods yield a range between 30,000 and 50,000.

87. In the cases of the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL) and the Communist Party (KSČM), it is apparent that the difference between the various estimations is at least in part a function of a continuing decline in membership from previously high levels held by the parties' predecessors, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) and the Czech People's Party (ČSL), respectively.

88. The CEU and AVČR surveys are used here because their frequency and the consistency of their questionnaires provides the best raw materials for comparisons over time and across borders. The results obtained here conform extremely closely in virtually every case with results obtained in surveys conducted in Slovakia by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic and the survey firm FOCUS, as well as other surveys conducted in both countries by the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.

89. A steady trend toward increasing age among supporters of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) gave this party the distinction of the highest average age of supporters by 1996, but even with a continuation of the trend, the party would not approach the levels the Czech Republic's KSČM, whose support base was aging at nearly the same rate.

90. The populations of two countries include significant numbers of Roman Catholics along with smaller populations of adherents to various Protestant churches and, in Slovakia, Orthodox churches. Surveys showed little variation in party support among these denominations. Frequency of churchgoing captures the more politically salient differences between Christians and other theists on the one hand and agnostics and atheists on the other.

91. Other surveys suggest that this share was even higher--approaching 100%. Electoral results tend to confirm the higher estimates (Krivý, 1995).

92. Unlike many of their counterparts, the CEU surveys make a particular effort to identify respondents of Romany ethnicity, but there does not appear to be any strong relationship between the ethnic group and any particular political party in either country, with the possible exception of the parties of the Hungarian Coalition (MK) in Slovakia. This result echoes other findings that Romanies in Slovakia frequently identify themselves as Hungarian to escape stigma.

93. A full comparison is not available because the Czech Academy stopped conducting surveys in Slovakia shortly before the appearance of the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS).

94. The extremely large number of very small municipalities in Slovakia makes it difficult and unrewarding for parties to field candidates in every one. Over 1,200 of Slovakia's 2,800 municipalities had fewer than 500 inhabitants, and another 800 municipalities had between 500 and 1000 inhabitants. Most mayors and municipal council members in these smaller municipalities do not have party affiliation.

95. HZDS also distributed school supplies with this organizations' logo to children shortly before the 1998 elections (Sme, 1998a).

96. In rank orderings most KDU-ČSL deputies cited the party's leader as the second most important influence. With one exception, all those who mentioned the parliamentary party group at all ranked it after the party's executive and its leader.

97. Although the HZDS refused to acknowledge that it controlled *Slovenská republika*, a top party official tacitly acknowledged the relationship ("I won't say that it's not ours"). *Slovenská republika* was published during this period by Salus, s.r.o. a firm that was at the time "100 percent HZDS-owned"[] and was managed by the husband of a HZDS parliamentary deputy. The editor of the paper between 1992 and 1997, Jan Smolec, also served as a parliamentary deputy for HZDS. Between 1996 and 1998, HZDS may have also exerted a limiting influence on the daily *Národná obroda* through the paper's owner, VSZ, a firm with close ties to the HZDS leadership. Former editors of *Národná obroda* claim that they faced significant pressure to fire certain journalists and restrict their editorial criticism of the HZDS-led government (Fisher, 1996).

98. High-ranking HZDS members also played an important role in the ownership of VTV, a private television network with relatively small viewership limited to western Slovakia.

99. As Chapter 2 shows, the Slovak National Party (SNS) was able to use almost identical means to prevent the installation of Emil Spišák, a designated alternate for a vacated parliamentary seat who had in the meantime distanced himself from SNS.

100. The fact that in several of these cases expulsions came not from the national party but from the local party organizations of the offending members suggests either the tight control of local organizations from above or a less coercive but equally significant connection based upon devotion to Mečiar as party leader.

101. The party's own press materials show a strikingly close identification between the party and the leader. A book published by the party entitled "Five years of HZDS in photographs" offers a strong indication of Mečiar's role within the party. Of the book's 117 photographs, the party's chairman, Vladimír Mečiar, appears in 106. After Mečiar, the next most prominent party figure appears in only 6 photographs.

102. Political commentators suggested that the resignation came as much because of pressure surrounding his handling of coalition talks that resulted in the exclusion of the KDU-ČSL from the governing coalition for the first time since 1990.

103. The 1992 elections in the Czech Republic do not easily yield comparable preference vote statistics. In contrast to the case of Slovakia where nearly all party leaders campaigned for election to the Slovak National Council, many Czech party leaders instead campaigned for the federal parliament and therefore did not appear on the same electoral list as their intra-party rivals.

104. Negative scores on issue ownership reflect the predominance of "least likely" responses over "most likely." Since respondents were allowed to name three parties in the "most likely" and only one in the "least likely" category, ownership scores are several times more likely to be positive than negative.

105. Figure 11.1 uses the standard deviation of ownership scores on all issues to measure distinctiveness. An alternative method looks at the range between the highest and lowest issue ownership scores. The correlation between the results of these two indicators is extremely high.

106. The low values for several of these parties, especially the Democratic Union (DU) and the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) in Slovakia, and the Liberal Social Union (LSU) in the Czech Republic may reflect the slow process of emergence in the case of the former two and dissolution in the case of the latter. These parties during their transition periods did not attract the public eye as much as they did at other times, and they were therefore less likely to be mentioned either in a positive or a negative vein.

107. If Tóka is correct that there is a link between the prominence of a competitive dimension and the degree of issue ownership on that dimension, then the available results offer further confirmation of the difference between the competitiveness of issue dimensions in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Table 7.8 indicates high levels of issue ownership on economic and socio-economic issues in the Czech Republic but relatively low levels for ownership of the same issues in Slovakia. By contrast, Slovak parties exhibit higher issue ownership than Czechs on national issues.

108. The format of the CEU questions--allowing three parties "most likely" and only one "least likely" appears to artificially lower the score of the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). As the junior partner of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and similar to ODS in many ways, ODA received nearly the same number of "most likely" votes as ODS, but it was the larger and more prominent ODS that received nearly all of the mentions in the questionnaire's single "least likely" blank. The questionnaire also underestimates the programmatic crystallization of SPR-RSČ since it does not include any questions regarding the party's main programmatic focus: restrictions on immigrants and racial minorities. SPR-RSČ receives its highest ownership scores on the questions of decommunization--perhaps the second most prominent theme in the party's programmatic efforts--and patriotism.

In Slovakia, similar circumstances affect measurement of the programmatic sharpness of most parties. The Democratic Union (DU) exhibited few strong positives or negatives on economic issues because of its centrist positions. Furthermore, the questionnaire omits questions regarding use of authority that might have produced stronger positives. A hint of the party's actual issue ownership can be found in its consistently high ownership scores on "protecting freedom of speech." The Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) likewise received no strong scores on any issues other than economic issues, and on those issues it encountered the limits of the survey. As with ODS and ODA in the Czech Republic, Slovak respondents tended to allot their the single negative vote on pro-market economic issues to the larger and more established Party of the Democratic Left (SDL). For the Hungarian Coalition (MK), the absence of sharp profile reflects both the limitations of the survey and the limitations of the coalition itself. Although the survey asks a question about patriotism and another about Czech-Slovak relations, it does not ask about minority questions, an area where MK maintained perhaps the sharpest programmatic profile in Slovakia's entire party system. Outside of these issues, however, the survey shows little differentiation except on questions of religion. Within Slovakia's Hungarian population--the party's only voting base--the ownership

scores of MK are sharply positive for *all* issues, even though several of the listed goals were clearly in conflict with one another. On the 1995 CEU survey, for example, Hungarian respondents gave similarly high positive ownership scores to MK for both "reducing economic burden" and "increasing pensions" as well as for "helping private industry" and for "increasing pensions" and "speeding up privatization."

109. One more figure, Jan Čarnogúrsky, chair of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), also appeared from time to time among the top five on the FOCUS surveys but with much lower scores than the others mentioned here.

110. The response pattern among ODA also corresponds well to the patterns discussed above. Although 23% of ODA supporters mentioned party notables, nearly half of these mentioned an individual other than party leader Kalvoda. Although the coding of the data does not allow the identification of particular political leaders other than the party chair, the result is extremely consistent with the exceptional personal popularity of the party's most prominent minister, Dlouhý.

111. The Democratic Union's (DU) 12% is high in comparison the whole range, but this reflects the results of only a single survey.

112. Slovak parties received a one time post-election payment of 60 SK (approximately \$2 US) per vote and a small yearly subsidy for the maintenance of a parliamentary club. Czech Parties after 1995 received the slightly greater sum of 90 KC (approximately \$3 US) per vote along with small annual sums for those parties with deputies in parliament.

113. An inadvertent product of the scandals surrounding the Czech intelligence service (BIS) was the revelation by investigators assigned to the case that Minister of Agriculture and chair of the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL), Jozef Lux "vacuumed [vyluxoval--a pun referring to the name of both the minister and a common brand of vacuum cleaner] half of the Agriculture Ministry, where he wanted to install his friends," but even this claim suggests personal rather than political motives (Mlada Fronta Dnes, 1996).

114. The interview produced the following exchange between interviewer Vladimír Jancura and Gavornik:

[Jancura] Mr. Gavornik, are you thinking of writing a book about Slovak privatization?

[Gavornik] Do you mean memoirs? I would be dead before I could finish the first chapter!

[Jancura] Are you suggesting that the subject matter is so dangerous?

[Gavornik] Yes, it is. And what is really dangerous is to touch the people who really benefitted and who control some of the privatized companies. I know about them, of course.

[Jancura] Are there any high-ranking politicians among them? Anyway, this is common knowledge.

[Gavornik] Of course there are, and I know about them, but I won't tell. After all, why shouldn't they be? Every citizen has a right to take part in privatization. The problem is that they don't want to admit it. But that's another matter.

(Jancura, 1997)

115. Surveys of mass opinion, which the above discussions show to be close to elite opinion in every testable circumstance, provide another means for gauging the differences of political parties on this issue. The pattern that emerges in mass surveys is nearly identical to the results of the Leiden survey above. The party positions found in the

Leiden survey of elites correspond to a high degree ($r=.86$) to the positions of party supporters on similar questions asked in a May 1994 survey conducted by FOCUS.

116. Although no elite surveys are available for ZRS deputies, mass-level surveys show ZRS voters to be as tolerant--in some cases more tolerant--of accountability violations than SNS or HZDS.

117. The difference between the Republican Party's (SPR-RSČ) shift in position between the 1994 and 1996 surveys may be explained in part by the wording of the question. During the 1990's SPR-RSČ consistently expressed sharp criticism of what it called the "*cikánská* [both "gypsy" and "deceitful"] *vláda*, and its deputies might therefore be more likely to agree with a statement calling for subjection of government to law. The 1996 question omits the question of government and simply asks deputies to choose between the priorities of abiding by law and achieving positive results.

118. Mečiar's complete disappearance during the three days following the 1998 parliamentary election and his unusual behavior in televised farewell interview during which he sang lyrics from a traditional Slovak song, "With the Lord God, I leave you. I did not injure any of you" contrast sharply with his behavior after his widely predicted loss in the final round of Slovakia's 1999 presidential contest. After the 1999 defeat, Mečiar adopted a more conventional posture, appearing immediately in public and congratulating his opponent, Rudolf Šuster, on his victory.

119 Many of Mečiar's informal statements exhibited a similar attitude. In response to opposition criticism of wholesale personnel changes made during the second of the overnight parliamentary sessions of early November 1994, Mečiar responded by saying "The election is over. Get used to it."(Lesko, 1996, 126).

120. The article suggests that "It remains to be determined only whether the Czech public responds the same to "our Vašek [the familiar form of Klaus's first name]" the way they do in Slovakia to "our Vlado [the familiar form of Mečiar's first name]"(Kramer, 1997, 4).

121. The links between the two appear to extend beyond outward appearances. In 1998, Mečiar tacitly endorsed Klaus in the Czech Republic's 1998 parliamentary election campaign (TASR, 1998e). In 1999, Klaus tacitly endorsed Mečiar's campaign for Slovakia's presidency (CTK, 1998) and later acknowledged his respect for Mečiar as "an immensely capable politician, one who simply rationally plays his political game"(Lidove noviny, 1998).

122. Lýdia Forrová, manager of the HZDS office in the regional town of Nitra noted that "Mečiar could recall every time he had ever met her" and described his capacity for generating deep personal loyalty among those who worked for him (Forrova, 1996).

123. Although Kusy's work represents one of the most systematic attempts to identify the differences, it contains several significant limitations. In particular, Kusy's work uses of electoral results to make conclusions about public opinion, largely overlooking the complicated interaction between opinion and party support.

124. The results produced by original data file of the T&M study differ from the published results. Although the two sets of results are similar, the data file yields slightly larger differences between Slovaks and Czechs and does not show Slovaks to be more likely than Czechs to join these three types of organization.

125. NBD questions about preference for "single-party rule" produce answers almost identical to those regarding "a return to communist rule." Overall levels of support for one party rule remained extremely low in both countries, and difference between the two countries ranged between six and fourteen percentage points, averaging nine percentage points over the five surveys.

126. In 1991 the question was posed only to those who had previously responded that dissolution of parliament "could happen" or was "very likely." In 1992 the question was asked to all respondents.

127. It is important to note that in the run-up to the 1994 parliamentary elections, FOCUS consistently over-estimated the electoral strength of liberal parties. The 1992 and 1994 FOCUS results may contain a similar degree of under-estimation of majoritarian views. Yet even if fully present, neither of these factors would change the overall result by more than a few percentage points.

128. Slovakia's Gini index is the lowest of any country listed in the World Bank statistics. Because the statistics use 1992 data for Slovakia, this may conceal a growth in inequality during the subsequent period of intensive privatization.

129. The Czech Republics extremely low unemployment--averaging just over three percent between 1990 and 1997, remains without an comprehensive explanation, though hypotheses include the easy geographical access of Czech workers to German labor markets and a low level of bankruptcies and their attendant layoffs (Svejnar & Dyba, 1995).

130. Although these results do not directly contradict the findings of Przeworski et al regarding the correlation between the positive relationship between economic performance and democracy, they do reemphasize the important conclusion that similarities in economic performance alone will not necessarily lead to similarity in outcomes. A comparison between GDP and Freedom House scores for rule of law and democracy shows Slovakia to be a significant outlier.

131 Although it could be argued that these figures do not reflect anything more than selective memory on the part of Slovaks or Czechs, the argument would be largely irrelevant since in this case it is perceptions rather than the facts of the case that shape political opinions. Furthermore, a survey conducted in 1986 by the state Institute for Research on Public Opinion (IVVM) suggests that the retrospective results found by the OSC survey correspond closely to actual opinions held during the Communist era. The 1986 IVVM survey asked Slovak and Czech respondents to report whether they had experienced positive changes in a number of expenditure categories including food, clothing, housing and health care. Although the categories used in the two surveys were not identical, they are sufficiently similar to allow for comparison. As Figure 11.0 indicates, the retrospective claims of Slovaks and Czechs for 1988 correspond very closely to what Slovaks and Czechs actually did feel in 1986, suggesting that the differences cited above are more than simply artifacts of memory..

The question of the validity of surveys conducted within a communist regime that sharply restricted freedom of expression and punished relatively minor expressions of dissatisfaction is, of course, a relevant detail. Vaněk notes that great care must be used when dealing with surveys taken during the communist era but he also argues that such survey results can be extremely useful when used correctly. He suggests that the information content of such surveys lies not in the actual percentage of "yes" and "no" responses, but rather in "developmental trends in specific thematic areas"(Vanek, 1994).

The investigation here circumvents the question of absolute levels by addressing only the relative differences between Slovak and Czech, though the validity of such comparisons rests on the assumption that inhabitants of one republic are not systematically more likely to conceal their preferences of the other.

132. For both countries, the measures for "previous twelve months" and "next twelve months" move in almost perfect parallel lines, reflecting the finding noted elsewhere that respondents have a strong tendency to base their expectations on their recent experience.

133. A CEU question on increasing the speed of privatization, for example, shows a dramatic narrowing over time. A question asked in 1995 by the T&M survey similarly finds Slovaks more likely than Czechs to believe that privatization "is carried out to a smaller extent than necessary and is taking too long." While Czechs on average showed a greater preference for private sector ownership of firms, the Czech Republic's more rapid program of privatization was apparently quicker to produce a wave of backlash than was Slovakia's much slower program, which left many Slovaks willing to accept a somewhat faster pace.

134 A 1992 FOCUS survey found a difference of only two percentage points between the means of Slovaks and Czechs on whether "Those who are able to do really good work should have much higher income than others," while a FOCUS 1994 survey found 15 percentage point difference in means using the precise the phrasing of the aforementioned AVCR question on differences in wages and salaries. The 1993 OSC survey found a moderate (6 percentage point) difference on the statement that "People should have the right to earn what ever they can, even if it means that they will be very rich" and a lower difference (two percentage points) on whether "those who work hard deserve more compensation." In 1995, the T&M study again found a moderate(seven percentage point) difference on a question about whether "most of today's social inequalities in our country are just or unjust."

135. It is interesting to note that within the Czech Republic samples, Moravia retains a certain amount of distinctiveness. According to the CEU surveys, the mean level of church attendance in Moravia remained consistently four to eight percentage points higher than in the Bohemia though still 19 to 24 percentage points lower than in Slovakia.

136. These figures sum to more than 100% because they are derived from two independently asked questions and a small but significant proportion of those sampled responded affirmatively on both.

137. On this question difference between Bohemians and Moravians all but disappeared, averaging less than three percentage points. Differences between Moravians and Slovaks on this question averaged nine points.

138. During the July 1996 "Conference on Czechoslovakia's Dissolution" Petr Pithart described a heated debate between Slovak and Czech negotiators over the meaning and practical implications of the similar but not identical meanings of the words "zvrchovanost" and "suverenita."

139. Here I deliberately omit from consideration an additional option offered to respondents in these surveys: a three-way federation which would separate the Bohemian and Moravian parts of the Czech lands into separate national republics. I omit this option here because it is more difficult to ascertain the why respondents might choose this option. Suggested in part as a method of preventing a series of one-one ties whenever

Slovaks and Czechs disagree, the addition of Moravia could be seen as a way of putting either Slovakia or Bohemia into the minority depending on whether the respondent expected the Moravians to side more often with the Slovaks or the Czechs.

140. The 1994 FOCUS survey shows Czechs to be overwhelmingly more likely than Slovaks to have changed their opinions toward separation from opposition to support (FOCUS, 1994).

141. Hungary and its external minorities are one of the primary models on which Brubaker constructs his model.

142. Because the surveys were conducted in late 1992 after the decision to divide Czechoslovakia but before the actual division, it is unclear whether to what extent these assessments include Slovaks within the "national minority" category, a phenomenon that would have produced an abnormally high level of "yes" responses relative to later surveys.

143. The fact that inclusion or omission of just two questions can substantially change the array of factors calls attention to the limits of factor analysis. The groupings that such analysis yields may be used for convenience but must not become reified.

144. The data for 1992 and 1994 yield three relatively strong factors for the Czech Republic. The data for 1993 and 1996 yield four factors, but in each case two of these four factors register weakly.

145. The questions comprising factors tended to bear similarly high weight. Calculations based on the synthetic factors do not differ markedly from calculations based on the actual factor scores.

146. The concept of competitive dimensions remains a complex and disputed term and is outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, there exists a close relationship between the issues on which voters evaluate parties and dimensions of competition at the political party level. Two surveys of Czech party elites show correlations between party leaders and party supporters at levels of $r=0.99$ and $r=1.00$ on virtually every measurement used in this paper. Attempts to replicate these surveys in Slovakia proved impossible because certain parties refused to participate, but similarities between party statements and party supporters' opinions suggest an equally high degree of correlation (Krause, 1998b).

147. Several of the CEU surveys include questions that ask respondents to identify the most important problem in their respective countries and to identify the parties that are most capable of resolving those problems, but these do not ask respondents to weigh issues against one another. It is also notable that there is only a moderate correlation (between $r=0.55$ and $r=0.65$ in both countries) between the party that respondents believe to be most effective in solving what they state to be the most important problem and the party to which they would give their vote.

148. As Table 9.3 shows, calculations of raw dispersion for particular factors yield no clear pattern, but this reflects wide differences in the dispersion of the population as a whole on those factors. The category of relative dispersion, which factors out differences in the population dispersion, produces considerably stronger patterns.

149. A closer look at individual party scores on the religion and nation factors shows a narrow range of opinion for all parties except one outlier. In the case of religion this

outlier party is the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL). In the case of the nation factor the outlier is the Republican Party (SPR-RSČ). These results closely correspond to what Kitschelt et al find in their study of Czech elites and refer to as "market niches"(Kitschelt et al., 1997, 207).

150. Although the outlying placement of Slovakia's Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) resembles the "market niche" position of its counterpart in the Czech Republic, party positions on Slovakia's religion factor are broader and more evenly distributed.

151. Thermometer scores can be translated into spatial arrangements using numerous variants of factor analysis and multi-dimensional scaling. For the sake of consistency with previous sections of this paper, the results used here are the products of factor analysis with varimax rotation and the number of factors held constant at 1.0. These results correlate extremely closely with the result of multi-dimensional scaling for the same data sets.

152. Thermometer scores from surveys by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and FOCUS overwhelmingly confirm the Central European University (CEU) studies' placement of parties on the main competitive dimension, correlating with the CEU results at levels between $r=0.98$ and $r=1.00$.

153. Both Slovakia and the Czech Republic show evidence of a rebound effect among secondary factors. A close look at the individual party scores indicates that this rebound effect is caused not so much by the re-emergence of these other factors as by the realignment of party supporters' positions on these other factors. In the Czech Republic, the movement of parties relative to one another on the nation factor is greater than their movement on the economy and transition factors, bringing the nation factor into a closer approximation with the economy and transition factors. The rebound of the economy and transition factors in Slovakia largely reflects the appearance of two new parties at opposite ends of the main competitive dimension that also held sharply opposing views not only on nation and democracy questions but also on economy and transition questions.

154. Correlation between party supporters' positions on the religion factor and their support for "Removing former communist party members from positions of influence" averages $r=0.78$ in Slovakia but only $r=0.54$ in the Czech Republic, suggesting a weaker tie between religious issues and anti-communism among Czechs.

155. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) attempted to capitalize on this difference by reprinting and circulating a political cartoon showing the chair of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), Ján Čarnogúrsky in bed with Peter Weiss, chair of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ). The cartoon shows Čarnogúrsky holding a bible and a rosary underneath a blue-tinted picture of the Virgin Mary while Weiss reads *Capital* under a red-tinted picture of Vladimír Lenin.

156. In its more specific aspects, this set of differences between Slovakia and the Czech Republic does not provide an explanation with a necessary connection to deep underlying factors. Since religion played little role in the support for or opposition to accountability, it is not difficult to envision a hypothetical anti-accountability coalition in Slovakia with a wide and disruptive spread of party opinions.

157. By 1996 HZDS tended to attract a slightly higher than average share of those with a positive financial outlook, though this may reflect a certain degree of loyalty by HZDS

supporters to the economic policies of their chosen party.

158. Surveys conducted before 1994 tend to identify supporters of the Slovak National Party (SNS) as marginally pro-market, whereas surveys conducted later show a shift toward the center.

159. The expectations of Czech voters and party leaders that parties would form alliances based on economic positions was confirmed in 1998 by the widespread surprise that greeted even the opposition agreement between the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), parties with similar political goals but significantly different economic programs.

160. This section uses an accountability measurement based on the accountability₁ factor but excluding a question comparing plurality and democracy to "solidarity and the unity of the nation" in light of its similarity to other national question. The national measure used here consists of questions regarding respondents views about the split of Czechoslovakia, the right of the majority to dictate rules for the minority, the desirability of Hungarians as neighbors, and trust in the European Union.

161.. To note that these clusters hold together from a conceptual standpoint is not to say that these other arrangements could not have emerged. Indeed other clusters did emerge, especially between 1992 and early 1994. During this period, the Slovak National Party (SNS) combined a strong preference for Slovakia's independence, with a neutral or even favorable attitude toward the European Union, NATO and foreign investment. HZDS echoed SNS in these positions, though at a more moderate level. SDL in the same period held positions opposite to these. Only during 1994 did SNS and HZDS begin to combine their preference for Slovakia's independence with an opposition to various forms of integration and a sharper criticism of both Slovakia's Hungarians and those Slovaks who were perceived as unpatriotic. And only during this period did the other Slovak parties begin to converge in their more favorable attitudes toward the outside world and, to some degree, toward Slovakia's Hungarians. After 1994 the process of alignment gained momentum and had by 1998 produced two relatively homogenous clusters of national issue positions within the Slovak party sphere to stand alongside the already well defined cluster formed by the Hungarian parties.

162. Although questions about Romania did enter the political debate, only a single party--the Republican Party (SPR-RSC)--adopted a distinct stand on the issue.

163. The 1994 FOCUS survey shows a significant positive relationship between accountability₁ and a favorable view of pre-1989 conditions, but the 1995 T&M survey shows no relationship at all between accountability₂ and attitudes toward lustration of former-communist party officials

164. A 1994 FOCUS survey question asking respondents to evaluate the activity of the Communist Party before November 1989 found extremely similar results. The survey found HZDS supporters to be slightly more likely than the mean to give a favorable evaluation of the Communist Party, but the difference was extremely small, and with the exception of the Hungarian Coalition (MK), HZDS supporters stood closer to the mean than supporters of any other party.

165. Certain indicators of accountability attitudes in Slovakia fail to show any urban-rural gap at all. Correlation between the Accountability₁ factor and the size of respondents' municipalities is statistically significant on a CEU survey conducted in 1994, but not on

any of the four FOCUS surveys conducted between 1993 and 1995. To some extent the absence of a clear relationship is a statistical artifact, the results of particular settlement patterns among Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian population. As Krivý notes, Slovakia's Hungarians deviated from the pattern noted by Šimecka in that they were both more in favor of accountability than the average resident of Slovakia and more likely to live in rural areas (Krivý, 1995). Leaving aside the Hungarian population yields stronger relationships. Both the 1994 CEU survey and the May 1994 FOCUS survey find relationships between the accountability¹ factor and municipality size that are significant at a level of $p > .01$, and two of the three other FOCUS surveys yield relationships significant at a level of $p > .05$. But these relationships, although they are statistically significant, are not particularly large. In the 1994 FOCUS survey--the survey exhibiting the strongest relationship--the level of support for accountability¹ among inhabitants of villages with fewer than 5,000 residents differed by only six percentage points from the level of support among inhabitants of cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. On other surveys the difference between urban rural areas was even smaller. By contrast, the difference between opposition and coalition party supporters stood at twenty-eight percentage points.

166. The otherwise parallel 1994 FOCUS surveys of Slovakia and the Czech Republic use different categories of municipality size, making a direct comparison impossible.

167. In fact it is mathematically impossible for the Hungarian minority alone to produce the accountability gap between coalition and opposition party supporters, even if all Hungarians stood at the pro-accountability extreme and all Slovaks stood at the anti-accountability extreme.

168. While not weighing in explicitly on this topic, Elster, Offe and Preuss do suggest that in the case of Slovakia, "the identity oriented conception of social conflict has discouraged the political parties from associating themselves with particular socio-economic groups"(Elster et al., 1998).

169. A full test would require cases that exhibited differences in the either degree of socio-economic development and similar experiences of communism or in the degree of national conflict but not in both areas

170. Nor does the coincidence of Slovakia's national and accountability dimensions conform closely to Kitschelt's explanation based on the underlying willingness of voters and politicians to accept "uncertainty about the outcome of political decision making"(15). Generalized uncertainty is difficult to measure at either the mass or elite level, but chapter six indicates little correlation between uncertainty in economic expectations and opinions on either the national or the accountability issue dimension in Slovakia. Furthermore, the behavior of parties Slovakia clearly conflicts with Kitschelt's prediction--based on his uncertainty hypothesis--that "even oppressed ethnocultural minorities may supplement their call for self-determination with an authoritarian, collectivist conception of political choice"(15).

171. Consistent questions on other national issues are not available for this period.

172. It is conceivably possible to argue that to the extent that this worsening image contributed to negative evaluations of Slovakia by the European Union, NATO, and foreign investors, the coalition succeeded in using institutional mechanisms to keep Slovakia independent from these outside influences. It does not appear that any members of the coalition have made this argument, however, but editorialists from opposition

newspapers and other commentators have recognized the irony (Simecka, 1998).

173. Hofbauer, for example, though his vehemence and the sheer volume of his writing gives the impression that his writings represent his own opinions. According to Igor Zvach, editor of the HZDS newspaper *Slovensko do toho!*, Hofbauer's editorials often arrived at the newspaper's office unsolicited.

174. In response to the delivery of a protest note concerning actions taken by the coalition against Slovakia's president and certain opposition parties, the headline of the daily *Slovenska republika* reported that "Ambassadors delivered not a demarche but an informal aide-memoire" According to ambassadors who delivered the document it was, in fact, a demarche.

175. HZDS parliamentary deputy Dušan Slobodník, chairman of parliament's foreign affairs committee, responded to criticism of Slovakia's democracy by German chancellor Helmut Kohl by responding that "Mr. Kohl is not an expert on Slovakia."

176. Although it is difficult to compare this with other parties which do not produce equally regular or substantial publications, experience suggests that these ideas appear far more frequently in the documents of HZDS than among those of any other party.

177. *Slovakia Today*, the English language monthly of the government funded Slovak Information Agency reflects similar concerns, perhaps unwittingly. The headlines of the January and March 1996 issues proclaim, respectively, "We'll Make it" and "Not Anybody's Shadow Any Longer"

178. The article, entitled "xxx" went so far as to focus on the *Hungarian* component of the 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

179. Whereas the coalition focused on national themes--the area where it maintained the greatest credibility--to obscure its vulnerability on accountability issues, so the opposition focused on accountability themes to indict the coalition without attacking it directly on national issues where opposition parties were weaker.