To some extent this can be said of any polity. In democracies the need for cooperation among people who otherwise sharply disagree appears wherever there is more than one issue at stake and wherever those who agree on one issue do not agree on the o thers. A democratic system in which voters individually expressed their opinions on individual issues would, in theory at least, allow such cooperation to remain ad hoc. Political systems which use representatives elected for some period of time bring wi th them pressure toward institutionalizing cooperation among those who otherwise disagree. In parliamentary systems a majority of representatives must find some basis for agreement which allows other disagreements to be put aside, at least for awhile.

In democracies in this century--and particularly in the post-WWII period--the most prominent common grounds have been "left" and "right." The positions of "left" and "right" offered a rough unification of positions on a variety of social, economic a nd cultural and foreign policy issues, though the combination which defined "left" or "right" are not necessarily the same from one country to another or even in one country over time. Since the collapse of communist regimes in Europe eliminated much of the foreign-poli cy basis for these positions, the "left-right axis" has declined in importance as a basis of political competition. Politicians in western democracies have faced the task of re-orienting their politics or at least offering new explanations of how their parties differ from others. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, this question has proved particularly significant. The new parties there do not necessarily have the sort of "natural" partners and "natural" enemies that have emerged [end of page 169] over time in older democracies. Parties developing in Central and Eastern Europe ther e have faced not only the task of building an organization and an electoral base but also of finding a political identity, identifying the issues important to them and, for the fortunate ones, finding a workable basis on which to form a government.

Observers of Slovakia have puzzled at a series of "left-center-right" coalitions ranged against "left-center-right" oppositions, and it has become clear that common notions of "left" and "right" do not form the most important basis of political divis ions in the country. Just what does form the basis of that division, though, has remained unclear. In response, many Slovak political scientists have proposed dividing Slovak political parties into the categories of "standard" and "non-standard." Although an understandable response to a complex situation which does not fit convenient categories, this terminology is at best open to misinterpretation and is at worst an invitation for the simply normative misuse of the two terms. If Slovakia's political landscape is indeed best divided into "standard" and " non-standard" it is important to know what it is that the parties in each group have in common that separates them from the other group, to know what it means to be "standard." Identifying those differences may also allow a for a more appropriate set of labels which are less prone to misinte rpretation.

This paper seeks to help clarify Slovakia's political scene by identifying which conflicts are present in the Slovak political system and the degree to which those conflicts separate political parties from one another. The economic and cultural elem ents of "left" and "right" do exist within Slovakia's parties, but their ability to align governing coalitions and oppositions does not appear to be as strong as that of two other, related dimensions. The first of these dimensions involves both the foreign and domes tic policy aspects of creating an independent Slovak nation-state, a state in which one tenth of the population belongs to the Hungarian ethnic group. The second dimension concerns beliefs about how democracies can and should be governed. These two dimensions parallel one another quite closely and have provided Slovakia's parties with a common basis for forming governments.

Bases of Party Competition

One starting point for identifying the dimensions of party competition and cooperation in Slovakia is to look at sources of divisions within other party systems in other countries. The most frequent starting point for discussing political divisions, Seymour Martin Lipset's and Stein Rokkan's "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments," begins by asking the same questions posed here: "Which conflicts came first and which later? Which ones proved temporary and secondary? Which proved obdurate and pe rvasive? Which cut across each other and produced overlaps between allies and enemies, and which reinforced each other and tended to polarize the national citizenry?"(Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 1) In answering their questions they focus on "constellations of conflict lines within each polity" they call these "lines of cleavage" and identify four "critical" cleavages. These are "Owner-Worker," "State-Church," "Center-Periphery," and "Land-Industry"(Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 14). In Democracies, Arendt Lijphart seeks to identify "issue dimensions" which determine competition within party systems. He uses four categories similar to those of Lipset and Rokkan, though he recasts them as "Socioeconomic," "Religious," "Cultural-ethnic," [end of page 170] and "Urban-rural." To these he adds three more: "Regim e support," "Foreign Policy," and "Postmaterialism"(Lijphart, 1984, p. 128). Lijphart also offers several guidelines for identifying "the issue dimension of party systems"(Lijphart, 1984, p. 127). He recommends looking at "party platforms and manifestoes" but only in concert with "t he actual policies pursued by a party when it is in power"(Lijphart, 1984, pp. 127-8). He further limits his scope to differences which divide parties from one another (rather than those which cause internal division), to those which divide major parties, and to those which endure from election to election.

Herbert Kitschelt's 1992 article on "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe" makes an important contribution to this framework. The article was one of the first works to suggest that the party conflicts this region could not be under stood simply as a conflict between "left" and "right" and that the conflicts might be better understood by looking at more than one dimension. In the article, Kitschelt proposes "to distinguish three highly abstract dimensions along which political cleavages can be o rganized... These components are (1) rules specifying who is a player admitted to the institution, (2) rules of the game players are expected to follow, and (3) the assets players are endowed with in order to participate in the game"(Kitschelt, 1992, p. 11). These abstract dimensions of cleavages translate into practical terms as the conflict (1) between "inclusive" and "exclusive" definitions of citizenship, (2) between an "authoritarian position (favoring narrow scope of democracy and primarily hierarchical mode of collective decision making)" and a "'libertarian' alter native (broad scope/participatory mode)," and (3) between "proponents of a purely 'spontaneous' market allocation of resources" and "advocates of a political redistribution of resources"(Kitschelt, 1992, pp. 12-13). In a later work, Kitschelt rephrases this latter dimension as a conflict between "'liberal' positions" and "'populist' calls for redistribution or expropriation in favor of particular groups or social classes"(Kitschelt, 1995, pp.13-14). Kitschelt's categories overlap but do necessarily coincide with the divisions identified by Lipset and Rokkan and Lijphart.

Divisive on the Margins: Post-Materialist and Urban-Rural Issues

Two of the issue dimensions discussed by Lijphart have played a role in Slovakia's party system but have not emerged as decisive except among a small share of the population and a few individual politicians. Parties which represent post-materialist (specifically environmental and ecological) issues and rural constituencies exist and have even gained seats in parliament, but they have remained small and dependent on the support of larger parties.

Despite recent works by Inglehart and others that show "post-materialist" values such as participatory democracy and environmental protection do hold some weight in east central Europe and are represented by separate political parties, but at the sam e time these issues have not yet had a formative effect on Slovak politics. The Slovak Party of Greens (SZ) gained representation in the Slovak parliament in 1990. Two splinters of that original party--the Party of Greens in Slovakia (SZS) and the Slovak Green Alter native (SZA)--gained a small number parliamentary deputies in 1994 as part of coalition agreements. SZA gained a seat through an informal coalition with Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). SZS gained two seats as part of the left-oriented Common Choice (SV) coalition. With the exception of debate over the completion of [end of page 171] the Slovakia's Glabcikovo dam on the Danube River and which has now nearly disappeared from public view and occasional protests over the completion of new nuclear power plants, neither these parties nor their issues have come to pla y a major role as the basis of a main issue dimension. Rather, Slovakia's environmental parties have been pushed to the margins in part as a result of their own susceptibility to division over other issue dimensions. The two parties which emerged from the original Slovak Party spl it over the same questions of nation and state building which shape Slovakia's political scene as a whole. This split contributed to the failure of either green party to gain seats in parliament in 1992. With both parties now represented in parliament, the potential for coop eration on environmental issues continues to remain low because SZA sits with the governing coalition and SZS with the opposition.

The urban-rural dimension shows a similar pattern although with deeper roots and potentially more significant consequences for Slovakia's political future. Urban-rural issues have tended to remain on the margins of Slovak politics and have not been the overt subject of political divisions. Within interest groups representing municipalities there have been conflicts between the interests of those which are larger and more urban on the one hand and those which are smaller and more rural on the other. The size of the community has been a determining factor in many internal conflicts within the Association of Cities and Villages in Slovakia (ZMOS), an association which represents nearly all municipal governments in Slovakia. A separate interest group, the Union of Cities, has even emerged to offer ad ditional representation for larger municipalities (Malova & Krause, Forthcoming). Yet while these issues have divided municipalities and their respective interest groups, they have not had a particularly strong effect on political parties. When urban-rural questions have emerged at the h ighest levels of government, they have tended to reflect rather than shape party conflict. Parties disagreed strongly over proposals for new levels of territorial administration, but their disagreements did not concern the question of whether this organization should be directed more tow ard urban or toward rural areas. Rather, parties clashed over concerns over the number and purpose of new regional offices, the opportunities for party patronage, and concerns over the autonomy of Hungarian regions. Mayors have endorsed or opposed these plans largely along party lines. Likewis e, although HZDS leader Vladimir Meciar has made statements critical of Slovakia's largest city, Bratislava, in these instances his remarks have concerned not so much the city itself or its interests but the actions of the city's government which is led by members of the opposit ion KDH and Democratic Union (DU).

Urban-rural issues have entered the political party system directly in the form of agricultural-oriented parties, but to date their position has resembled that of the environmental parties. They remain small and divided by other issues. In 1994 th e Movement of Farmers (HP) gained a seat in parliament as part of SV coalition and the Peasant's Party of Slovakia (RSS) gained three seats in coalition with HZDS. Not only is their representation relatively small, therefore, but it is divided between coalition and opposition forces. Recent attempts by these to parties to combine their strength have been made more difficult by this division and the results of negotiations are not yet clear.

Divisive Sometimes: Religious and Socio-Economic Issues

Two other potential issue dimensions play more of a role in determining party competition and cooperation in Slovakia but only in certain spheres and among certain parties. Recent coalitions and oppositions have not been united on questions of relig ion or socio- economic [end of page 172] policy. With significant internal disagreements both either sides, it has also been difficult to differentiate opposition from coalition on the basis of these issues. In Slovakia in recent years these two groups of issues have shown a potential to divide rather than to unite. Their divisive capacity has been most significant for the trio of KDH, DU and SDL which briefly formed a government together in 1994 and which has since that time remained in the opposition.

Although the Roman Catholic church plays a prominent role in Slovak society, issues of religion have not emerged into the public realm with enough vehemence to shape Slovakia's politics. The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) has played an importa nt role in every Slovak parliament since 1990 and has at times championed various church-related issues including campaigns against abortion and pornography. It has also consistently pursued the restitution of Roman Catholic church property confiscated duri ng the communist period, and it has advocated greater freedom and support for private education at all levels. Yet the religious character of many of KDH's issue positions has inspired neither strong agreement nor strong discord. Issues of social morality, religious education or ch urch involvement in government have been solved or postponed in relative quiet. Nor have religious issues generally played a role in the encouraging political alliances. The parties with the most Catholic electorate have in fact frequently pursued and formed coalitions with far less Catholic parties rather than with one another. Since early 1994 KDH entered into coalition with the post-communist SDL and HZDS has entered into coalition with Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), a splinter from SDL. To the extent that religion has played a significant role under the most recent HZDS government, it has been as a source of struggle between the HZDS and KDH as each has accused the other of using and misleading the hierarchy and the followers of the church.

The issues that Lijphart describes as "Socioeconomic" and those that Kitschelt includes under the heading of "distribution" are similar enough to be considered together here. Unlike religious issues which frequently remain in the background, socioec onomic and distribution issues play a prominent role. This dimension, however, lacks clarity in the political realm and it has not proven sufficiently strong to cause parties which share similar socioeconomic views to overlook differences on other issues.

Since the largely successful marketization of Slovakia's economy which was undertaken in the early 1990's, the single most dominant socioeconomic issue in Slovakia has been the progress of privatization and the protection of workers from the negative effects of the process. More complicated than a simple "for" or "against" privatization, political debate has focused on the speed of the privatization process, the choice of firms to be privatized and the method of privatization. This mix of factors and the diffe rences in outcome depending on their combination has led to a series of apparent reversals by various parties. HZDS which campaigned against rapid privatization in 1992 and which privatized few major industries during most of its first term in office proceeded to privatize numerous of major concerns in its final days in office. Since 1994 HZDS has again pursued a mixed strategy of keeping certain "golden egg" industries in government hands while rapidly privatizing much of the remainder through direct sales, usually to management. SDL shared much of HZDS's [end of page 173] reluctance t oward privatization in 1992 but while in government coalition in 1994 it cooperated with KDH and DU to plan a program of coupon privatization. At the same time, however, the party also proposed a referendum on legislation which would allow the investigation of illegal sourc es of funds in already completed privatization agreements. Since 1994 SD has defended the coupon privatization method as at least better than the HZDS-led coalition's approach of giving long-term bonds to coupon holders and selling firms directly. The shift of SD 's position on privat ization in 1994 gave impetus for the candidacy of the ZRS which accused SDL of abandoning the interests of workers. Since late 1994, however, nearly all of the management buy-outs have occurred while the organ responsible--the Fund of National Property--has had as its chairman a mem ber of ZRS. KDH and DU have consistently endorsed more rapid privatization through the coupon methods used in Czech and Slovak Federal Republic after 1990, but even they compromised with SD to limit the scope of coupon privatization in 1994.

On other socioeconomic issues the political debate has been equally complicated. The establishment of a tripartite system of bargaining between labor unions, employer unions and the government has largely kept labor politics out of the political sph ere. Since 1994 the governing coalition represented in the tripartite system has always included a party with a self-proclaimed pro-labor orientation, but this has not prevented these successive government from resisting the wage and benefit demands organized labor. Des pite the presence of ZRS in its government, HZDS has actually received praise from otherwise unfavorably inclined western newspapers and analysts for its "tightfisted spending policy that has spurned labor's calls for higher wages"(King, 1996). At the same time, both of the governing c oalitions since 1994 have also engaged in the politically popular activity of raising pensions and promising improvements in health care.

The difficulty of attributing a distinctive "left" or "right" socioeconomic orientation to complicated economic strategies is certainly not unique to Slovakia, but the inconsistency between party claims and party actions, and the rapid changes which have occurred in both, make it difficult to draw a clear dimension of socioeconomic competition. One side of the spectrum is easier to trace than the other. KDH, DU and the small extra-parliamentary Democratic Party (DS) can make a fairly plausible claim to a position o n the "right" to the extent that this means pro-market policies and rejection of calls for broader, government-ensured economic security. Although not "proof" of these parties' socio-economic orientation, it is interesting to note that for KDH, DU and DS the opinions of party suppo rters also fall on the socio-economic "right." Slovakia's opinion research firm FOCUS has devised a measure of "economic orientation" based on answers to public opinion survey questions . The scale defines respondents as "liberal" if they respond positively to questions about rapid economic change, freedom of exchange, and capitalism as the best option for Slovakia's future economy (FOCUS, 1994, p. 97). A December 1994 FOCUS poll shows that although DU and KDH together attracted less than 30% of likely voters overall these same parties attracted over 60% of voters who fall into the "liberal" category (FOCUS, 1995). That this ratio was similar in a May 1994 poll suggests that the share of "liberal" support is rather stable over time (FOCUS, 1994).[end of page 174]

On the "left" positions are somewhat less clear. ZRS was elected in 1994 on the basis of pro-labor promises and opinion polls have consistently shown it to be on of the few parties in Slovakia with a marked socio-economic profile. The party's suppo rters consist largely of workers and the unemployed (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 1994). Yet the party has participated without substantial objection in a government which has not preferred employee-led privatization proposals to management-buy-outs and which has not shown particular largess to trade unions. SDL has not made quite this large a shift. It moved to some degree away from the economic "left" in its cooperation with DU and KDH during their coalition government though more recently it has attempted to recover much of the p olitical space on the left which was taken by ZRS in the 1994 election. Over the course of this period, however SDL has not received particularly strong support from within demographic groups commonly associated with the socio-economic left. A 1996 survey suggests that while SDL s upporters are more likely than average to be employed in state sector, they are less likely than the average Slovak to work in blue-collar jobs, to be dissatisfied with their financial situation, or to consider themselves "lower class."(MVK SRo, 1996).

The remaining parties on the Slovak political scene are harder to categorize on the socioeconomic dimension. HZDS representatives frequently refer to it as a "movement of the wide center," and in economic terms it has indeed engaged in activities ai med across the socio-economic spectrum. On one hand, the numerous management buy-outs approved by the Fund of National Property--on which HZDS appointees form a majority--hold the potential to create a small group of extremely wealthy property owners. On the other hand, having cancelled the "voucher" method of privatization, HZDS strongly supported and has since taken considerable credit for an SNS-proposed alternative which would deliver a guaranteed sum of SK 10,000 (approximately USD 330, well over one month's average wages) plus inte rest to all those who had subscribed to the initial coupon offer. The question of public support does not shed much additional light on the party's perceived socio-economic profile. Supporters of HZDS include a somewhat higher than average share of those with orientations id entified by FOCUS as "social market" and "socialist," but at the same time the party receives support across all class and occupational groups, with only a slightly higher level among blue-collar workers. Surveys show that HZDS receives consistent and markedly high support only with in the employment category of "retirees."

For Slovakia's ethnically oriented parties, economic issues have played a more marginal role. Neither the Hungarian coalition nor SNS has demonstrated a clear socio-economic profile in recent years except to the extent indicated by their participati on in or support for particular governments. The situation corresponds in general terms to Kitschelt's contention that, "[t]he political representation of an ethnic group coheres around issues of economic and political redistribution between ethnic groups. Ethn ic parties are internally divided, however, over economic reform because winners and losers within the same ethnicity clearly have different interests. Ethnic parties thus are likely to choose centrist economic stances"(Kitschelt, 1995, p. 25). Like leaders of HZDS, SNS representatives have suppo rted the government's privatization program on the grounds that, whichever hands may receive the benefits of privatization, they are at least not foreign hands. The 10% of Slovak citizens who are Hungarian also opt for representation of their national interests over that of their individual [end of page 175] socioeconomic interests and in the 1992 and 1994 election voted almost exclusively for Hungarian parties. The existence of four different Hungarian parties allows for more internal economic differentiation than Kitschelt's statement might suggest (Malova, 1995), but as long as the thr ee largest of parties remain willing to repeat their 1994 decision to form a broad electoral coalition and in the meantime compete against one another only for local elections, they stand to gain little from differentiating themselves on the basis of macro-level socio-economic policy.

Socio-economic issues do matter to politicians and voters in Slovakia but vague party positions, mismatches between rhetoric and policy, and frequent political reversals make it difficult at the policy level to identify a socio-economic profil e for many parties. This is particularly true for parties in the governing coalition of HZDS, SNS and ZRS and those in the Hungarian Coalition. The lack of clear profiles has been paralleled by a lack of major public socio-economic conflicts within those two coalitions. T he Hungarian parties have continued in close cooperation with one another and plan to cooperate in future electoral coalitions. HZDS, SNS and ZRS have cooperated even more closely, maintaining support for a coalition government and coming into public conflict on socio-economic issues only to the extent that each party has accused the others of seeking undue gain from particular privatization projects. The current opposition parties including KDH, DU and SDL have been out of power for approximately two years and during that time have not been burdened by the need to re concile rhetoric with policy. While in the opposition they have publicly differed in their socio-economic prescriptions and even sharpened in these differences. While party continued to engage in periodic consultation, they have not often succeeded in coordinating their opposition ef forts. Leaders within SDL have often repeated the sentiments expressed in 1995 by then-president of the party Peter Weiss who stated that SDL wanted "its own seat within the opposition"(Meseznikov, 1996, p. 21). A socio-economic issue dimension, and to some extent a parallel religious one, thus exists among the opposition while the coalition parties, though containing a similar socio-economic and religious mix of voters and elites, have not proven divisible by these same issues. The left-right dimension in Slovakia is a cross-cutting dimension that does not cut all the way across.

Divisive Always: The Slovak Nation and Democracy

The issue dimensions discussed above have shaped particular parties but have not had a decisive effect on the shape of the Slovak political scene or on the formation of coalitions and oppositions, especially after the 1992 election.. Crucial instead have been intertwined dimensions of state building which relate to who makes up the state and to how it is governed.

The first of these dimension actually includes several related issues which Lipset and Rokkan would likely consider under the heading of Center-Periphery, which Kitschelt would consider under the heading of "citizenship," and which Lijphart might div ide between Ethnic and Foreign Policy. One pole in each of these related issue dimensions has been occupied by parties which emphasize the "Slovak nation" as an important principle of political organization. Depending on the specific issue in question, the other po le has been occupied by a combination of Czechs, Slovak citizens of Hungarian ethnicity, and Slovaks who endorse rival principles of political organization which range from Czecho-Slovakia to autonomous [end of page 176] Hungarian regions, to the European Union and NATO. Certain parties have remained consiste ntly at one of these poles, while others have searched for a suitable middle ground. The mere fact that these conflicts are both politically divisive and capable of dividing parties in a consistent pattern offer initial signs that this dimension differs from those discussed above.< P> Signs of this issue dimension appeared in increasing levels after 1989 in the form of questions about the role of Slovakia within Czechoslovakia. Formally the issue is dead-- solved by the separation at the end of 1992--but the struggle over the spl it helped to clarify differences between parties and shape the way the Slovak party system would split over subsequent issues. On one side of the pre-election debate in 1992 stood the Slovak National Party (SNS) which had since 1990 advocated some form of Slovak independence and the small Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (SKDH) which split from KDH in 1991 largely over intensity of feeling on national issues. On the opposite side stood the Hungarian parties whose leaders and followers believed that their interests were better served as long as both Hungarians and Slovaks remained minority groups in the larger multi-ethnic state of Czechoslovakia. Near to this position stood several small parties consisting largely of Slovaks with a "Czechoslovak" orientation including the Civic Democratic Union (ODU) which contained many of the leaders of the former Public Against Violence (VPN), and a coalition between the Democratic Party (DS) and the Slovak branch of the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the only major party to campaign in both the Slovak and Czech republics.

In the campaign for the 1992 election the three largest parties sought to occupy territory in the middle ground on the question of future relations between the Czechs and Slovaks. All acknowledged the need for some revision of the then existing rela tionship, but they varied in their proposals and in their intensity of emphasis on the subject. SDL remained committed to a continuation of the Czecho-Slovak federation, but in its campaign it did not cooperate with its one-time sister party in the Czech Republic. Af ter the election the party parliamentary club went even further, narrowly voting to let party members vote their conscience on the potential separation of the two republics. KDH also campaigned for a continuation of federation and accused HZDS of wanting to split the country. Yet as prime mini ster of the Slovak Republic of the CSFR, Jan Carnogursky had in many ways sparked public debate over independence by weighing the possibility that Slovakia might enter the European Union with "its own star" on the flag. HZDS presented an even more ambiguous figure in the campaign, promising to resolve difficulties between Slovaks and Czechs but not specifying a particular method for their resolution. Through the tone of party statements, however, it acquired a reputation as a party which would take concrete and immediate measures to improve the positi on of the Slovak Republic vis-a-vis the Czech Republic, whether within the CSFR or in some other framework.

In the election HZDS won nearly half of the seats in the Slovak National Council. Meciar became Slovakia's premier and his negotiations with Czech premier Vaclav Klaus rapidly led to the separation of the two republics. The ambiguity of many major party positions during the campaign make it difficult to argue that the election revolved solely around Slovak independence, but in combination with other issues the election campaign and results did confirm the role of perceived "Slovak" interests as an influential dime nsion of political [end of page 177] conflict. Furthermore, although the specific question of independence was resolved shortly after the election, the issue had longer term effects. In 1992 HZDS had as its main asset an extremely popular party leader. With the break-up of Czechoslovakia the party also acquired a reputation as the party of Slovak independence, a reputation which contained strong negatives for some and strong positives for others. Along with SNS, HZDS became the most plausible representative of Slovak interests against those who might threaten them or allow them to be threa tened.

The 1992 elections sparked a wave of political migration as masses and elites moved across party lines to join those with similar beliefs. This has strengthened the national issue dimension. Conflict over the importance and method of defending spec ifically Slovak interests has emerged in a prominent but still vague foreign policy dimension concerning integration into European structures and a considerably sharper ethnic policy dimension which concerns the rights and responsibilities of Slovakia's Slovak and Hungar ian populations.

Several of Slovakia's parties have consistently supported Slovakia's integration into any and all international and Western European structures that would have it is a member. This group includes the parties of the Hungarian coalition and DS, the s ame parties which in 1992 had supported the continuation of a Czechoslovak federation. Only slightly more circumspect, KDH and DU have also encouraged integration into the European Union and NATO. SDL has likewise endorsed these steps, although unlike the other parties m entioned so far it does so without the whole-hearted endorsement of its membership, many of whom have little trust in the EU and even less in NATO. Among the parties of the HZDS-led coalition, ZRS and SNS have consistently questioned the wisdom of integration into NATO or the E U. HZDS, by contrast, has consistently endorsed integration, although its expressed reservations have increased over time. Although party leaders have repeatedly emphasized the party's intention to pursue NATO and EU membership, other party figures and the party-owned daily n ewspaper Slovenska Republika have often been harshly critical of these institutions. Like SDL, HZDS has given itself room to maneuver by stating that such decisions would depend on a vote of Slovakia's citizens in a referendum. A similar spectrum has emerged on the mo re immediate and concrete question of ratifying the basic treaty between Slovakia and Hungary which had been signed by the two countries' premiers in 1995. Only SNS unambiguously opposed this treaty though this party was joined a group of parliamentary deputies within HZDS and an other group from DU. Although the treaty had gained sufficient support between HZDS and members of the opposition, HZDS leaders refrained from bringing the issue to a vote until they had secured sufficient support from within their own coalition. They did not accomplish this task until early 1996, receiving the support of SNS in exchange for amendments to the criminal code which criminalized the spreading of false information about Slovakia abroad.

Although on these questions of integration the dividing line between support and opposition often runs between HZDS and its own coalition partners, the placement of parties along a spectrum of support for integration nevertheless resembles the spectr um of party support for the preservation of Czechoslovakia. From Hungarian parties and DS on one extreme, the spectrum includes more moderate support by KDH and SDL, mixed signals from HZDS and rejection by SNS. The two parties which came into existence after the breakup of [end of page 178] Czechoslovakia reflect their to some degree their party of origin on these questions. DU which emerged from SNS and HZDS supports integration but is more likely to express reservations than SDL or KDH. ZRS which emerged from SDL differs from its parent party by expres sing the same doubts at the elite level that the membership of both ZRS and SDL express at the mass level. Although by no means a perfect representation of Slovakia's political scene, the spectrum on this issue dimension is the first to be discussed so far in which th e proximity of parties to one another corresponds approximately to the parties' actual coalition-forming decisions.

A further, if minor, aspect of European integration helps to shed additional light on the dimensions of Slovakia's political scene. One explanation of the terminology "standard" and "non-standard" to describe the current cleavage in Slovakia stems f rom observations about the willingness of the parties themselves to become integrated into the European political spectrum. Slovak political scientists note that while KDH, DU, SDL and the parties of the Hungarian Coalition have all at least applied for membership in an international party organization, the other major Slovak parties--HZDS, SNS and ZRS--had not. In one way, this dichotomy is a weak one since ZRS does indeed cooperate with "workers'" parties outside of Slovakia and since for SNS the question of becoming "standard" by joining a Europe-wid e organization is complicated by the non-existence of such an organization. Although national parties analogous to SNS exist throughout europe, they are by their very nature less likely to form a strong international organization. In another sense, however, Slovakia's "non-st andard"--i.e. unaffiliated--parties themselves this aspect of their "non-standard-ness" and embrace it as part of their appeal. Like affiliated parties which offer their international membership as evidence of their legitimacy as parties and their European orientation, the unaffiliated par ties cite their lack of affiliation as a sign of their independence and their commitment to Slovak interests over the interests of Europe as a whole. To the extent that "standard" means "affiliated," the terminology therefore corresponds roughly to the position of parties on European integratio n and reflects the foreign policy dimension of Slovak politics.

Closely related to the foreign policy dimension are questions of ethnicity and citizenship. These have remained the Slovak Republic's most durable and heated political themes since the separation of Czechoslovakia. The relative positions of parties on the dimension of minority policy closely resembles their relative positions on the question of integration. The actual location and grouping of the parties is a bit different however. A look at party statements and party voting in parliaments suggests the existence o f three distinct groups distinguished by their understanding of the proper relative status of the Hungarian and Slovak nations within Slovakia. At one pole, the parties of the Hungarian Coalition understand Slovakia's population in national terms and believe that the Hungarian and Slovak nat ions should function as largely equal partners. The seek conditions for Slovakia's Hungarians which are analogous to those enjoyed by Slovakia's Slovaks. These include the right to sue their native language in schools, offices and other settings, along with equal distribution of resou rces and some degree of administrative or cultural autonomy. Least sympathetic to this position are the parties of the current governing coalition, especially SNS and a segment of HZDS which, although they repeatedly emphasize the "civic" nature of their position also emphasize Slovaks as the "statotvorny narod" or "state-forming nation" of Slovakia (Krause, 1996). While not [end of page 179] excluding minority rights, this concept categorizes Hungarians together with Slovakia's other, much smaller minorities and identifies minority rights as something granted by the "state-forming" Slovaks. Acco rdingly, the governing parties have pursued policies which allow the use of the Hungarian language in many spheres but which also require that all citizens of Slovakia master the Slovak language and use it in official settings. They have also implemented a territorial redistricting pl an which reduces the extent of administrative districts where Hungarians form a majority (Krivy, 1996, p. 267).

Between these two poles stand KDH, SDL and DU, which differ from the others mainly in their reluctance to call any attention to minority issues or national identity. in their programs and public statements they reject "national" solutions and offer various formulations for balancing the rights of Slovaks and Hungarians as citizens. In practice, however, they often appear reluctant to take any position at all. The Slovak Language Act (c. 270/1995 Z.z.) offers a crucial example. Hungarian parties rejected the proposal as infringing on the rights of Hungarians. Deputies of KDH abstained. Most of those representing DU and SDL after vocal protest against the law proceeded to vote in favor of it (Sujova, Kovacic, & Samel, 1995).

The Hungarian question is the first issue dimension discussed so far which might be called a "cleavage" in the strict sense of the concept used by Lipset and Rokkan to describe a political conflict based on deep social division. At the Slovakia-wide level, the "cleavage" aspect is in once sense marginal since it directly isolates only one tenth of the population. But to the extent that the issue of how to consider the Hungarian population in slovakia has also sown an ability to divide Slovak parties, this dimension plays a very significant role. The threefold division of party positions created by this issue dimension provides perhaps the best map for understanding coalition-formation in Slovakia since 1992 and especially since 1994. while in government in 1994 the coalition of DU, KDH and SDL accepted the si lent support of the Hungarian Coalition but never invited its formal, equal participation in government. Since returning to the opposition DU, KDH and SDL have engaged in a mix of cooperation and coalition with the Hungarian parties. On the other side of the spectrum, HZDS formed th e first of its coalition governments with the strongly pro-Slovak SNS. When in need of an additional coalition partner after the 1994 elections, HZDS and SNS found one in ZRS, a party marked by a wariness of foreign--if not specifically Hungarian--intentions. This, however, was not the only reason that ZRS appeared to be a particularly eligible coalition partner. Other factors can be found in a final, equally visible issue dimension.

The last issue dimension in Slovakia is the hardest to define because it is least related to particular political issues and most related to the political system itself. It is probably much too simple to suggest that this dimension reflects a confli ct between democracy and authoritarianism or even support or opposition to a democratic regime. More correct would be to argue that the conflict concerns limits on how political power gained and used in Slovakia's democracy. The conflict exists at both the level of party el ites and that of party supporters, and it pits the HZDS, SNS and ZRS against former governing coalition partners SDL, KDH and DU along with the parties of the Hungarian coalition.

Slovak parties frequently differentiate themselves from other parties by pointing out how others violate democratic principles and attempt to use power for party or personal interests. Until the summer of 1996 when HZDS, SNS and ZRS engaged in mutua l recriminations, these [end of page 180] accusations of "undemocratic methods were rarely used by parties against fellow members of a coalition or opposition, even when there were sharp intra-coalition or intra-opposition on other issues. The accusations made by coalition and opposition p arties against parties of the opposite side have frequently been quite specific and range from simple arrogance of power to fraud and criminal activity. Each accusation is met with counter-accusations, and in the constant conflict over which side is truly democratic, both sides claim the same high ground. While it is easy to assert that it one side is more willing to put specific interests over democratic principles, it is extremely difficult to offer satisfying evidence which is not subject to counter-charges from those accused. A careful examination of the sp ecific allegations would help this process but it is far beyond the scope of this work. A survey of party elites on their understanding of democracy would also help but none are yet available for Slovakia. Since party leaders are all usually very careful in public statements to praise democracy no matter what their actual intentions might be, it is necessary to look for indirect indicators which are less subject to denial or counter-charges. On this particular issue dimension, to understand the way in which parties understand. One such source is the attitudes of party supporters, w ho have less incentive to hide their actual understanding of democracy. If party support can be taken as a sign of satisfaction with party positions, a consistent pattern of party support by those who express particular political opinions should also hint at the orientation of the party. I n Slovakia, particular patterns at the mass level allow a re-evaluation of the accusations which fly back and forth at the elite level

Surveys of public opinion taken by the firm FOCUS frequently include a number of questions designed to measure the public understanding of democracy. Among the most suggestive of these is a question which asks respondents to rank their preference fo r two statements: "What is important in politics is patient negotiation" and "What is important in politics is decisiveness and the firm hand of a strong personality"(FOCUS, 1994). In May of 1994, 41% of respondents in Slovakia agreed partially or in full with the first statement while 26% agreed with the second. Among supporters of HZDS, the ratio was reversed: only 30% agreed with patient negotiation while 48% preferred decisiveness and a firm hand. These ratios have remained stable in other surveys taken over a longer period. In thos e surveys, SNS and ZRS showed profiles similar to that of HZDS. Supporters of all other parties were considerably more likely to support patience over decisiveness. The imbalance between the two groups of parties on this question is so significant that HZDS alone attracts thr ee fifths major-party supporters favored "decisiveness and the firm hand of a strong personality." The supporters of HZDS, SNS and ZRS include nearly four fifths of major-party voters who endorsed this position. Although care must be taken with generalizations, the results suggest that those who favor "decisiveness" are almost four times more likely to support one of the parties of the HZDS-led coalition than they are to support all other major parties combined.[end of page 181]

Results on a variety of other questions look quite similar. When asked whether "unity and solidarity" were more important than "plurality of opinion and democracy," HZDS received considerably higher than average preferences for "unity" over "plurali ty." SNS and ZRS again showed similar profiles (FOCUS, 1995, p. 68). HZDS alone captured over half of major party supporters who prefer "unity." The HZDS, SNS and ZRS coalition together attracted three fourths of all such voters. Figures are similar for those who agree that "government should control and direct mass media"(FOCUS, 1995, p. 134). Other questions asked in 1994 lend credence to this profile since HZDS supporters were considerably more likely than supporters of other parties to agree that "the right of the majority to decid e even at the expense of the minority" and that "in the interest of the people a politician can sometimes act contrary to the law"(FOCUS, 1994).

The picture that emerges from these surveys is shows well above average support for HZDS and its coalition partners among those respondents who are more likely to emphasize the importance of action and strength over procedural limitations and less li kely to endorse democracy when it conflicts with other values. Although this group of respondents appears to make up the largest single share of the coalition's supporters, it is also important to note that a significant share of the coalition's supporters fall somewhere in the large middle ground on questions of priorities in a democracy. And a smaller than average but numerically significant share of support for these parties comes from those who believe that democracy ought to be firmly bound by rules and other limitations. The same broad spec trum of opinions about democracy is not apparent among the supporters of SDL, KDH, DU and the parties of the Hungarian coalition. A very small share of their support--from one third to less than one tenth depending on the question and the party--come from those who do not place a high v alue on the limitations imposed by a democratic system. In this sense, then, these parties have a more limited if not numerically smaller base of support with regard to opinions about democracy. Supporters of SDL, KDH, DU and the Hungarian coalition seem to have a considerably lower t olerance for activities which might violate democratic norms.

On this basis it is possible to take another look at the charges of anti-democratic behavior which fly back and forth at the highest levels. A number of Slovak commentators on political matters have long argued that one group of parties--those they label as "non-standard" and which include HZDS, SNS and ZRS--have pursued their own interests while ignoring key rules of the democratic game. In an edited volume entitled Slovakia: Parliamentary Elections 1994. Causes - Consequences - Prospects, these parties are des cribed as employing "a crude majoritarianism following the rule 'the winner takes all'"(Butorova, 1995, p. 138) and "characterized by "a confrontational style of politics, a leader type of organization of the party, and questioning the principles of pluralist democracy"(Szomola nyi, 1995, p. 15). Unfortunately the supporting evidence presented in these articles is rarely strong enough to substantiate these claims, and the articles make little attempt to analyze or refute the counter-charges which are leveled by the accused parties. The term "non-standard" in < i>this context threatens to become only a residual category with negative connotations. At the same time, it does seem clear that the general accusations made against HZDS, ZRS and SNS by these authors and others bear intriguingly close correspondence to the preferences of a large share o f those parties' voters in opinion surveys. Without entering into the battle over specific incidents therefore, it is possible at least to conclude that far the supporters of HZDS, ZRS and SNS are more likely than others to [end of page 182] tolerate party politics which is, in the words of the aforementio ned articles, "confrontational," "majoritarian" rather than "pluralist," and conducted according to the "leader principle."

Before jumping from "non-standard" to the label "authoritarian," which is sometimes used to describe these parties, it is important to note that these descriptions do not conflict with democracy per se but only with certain of the more durable types of democracy. The characteristics noted in HZDS, SNS and ZRS and the preferences of many of their supporters are often also associated with the concept of "populist" democracy, a concept which in its descriptive, if not its normative, sense describes a sub-type of demo cracy. The work of Guillermo O'Donnell on "delegative" democracy provides an even more apt description. By the adjective "delegative" O'Donnell describes "newly installed democracies" which "are democracies, in the sense that they meet Robert Dahl's criteria for the definitio n of polyarchy" but which "are not--nor seem to be moving toward--representative democracy"(O'Donnell, 1992, pp. 1-2, final italics added). These democracies, says O'Donnell, are "grounded on one basic premise: he (or eventually she ...) who wins a presidential ele ction is enabled to govern the country as he sees fit, and to the extent that existing power relations allow, for the term to which he has been elected. The President is the embodiment of the nation and the custodian of the national interest, which it is incumbent upon him to defi ne"(O'Donnell, 1992, pp. 6-7). He notes a number of characteristics including a "strongly majoritarian" impulse and "practically no horizontal accountability" of the president to political institutions or any others (O'Donnell, 1992).

The pattern described by O'Donnell matches quite closely the preferences of a significant share of HZDS supporters, as well as those of SNS and ZRS. The FOCUS survey of May 1994 suggests that those supporters are only slightly less favorable than av erage to "respect for democratic principles"(Krivy, 1994) but that at the same time they are considerably more favorable than average to "unity and solidarity of people," "the firm hand of a strong personality" and the absolute right of the majority. O'Donnell 's characterization likewise corresponds to many of the steps taken by HZDS-led governments including the exclusion of opposition representatives from sensitive committees, transferral of various powers from the president to the government, and the slow response of the government to unfavorable decisions by the Constitutional Court. Since supporters of a delegative type of democracy are several times more likely to vote for HZDS, SNS or ZRS than for other major parties, and since the HZDS-led coalition appears to fit the delegative model more closely than its rivals, the issu e dimension discussed here may well be labeled as a conflict between delegative and representative forms of democracy.

The placement of parties on questions of "democracy" almost perfectly matches their positions on "Slovak" questions. Furthermore, there are intriguing affinities between the notions of the "state-forming nation" and "delegative democracy." Both, in particular, emphasize the rights the a majority within a democracy and define that majority in very basic terms. The basis of the former majority ethnicity and of the latter on election results. In both cases this group is conceived of as the majority rather than one of a multitude of possible [end of page 183] majorities depending on the political question at hand and how it is framed. Furthermore, since the government is chosen by the voice of the people there is little need for accountability to other, rival political institutions which only serve to interfere w ith the carrying out of popular will. Both of these related conceptions have been embraced by the HZDS, SNS and ZRS coalition, each party emphasizing those elements which are most consistent with its position and most appealing to its support base.

Conclusions

As long as Slovakia's political system remains split over issues of the nation and the state, the cohabitation of former communists and conservative Catholics--whether in the opposition or in the government--does not seem as unusual as it otherwise m ight. Likewise more conceivable become coalitions between ecological activists and industrialists, villages and cities, workers and managers, all of which are present in the Slovak political scene.

The ability of national and democratic issue dimensions in Slovakia to cut across all others bears an extremely close resemblance to the three dimensional model introduced by Kitschelt in 1992. Kitschelt notes the need to decide on the players and the rules before playing the game. In Slovakia these questions are not completely undecided--Hungarians are citizens of Slovakia, the political system does reflect democratic principles--but many important decisions associated with these two dimensions are still in flux. Many, in fact, have resurfaced [end of page 184] despite earlier settlements, serving as a reminder of the possibility for reversals in the process of consolidation discussed by Kitschelt and others. Building a new state is a difficult task and these difficulties might be more expected of Slovakia than of its older neighbors. The building of a new state also provides opportunities for those who wish to take advantage of its fragility and uncertainty--even to prolong this period--to build their own political power base. As long as these processes continue in Slovakia it may be that devotees of Marx and those of Mary have more in common than they have in conflict.[end of page 185]

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